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Irish Republicans found themselves at a crisis moment in 1949. Legislation enacted by 
each state on the island affirmed the political reality of Ireland’s partition. The Southern 
state declared an Irish Republic while the Northern state affirmed the continued 
integration of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. The partition of island 
between these two governments was reinforced by the Irish border in the 1950s as it had 
been for the previous three decades. The Irish Republican Army remained committed to 
ending the separation through force while the Northern Ireland security apparatus 
steadfastly safeguarded the realm against any foreign incursion or domestic insurrection. 
Irish Republicanism reorganized and the IRA launched a disastrously planned and under-
resourced Border Campaign between 1956 and 1962. The IRA was fully repelled by the 
Northern security forces: the Royal Ulster Constabulary supported by the Special 
Constabulary with security assistance from the governments in Belfast, London and, 
eventually, Dublin. The militant aspect was accompanied by political measures that 
reaped electoral gains and signs of public support peaking in the mid-1950s before a clear 
repudiation of the movement by the end of the decade. By the start of the 1960s, the IRA 
had been defeated and Irish Republicanism was reeling, unsure of its future political 
vitality and social relevance. Northern Ireland and the Irish border was more secure than 
at any point in its previous 40 years of existing, ruled by a strong, confident British 
Unionist hegemony. For Irish Republicans living on the frontier of the Northern Ireland 
state, new modes of political thinking and confrontational actions with the state had been 
attempted and ultimately abandoned. This project examines the main dynamics at play 
along the Irish border between 1949 and 1961. Focus will be on the Sinn Féin, the IRA 
and Liam Kelly’s Republican splinter group Saor Uladh, the RUC, B-Specials and 
militant-political Unionism, and the role of governments in Belfast, Dublin and London 
during the costly decade of the 1950s. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
There are a small number of language items I would like to speak to at the outset 
of this work. The language of a quote has been maintained, even if names have multiple 
spellings or minor annotation errors, as in the Gardaí recording of Joseph McGurk 
“Joseph McGuirk.” I have left intact the more common Anglo-Hiberno English spellings 
in quotations, for example “colour” over “color,” but use the American English spellings 
more generally throughout the text.  
I have also attempted to best mirror the language used of the individuals being 
surveyed. Chapter One will feature numerous references to “the North” from Republicans 
based in the Republic of Ireland not wishing to use the full name of Northern Ireland. 
That term is occasional replicated instead of Northern Ireland for text flow. In Chapter 
Two, where the focal point is the Northern Ireland security forces, terms like “the United 
Kingdom” are used more commonly. This is a purposeful intent to ground each chapter in 
the mindset and worldviews of the people aiming to destroy the Irish border and those 
people dedicated to defending it.  
Place names in Ireland also can be sources of dispute. Like countless historians of 
the region before me, I paused and gave considerable thought to the name of 
Derry~Londonderry. Beyond the convention mentioned already from chapter to chapter, I 
more broadly tried to be sympathetic to majority opinion: County Londonderry still holds 
a majority population of those most identified with the state’s official designation, while 
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the metropolis Derry City has a majority population - and since 1984 a distinct council 
name – favoring a name comparable to its Irish language origin, Doire. I hope the 
inclusion of both, and the deference at times to one or the other, does not offend.  
Chapter Three, mainly on the border Republican figure Liam Kelly, features a 
number of Irish language references. As Kelly and others nearly exclusively used the 
Irish names Saor Uladh and Fianna Uladh for his political and militant organizations, 
they are exclusively used throughout without translation or italics (as above). Kelly 
himself gaelicized his own name at times throughout his adult life, notably in official 
capacities in Seanad Éireann where he is recorded as “Liam Ó Ceallaigh.” For 
consistency, he is always called by the anglicized-version of his name, Liam Kelly, here. 
For any other widely used Irish words, from political parties to institutional names, 
attempts have been made to accurately render the names at all times with spellings and 
accent marks. 
 
 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This year marks one-hundred years of the Irish border’s existence. Arguably, in 
no other era has it been under more international scrutiny. The contemporary border 
debate centers on the future dynamics between Ireland, Britain and Europe. The British 
withdrawal from the European Union has facilitated the re-emergence of the ‘Irish 
Question’ in the British political discourse. Slicing across the island of Ireland for just 
under 500 kilometers, the Irish border is the United Kingdom’s only land boundary. The 
ill-defined partition has even more poorly defensed barriers with an EU member state: the 
Republic of Ireland. While the two governments on the island of Ireland have never 
worked more closely together than the present-day, it is the relationship with Northern 
Ireland and the government of Great Britain that has never been more strained. Where 
one-hundred years ago the preservation of Britain’s ties to Ireland satisfied notions of 
British grandeur, today the arrangement seems out of line with contemporary nationalist 
sentiments. Conversely, as all-island collaboration has increased in recent decades one 
wonders why two governments persist on a small island on the periphery of Europe. 
What political dynamics continue to facilitate the need for a division of two governments 
in Ireland, and how did the Irish border come to define nationalism for both Irish 
Unionists and Irish Nationalists? 
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The answers, like many contemporary political issues, rely on the historical 
memory of a place. The Irish border was created as a political solution that sufficiently 
satisfied neither of the government’s situation on each side of it, yet it came to be a 
defining characteristic of 20th century Irish politics. While the issue was settled one-
hundred years ago, the aversion of war has not necessarily meant peace for those living 
along Ireland’s line of partition. 
While the two modern Irish states trace their origins to the Government of Ireland 
Act (1920) and the Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921), defining legislation occurred mid-century. 
The year 1949 was a watershed moment as two pieces of legislation on each side of the 
Irish border laid the groundwork for security and militancy in the decade to follow. The 
Republic of Ireland Act, written in 1948 but taking effect in April of 1949, altered the 
status of Ireland as a nation apart from the British Commonwealth. Subsequently, 
Westminster passed the Ireland Act (1949) which copper-fastened Northern Ireland to the 
United Kingdom. The Union was preserved, strengthened and assured for the future. 
 For Irish Republicans, long looking to end partition, this signaled a crisis. These 
motions by the two governments on the island of Ireland bolstered their governance and 
legitimacy while reinforcing partition, something that forced militant Irish republicanism 
to act. The Irish Republican Army (IRA), despite being institutionally unsound still after 
the trauma of Second World War-era internment, and its politically stunted affiliate Sinn 
Féin, would spring into action in an attempt to forcefully end the partitioning of Ireland. 
While the initial intent was to destroy the border by force, at decade’s close the initiative 
had the inverse effect of strengthening the defense and giving the Northern Ireland 
security apparatus reason to exist, increase and engage in ‘counter-terrorism.’  
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Northern Ireland was born into conflict, as the Anglo-Irish War and IRA action of 
the 1920s precipitated a response from the Unionist, mainly Protestant Irish population of 
Ulster to separate from the Southern-based Nationalist movement. When two-thirds of 
the province of Ulster created a separate political entity from the remainder of the island, 
further vigilance was needed to defend against – perceived – disloyal, mainly Catholic 
Irish subversives within the newly laid down border. The period from 1925, when the 
Boundary Commission report was abandoned by both governments, through the outbreak 
of the Troubles around 1968 is seen to be quiet, unspectacular even. This project 
resoundingly challenges that narrative of the 1950s as a ‘lost decade,’ instead asserting it 
as a crucial period for state solidification in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.  
The 1950s, far from a tranquil and unremarkable time, was one of intense political 
discernment and opportunity. While the IRA attempted to seize the opportunity to force 
the end of partition, it failed militarily to mobilize the Northern Catholic population. It 
alienated one significant movement in Mid-Ulster among Catholic nationalists, and 
rejected a series of policies that could have revolutionized the fledgling republican 
political-military dual thrust. It was during the 1950s that the Irish border was made more 
defensible by the Northern Ireland security forces. While the border was created in the 
1920s and plunged into international headlines by the 1970s, it became an armed, volatile 
battle ground in the late 1950s because of IRA incursions. The Northern security forces 
were able to bolster their Unionist “no surrender” ethos while affirming the safety of the 
United Kingdom’s frontier in a shrinking British empire. As empire receded, the 
domestic kingdom’s defense hinged on the border between Tyrone and Monaghan, 
Fermanagh and Cavan. The response by the RUC, supported by the Ulster Special 
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Constabulary, was definite: Ulster would stand against the existential threat posed by 
Irish republican extremism and emerge stronger than ever before as defenders of the state 
against subversion, peaceful or militant.  
By 1962, the Irish Republican Army was defeated. As Sinn Féin reeled and 
smaller Republican political parties collapsed, the cause of anti-partitionist 
Republicanism was set back immensely. Leading figures immigrated, grassroots support 
in the North was non-existent and the Irish border was better defended than ever before. 
Securing the border had rallied Unionist support in the state, and anti-partition rhetoric 
was dealt a silencing blow. As the 1960 progressed, Fianna Fáil – the Republic of 
Ireland’s “Republican Party” – sought to improve north-south cooperation as typified by 
the meetings between Sean Lemass and Terence O’Neill. The border was firmly secure, 
and endorsed by both governments in policy and practice.  
Northern Ireland’s traditional narrative centers on the relative calm from state 
formation, around 1920 until the outbreak of the Troubles, a neat period of 50 years. 
However, this overly simplistic rendering of events, particularly along the border, 
overlooks broad public unrest and simmering resentments by the minority community. 
Traditionally it is written that the new Unionist political-economic hegemony created 
stability in the early interwar years and aided in defense of the realm as the 1930s closed. 
Northern Ireland, ever affirming its place in the Union, would prove its loyalty during the 
Second World War. Belfast, as a ship-building and ammunitions producing site, gained 
the attention of the Luftwaffe during the “Bombing of Britain (and Ireland)” beginning in 
1941. Northern Ireland had been led since its birth by the steady hand of James Craig, or 
Lord Craigavon; the successor after his death in 1940 was the ineffectual John Andrews. 
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Andrews was swiftly replaced in 1943 by the stately Basil Brooke, Lord Brookeborough, 
who refreshed a stale Unionist administration that was ill-equipped to respond to the Nazi 
blitzes of April and May 1940.1 Brookeborough would stay atop the Unionist state in a 
patrician and paternalistic manner beyond the Second World War and until his 
resignation in 1963 for health reasons. Northern Ireland remained conservative and 
insular during his two decades in power. As his tenure ended, Brookeborough cautioned 
against reforms and North-South collaboration, which his successor Terence O’Neill 
swiftly ignored. By the late 1960s, reform attempts had raised the concerns of Unionists 
and failed to placate Nationalists. As the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association and 
People’s Democracy pushed the issue by 1968, volatility spilled over. The Belfast to 
Derry march in January 1969 resulted in a loyalist mob – featuring some members of the 
Northern security forces – attacking marchers at Burntollet Bridge. The fuse that would 
become the Troubles had been lit, and it would be three decades before a cessation of 
hostilities in the region. 
Yet, this narrative is far too simplistic. Falling between the Belfast blitz and 
Burntollet Bridge is an often over-looked period of Irish history. Northern Ireland’s 
century of existence featured devotion to armed service in two major conflicts on the 
continent2 before the descent into a bloody internal strife. This time of perceived 
tranquility occurring between the Second World War and the outbreak of the Troubles 
actually contains significant conflict and broader political developments. The relative 
                                                        
1 Phillip Ollerenshaw, “Neutrality and Belligerence: Ireland, 1939-1945” from Thomas Bartlett, ed., 
Cambridge History of Ireland, Vol. IV, 1880 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2018), 356 and Jonathan Bardon, A History of Ulster (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press, 2001), 553. 
2 While the First World War ended in November of 1918, many of the security personnel who would 
join the RUC and the Special Constabulary in the 1920s had been connected to that conflict, like Basil 
Brooke, or even previous military service to Great Britain, like James Craig, veteran of the Boer War. 
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calm of the 1950s is misleading; beneath the surface, and rising from south of the Irish 
border, Irish Republicanism was attempting to mobilize political and militant means to 
destabilize the state of Norther Ireland. Conflict continued as an underling, but near 
constant, threat along the Irish border from 1954 through the formal IRA ceasefire. This 
tension was fueled by Republican politics new and old and was directly the result of 
engagements between armed Irish Republican insurgency and the counter-insurgency 
efforts by the Northern Irish security forces. By the 1960s, one entity emerged 
irrevocably damaged while the other was elevated to a place of supremacy.  
Ultimately, the revised narrative matters because it illuminates the linkage 
between past and present that has traditionally been neglected. The 1950s should not be 
the Second World War’s post-script or the Troubles’ harbinger; it is an immensely 
important stand-alone era for the solidification of the Irish border that occurred from the 
Border Campaign and its contrasting repercussions on the IRA and the RUC. They can 
stand alone as a period of intense pressure from each side of the border creating new 
dynamics that are still being reckoned with today.  
 
State of the field 
In twentieth-century Irish history, the 1950s persist as a relative blind-spot. In 
both Irish and British histories of the modern period, it is an era characterized by high 
immigration, poor economics, and political and social conservatism. Yet, this should not 
be surprising given the way the decade was viewed during the time of “the vanishing 
Irish.” It was in 1953 that John O’Brien published an edited volume under that title 
advancing the theory that Ireland’s population had undergone unbroken decline since the 
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Famine.3 Dermot Keogh would transfer a dozen essays from an early 2000s academic 
conference on the 1950s, the “lost decade,” and produce another edited source addressing 
the legions who emigrated, “enforced departure,” because their young state could not 
provide jobs, education and economic stability.4 The collection of essays covers politics 
and culture, but is grounded in the widespread despair as the economy sputtered through 
the decade: amidst stagnation (unparralled in the developed Western world at the time) 
the state’s population fell under 3 million, its lowest since the late 18th century.5 
R.F. Foster’s Modern Ireland handles the 1950s as a time that laid crucial 
political ground-work for 1960s economic advancement and exposure to the wider 
world.6 For a British-centric narrative, Peter Clarke’s Hope and Glory chronicles 
developments in Ireland from Home Rule to partition, but admittedly forgets the Irish 
question for the next half century until the outbreak of the Troubles.7 Accurate for its 
stated scope, this would parallel the general indifference to Northern Ireland felt amongst 
the British public when television brought the late 1960s turmoil in Derry and Belfast 
into London and Manchester homes.8 Many Northern Irish observers advance the two 
community narratives that anchor the sectarian divide in society. Michael Farrell’s The 
                                                        
3 Dermot Keough, “Introduction: The Vanishing Irish,” in The Lost Decade: Ireland in the 1950s, eds. 
Dermot Keogh, Finbarr O’Shea, Carmel Quinlan (Douglas Village, Cork: Mercier, 2004), 17. 
4 Keough, “Introduction: The Vanishing Irish,” 13. 
5 “The 1950s stand out as the highest decade of emigration in absolute and relative terms since the 
1880s, as approximately one in eight of the population would leave during the decade. The state’s 
population had shrunk to an all-time low of 2.8 million people. From Gerry O’Hanlon, “Population 
Change in the 1950s: A Statistical Review,” in The Lost Decade: Ireland in the 1950s, eds. Dermot 
Keogh, Finbarr O’Shea, Carmel Quinlan (Douglas Village, Cork: Mercier, 2004), 74. 
6 R.F. Foster, Modern Ireland 1600-1972 (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 580-581. 
7 Peter Clarke, Hope and Glory, Britain 1900-2000, (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 340. 
8 Robert Savage, The BBC's 'Irish Troubles': Television, Conflict and Northern Ireland (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2015), 51-53. Savage writes how television images, particularly filmed 
by RTE and the BBC, entered thousands of British homes and led to “acute distress” for London, 
Belfast and Dublin. Additionally, the three main American networks, CBS, NBC, ABC, increased their 
coverage in 1969 comparing the disturbances to civil rights protests in the American South.  
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Orange State combatively cites the failings of the Unionist socio-political mechanism at 
addressing Catholic grievances in the province while traditionalist historians like 
Jonathan Bardon, A History of Ulster, promotes the state’s steady loyalism and higher 
standard of living compared to its southern neighbor.9 The adversarial nature of these two 
histories fits the broader communal narrative of justifying self-perseverance and 
resistance. 
The existing academic research that examines the period often casts it 
comparatively among other eras, assessing it as part of broader trends. Often the early 
Republic (1949-1960s) is characterized as maintaining the insular and failing policies of 
the Free State and on the cusp of national maturity in economic policy re-orientation. The 
history of Northern Ireland focuses on the state’s creation directly following the First 
World War and often sees the 1950s as stirrings of the Civil Rights movement that led in 
to the Troubles. More interestingly, the Second World War casts a long shadow over 
Northern Ireland, with many historians emphasizing the stability and elevating social 
standards of the welfare state into the 1950s era. Histories that are backwards looking 
from the turmoil of the late 1960s then relegate the early part of that decade to missed 
opportunities for diverging catastrophe. 
A significant body of literature assessing the radical physical force Irish 
Republican element gives substantial insights into a central component of border conflict 
during the 1950s. The periodization of these studies generally exist in relation to the Irish 
                                                        
9 Alvin Jackson, Ireland 1798-1998: War, Peace and Beyond (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 352. 
Jackson writes that the 1946 decision to extend the welfare state social services to Northern Ireland 
aided Unionists in bolstering partition and “tranquilizing possibly restless Protestant voters” while 
also appealing to Catholics by “killing Northern nationalism by kindness.”  
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War of Independence and the Troubles; substantial histories survey the “Old IRA” flying 
columns of the crucial 1919-1921 era and dozens assess the “Provos” that emerged from 
the ashes of 1969.  Richard English’s history of the Irish Republican Army surveys the 
movement from the late 19th century until the birth of the modern Provisional 
movement.10 His attention to detail is exquisite, yet only a small fraction of his massive 
work examines the IRA of the 1950s. English’s assessment of the IRA reeling from the 
failed efforts during the Second World War is that they pale in comparison to the 
organization that emerged by the outbreak of the Troubles; he mostly speaks of the 1950s 
Border Campaign in the context of a training ground, militarily and politically, for future 
Provisional IRA leaders. English reaches the conclusion that despite the failings of the 
IRA’s border campaign (1956-1962), neither the organization nor its mission should be 
discounted as trivial.11 Two other surveys of 20th century conflict in Ireland – Henry 
Patterson’s Ireland Since 1939, The Persistence of Conflict and Matt Treacy’s – The IRA 
1956–69: Rethinking the Republic – more appropriately address the Border Campaign in 
the wider context of physical force Republicanism. 
Barry Flynn’s Soldiers of Folly accepts the campaign as farce narrative and paints 
an elaborate picture of misguided intentions and poor planning in the IRA. Within one 
year of launching the campaign, the IRA would take substantial losses militarily and 
publicly and the effort was “floundering due to its poor planning and lack of 
professionalism.”12 In a post-mortem to the 1962 IRA ceasefire that blames the 
                                                        
10 Richard English, Armed Struggle, The History of the IRA (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1-
4. 
11 English, Armed Struggle 76. 
12 Barry Flynn, Soldiers of Folly: the IRA Border Campaign, 1956-1962 (Cork: Collins, 2009), 95. 
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indifference of the Irish public as much as the military failings, Flynn believes that “[f]or 
the IRA, it was a time to reflect and to face the reality of a changing world.”13 Well 
researched and brutally honest, Flynn’s book analyzes the IRA narrowly with only 
passing mention to the wider political and security climate in Northern Ireland prior to 
and after the abortive operation.  
Some even-handed histories of 1950s Northern Ireland emphasize the IRA threat 
among other mundane details of the province. Marc Mulholland’s Northern Ireland: A 
Very Short Introduction points to a “low ebb” in 1960s armed republicanism as the failed 
1956 campaign resulted “due to the lethargy of the nationalist people.”14 Under new[ish] 
leadership spearheaded by Cathal Goulding, then, they made a leftist turn slowly towards 
a socialist agenda. Particularly citing the physical force Republicanism of the PIRA, 
Mulholland traces their mandate to the ‘virtual republic’ created out of the IRB’s 1867 
Constitution granting rights over an “absolute national independence, and a permanent 
Republican Government.”15 While the IRA of the 1950s aimed to emulate the IRA of the 
Anglo-Irish War, they miscalculated the tactics that brought Britain to the table.16 Lastly, 
it appears the IRA won its first war (the Anglo-Irish War or the War of Independence) 
then was defeated shortly after by former members of its organization that had moved 
over to the Free State forces: “the IRA lost the civil war, but maintained itself in 
                                                        
13 Flynn, Soldiers of Folly, 203. 
14 Mulholland, Marc. Northern Ireland: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002, 63. 
15 Mulholland, Northern Ireland, 66. 
16 Soldiers of the Republic “hoped to validate their shadow state by replicating in miniature norms of 
soldiering. Indeed, it was large-scale confrontations (the Kilmichael ambush, the assault on Dublin 
Customs House) that helped create an environment in which the British government persuaded itself 
that it was valid to negotiate with representatives of gunmen.” From Mulholland, Northern Ireland, 
68. 
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existence as representatives of the Republic.”17 Mulholland’s history defines the 1950s 
IRA little more than a cheap imitation of prior generations. 
British histories regard Ireland as a land plagued by periodic internal strife 
(“ancient enemies”18), and Northern Ireland more often is treated as a partially-integrated 
rather than an integral part of a United Kingdom. Peter Clarke’s magnificently written 
history Hope and Glory, Britain 1900-2000 tends to the political and economic with 
substantial attention to cultural and social developments. Broadly, his history identifies 
Ireland as an impediment to the politics and drain on economics with minimal cultural or 
social contribution. Questioning the notion of a national history of Britain, he develops a 
“clear political rift” between Southern-centric Catholics and Northern-centric Protestants 
in Ireland around 1900 that led to the border in 1920 “no neat and permanent, still less 
preordained, solution to the Irish question” and its ripples on the rest of the “British 
nation,” though doubtfully one exists.19 Clarke’s mention of Ireland’s place in the 
broader British sphere of influence in the opening decades of the 20th century gives way 
to little mention of either the quite separate southern Free State – understandably, 
“Ireland went its own way in 1918” - and the devolved, equally detached Northern 
Stormont regime: “This suited the Protestants of Ulster...” whom the Tories, ruling for 
nearly all of the mid-20th century, left “to rule the roost in their own backyard, with no 
awkward questions asked.”20 When signs of conflict emerge with O’Neill reforms and 
                                                        
17 Mulholland, Northern Ireland, 69. 
18 Clarke, Hope and Glory, 436. 
19 Clarke, Hope and Glory, 1-2. Clarke acknowledges the centrality of English history in his British 
story, yet he states: “this volume does not, I trust, show itself oblivious of their very existence 
[Scottish, Welsh and Irish nationalisms] and it acknowledges that the term Britons is problematic...”  
20 Clarke, Hope and Glory, 98-110, 340. Focusing on David Lloyd George, Ireland’s war, armistice and 
partitioning is dealt with in the context of the brilliant diplomacy of the Welsh Wizard whose 
strength and prestige after World War I was unrivalled in British political history. 
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Civil Rights protests, Clarke again casts the Troubles as an internal grievance with 
Britain as a forced mediator. Clarke’s inattention is emblematic of British perspectives 
towards the island of Ireland during the 1950s. Northern Ireland’s population was always 
well under 5% of the total United Kingdom population, and most British histories reflect 
the province’s relative isolation in mainstream British history. After half a century of 
laying dormant, “the old quarrel about Ulster” re-emerges amidst debates about British 
integration into the European economic market, drawing British attention inward as it 
looked outward.21 Clarke frames Northern Ireland in a purely political context, Labour’s 
frustration with the impervious working classes split along sectarian lines and the 
Conservative’s long-standing allies in Unionism. He glosses over much of the causes of 
Catholic unrest, alluding to the justification of their grievances – calling Stormont’s fifty 
years a “failed experiment” - without many specifics, despite giving great deal to a 
myriad of other strands within the wider history of the United Kingdom.  
If British historians of the 20th century have cast Northern Ireland and the border 
in the context of foreign politics and a committed military force to quell an ancient 
‘internal squabble,’ Irish historians generally integrate Northern Ireland more seamlessly 
into an island-wide history. Contrasts are drawn between Southern and Northern states of 
being and states of mind, often predating the boundary laid down in 1920. Cultural non-
congruencies around religion, language, traditions and venerations underpin the historical 
divergence in armed conflicts. Differences abound between North and South during 
Ireland’s War of Independence (or the Anglo-Irish War) as well as the Emergency (or the 
Second World War) and continue into the second half of the 20th century where 
                                                        
21 Clarke, Hope and Glory, 340. 
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modernity draws each state apart before a convergence around the millennium. This is 
well-captured in the recent publication (2018) of The Cambridge History of Ireland, 
Volume IV when Eunan O’Haplin’s culminating chapter emphasizes the ‘two Irelands’ of 
post-1921 with a particular divergent eye on very different post-1945 realities in 
governance and social fabric.22 Second World War neutrality exacerbated the north-south 
divide and isolate the southern state from the institutions of post-war Allied economic 
policy. Brian Girvin’s analysis in “Stability, crisis and change in post-war Ireland 1945-
1973,” focuses on the political-economic drive towards European integration and true 
20th century modernity. As Henry Patterson points out, the early years of the Republic 
were disastrous economically and demographically. Yet the Republic would resolve its 
crisis around the time civil disturbance in Northern Ireland commenced. As the conflict 
dragged on, “the Republic’s post-1959 economic transformation and its associated 
membership in the EEC made it increasingly attractive as a partner, junior or otherwise, 
in Britain’s search for a solution in Northern Ireland.”23  
While British observers paid little heed to Northern Ireland between the 1920s 
and 1970s, a number of Northern-born historians have attempted to explain the conflict 
from a communal perspective. Bringing a critical light to the frequent assertion that the 
Northern Ireland state unjustly neglected its Catholic population, Jonathan Bardon’s A 
History of Ulster surveys the province stuck between Ireland and Britain, and of unique 
                                                        
22 Eunan O’Halpin, “Endword: Ireland Looking Outwards, 1880–2016” in Cambridge History of 
Ireland, Vol. IV, 1880 to the Present, ed. Thomas Barlett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2018), 836. O’Halpin summarizes: “[p]rosperity and a dilution of dependency on the United Kingdom 
came not through political and economic isolationism, but through trade and international 
cooperation from the late 1950s onward. Independent Ireland could make choices which radically 
altered her economic fortunes; Northern Ireland could not.” 
23 Patterson, Henry, Ireland Since 1939: The Persistence of Conflict (New York: Penguin Group, 2006), 
xiii. 
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character to both. Bardon, although Dublin-born, weaves a historical narrative 
sympathetic to the Unionist perspective on the mid-20th century and reflects his 
experience of public history in Belfast. By positioning the province outside of Ireland, he 
exoticizes it and enhances the notion that the state formed by partition had long existed as 
a cultural and political separate entity. Of the experience of the Second World War, 
Bardon writes that the two Ireland’s grew farther apart and that 1945 marked the dawn of 
“the most peaceful, hopeful and progressive period the province was to enjoy in the 
twentieth century.”24 Alvin Jackson calls Northern Ireland’s history a compressed version 
of Ireland from 1700-1900: Stormont was merely a rebirth of the Ascendency parliament 
pre-Act of Union.25 Jackson casts militant republicanism along the Irish border in the 
context of failed politics. Anti-partition political disappointment leads to the rise of Liam 
Kelly’s Saor Uladh and border provincialism, albeit however short-lived. While the IRA 
campaign was easily defeated, Jackson does elevate its importance for mobilizing 
hundreds of IRA volunteers and thousands of security forces while “heighten[ing] the 
defensiveness of all aspects of Unionism” reinforcing each side of the community’s 
populist and sectarian leanings.26 Challenging Unionist apologists, Henry Patterson 
writes that the Stormont regime did practice structural discrimination; however, the 
extent and intensity of discrimination pre-Troubles as well as state’s culpability in local 
and central levels has been at times exaggerated to fit Nationalist narratives and the 
justification of Republican armed resistance. Still, the Northern-born Patterson, lecturing 
at the University of Ulster, writes that “what cannot be denied was the incapacity of the 
                                                        
24 Bardon, A History of Ulster, 586. 
25 Jackson, Ireland 1798-1998, 331. 
26 Jackson, Ireland 1798-1998, 354. 
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Stormont regime to provide an opportunity for Catholics to feel themselves as a respected 
and valued part of the community.”27 Unionists valued too greatly the material 
advantages to UK membership in the 1950s and 1960s compared to their southern 
counterpart as an excuse for maintaining a discriminatory state. 
One of the stated aims of Michael Farrell’s Northern Ireland: The Orange State is 
to fill gaps in the literature of the conflict in Northern Ireland.28 This is noteworthy as 
Farrell first published his well-known account in 1976, still in the first third of what 
would be a thirty-year conflict. By the mid-1970s, Farrell believed, the growing body of 
work had overwhelmingly viewed the Northern Irish situation from the events of 1968 
onward; this “Troubles onward” lens led to confusion that he wished to clear up. The 
author was a direct participant in many of the events of the early Troubles, himself a 
Northern-born Catholic graduating from Queen’s University Belfast before becoming a 
founding member of People’s Democracy in the late 1960s.29 Farrell neither attempts to 
hide this bias or justify it; his central place in the turbulence of Northern Ireland adds to 
his narrative history of the “Orange State,” which he defines as a “rigidly repressive 
police regime” ruled by a Unionist hegemony.30 With his political-focus, Farrell 
chronicles conventional politics – the Anti-Partition League – as well as politics taken to 
the streets – pre-Civil Rights agitation – and armed conflict.  
For assessing the security dimension of Northern Ireland, there does exist some 
literature analyzing policing and security. However, most recent publications focus on the 
                                                        
27 Patterson, Ireland Since 1939, xv. 
28 Farrell, Michael. Northern Ireland: The Orange State. London: Pluto Press, 1992, 12. 
29 Colm Keena, “Hunger Striker Turned Lawyer in Long-Time Fight for Social Justice.” The Irish Times, 
January 15, 2016.  
30 Farrell, The Orange State, 328. 
 16 
period 1968 until 1998 and give little background to the RUC during the 1950s. These 
studies fit into the wider study of terrorism and guerrilla warfare, particularly in a post-
colonial and Cold War context. Unlike histories of Latin American and Middle Eastern 
studies, however, Northern Ireland is unique as a Western European conflict zone lasting 
a significant duration.31 In examining the terrorism and counter-terrorism efforts in 
Northern Ireland, these histories center on the security forces: the British military, MI5, 
the Royal Ulster Constabulary and even Irish security forces. Gordon Clubb’s Social 
Movement De-Radicalisation and the Decline of Terrorism, James Dingley’s Combatting 
Terrorism in Northern Ireland and William Matchett’s Secret Victory examine how the 
security forces countered the IRA. The most comprehensive examination of the RUC is 
Neil Southern’s Policing and Combating Terrorism in Northern Ireland, but this is still 
only a surface level view of the force before the Troubles. Similar to Unionist-
sympathetic studies, these accounts focus on the communal tranquility preceding the 
Troubles and tend to mitigate Catholic grievances while emphasizing the order of Ulster 
society regulated on seemingly logical, and unavoidable sectarian lines.  
In summary, a number of trends emerge from the present state of the field. From 
an analysis of dozens of histories, Ireland’s experience in a post-colonial context is 
foundational to the political dilemmas of both states: the Free State/Republic of Ireland 
and Northern Ireland. The militarization of the Irish border would occur during the 
middle of the twentieth-century in a way that had not been seen before. Furthermore, 
many histories stress economic limitations and developments without delving in to the 
ground-level impact on the citizenry, particularly along the border. Post-Second World 
                                                        
31 In Europe, the Balkans conflict on the 1990s also drew international attention. 
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War decolonization across the British Empire and Cold War polarization greater 
emphasized Northern Ireland’s place in a United Kingdom, yet how did disenfranchised 
Catholics assess this new dynamic? When the Republic of Ireland formally self-declared 
in 1949, a declaration of departure was made from Britain as Northern Ireland was 
copper-fastened to Great Britain: how did this rupture create ripples across the next 
decade? The border became the focal point of both states for an intense, albeit short, 
period of conflict driven by physical force republicans attempting to destabilize the state 
of Northern Ireland. They forced a security response that not only reinforced the border 
but solidified its place of prominence as a line of division. What truths can be gained 
from this period, and what conclusions have perhaps been overlooked? 
 
Methodology 
This project examines the main dynamics along the Irish border between 1949 
and 1962. Focus is on the IRA and Republican splinter group Saor Uladh led by Liam 
Kelly, the RUC and militant-political Unionism and the role of governments in Belfast, 
Dublin and London. This thesis will examine the Irish border in three components. First, 
the state of Irish Republican resistance between the Second World War and the IRA 
ceasefire to its Operation Harvest. A short 20th century background is given to the 
ideology before a generally chronological history unfolds. The core of the analysis comes 
from Gardaí police records on Republican commemorations from the early 1940s to the 
end of the 1950s. Secondly, the focus shifts to the security forces of Northern Ireland 
who are tasked with defending the state and safeguarding the border. In similar fashion, 
there is a brief history of Ulster’s distinct regional history from the 19th century to the 
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formation of the state, and then there is a chronological history to the IRA’s Border 
Campaign. Newspaper reporting and government documents from the 1950s and early 
1960s are the primary source that grant some insight in to the otherwise private dealings 
of the Northern security apparatus Thirdly, the last state observed is an alternate view of 
Republicanism from within Northern Ireland: Liam Kelly’s brand of border 
Republicanism. This chapter moves between Kelly’s life and events on the ground in 
Ireland. A number of sources on Liam Kelly held at the Public Record Office of Northern 
Ireland in Belfast are utilized here, including a previously classified folder compiled by 
the Inspector-General of the RUC. The chapter maintains a chronological pace, but also 
moves between wider events and the experiences of Kelly as a 1950s case study.  
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CHAPTER ONE, THE SOUTHERN STATE 
 
1.0: Republican threats to the border 
One hundred kilometers south from where the Irish border separates Armagh 
from Monaghan is the resting place for the father of Irish Republicanism. Theobald 
Wolfe Tone lies in the clay at Bodenstown in County Kildare, just west of Dublin. Tone 
had dedicated his adult life to the cause of Irish freedom, gathering support and taking on 
a foreign power on Irish shores in the failed 1798 United Irishmen revolt. The rebellion 
drew from Catholic and Protestant ranks particularly heavily in greater Belfast’s large 
Presbyterian population in, what is now, Northern Ireland. Tone rallied others, 
spearheaded a mass moment, launched the insurrection and was apprehended before the 
upper hand could be won. More Irish revolutionaries would follow a familiar formula, 
spilling rebel blood and creating Fenian dead.1
1 During the 20th century, the annual Wolfe Tone commemoration became a 
ritualized Republican event meant to revitalize the movement, signal ideological 
evolutions and allow its leadership to gauge public support. Simultaneously, the security 
                                                        
1 This reference to Patrick Pearse’s well-known line from the 1915 graveside oration over Jeremiah 
O’Donovan Rossa (“but the fools, the fools, the fools! — they have left us our Fenian dead, and while 
Ireland holds these graves, Ireland unfree shall never be at peace.”) takes into account that many self-
identifying Republicans would not fall into the narrower category of “Fenians,” particularly the 
United Irishmen of 1798 and Young Irelanders of 1848. Still, Pearse’s role in 1916 and his oration a 
year prior at the grave of an IRB founder linked 19th century and 20th century “blood sacrifice.” From 
R.F. Foster, Vivid Faces: The Revolutionary Generation in Ireland, 1890-1923 (New York: W.W. Norton, 
2015), 215. 
 20 
forces in Dublin and Belfast2 took notice and viewed it as a vehicle for physical force 
Republicanism’s intent and intensity.  
 As was customary for the third Sunday in June, the crowd of Republicans and 
Republican-sympathizers had gathered at Sallins field in rural Kildare on the 21st of June, 
1959. The traditions of the march, with organizations like Sinn Féin  and Cumann na 
mBan marked out by signs and accompanied by seven bands and a color guard, had 
changed little over that decade.3 But this year, more than previous ones, marked a vital 
moment in Irish Republicanism: the IRA’s Operation Harvest, its border campaign to 
defeat the Northern Ireland state, had been going on for two and a half years. It was 
faltering. Public support peaked in 1957 after an IRA loss of life and gain of temporary 
electoral strength for Sinn Féin. Commemoration literature (see Figure 1.1) connected the 
blood sacrifice made by IRA men in the Border Campaign to the historic struggle. The 
year 1959 was the twilight of that campaign, as the internment policies of both 
governments North and South of the Irish border had decimated the IRA and destroyed 
public faith in the movement. In this context, the IRA’s Chief of Staff was selected to be 
the keynote speaker overlooking Tone’s grave.4 After the standard rituals of wreath-
laying, Ruairí Ó Brádaigh’s voice rang out the oration to nearly 3,500 spectators. He 
                                                        
2 The RUC was aware of Irish Republican public events, especially from the early 1950s through the 
Border Campaign. It is apparent that intelligence relating to at least Seán MacBride and Liam Kelly 
was being passed to the RUC Inspector General at Waring Street, Belfast. From typescript of RUC 
report “LIAM KELLY AND SAOR ULADH,” HA/32/1/955A, 2-3, Public Record Office Northern Ireland, 
Belfast, Northern Ireland. 
3 Typescript of “I.R.A. Commemoration Ceremony at Bodenstown on 21st, June, 1959,” 1, Garda 
report on 1959 Wolfe Tone Commemoration, JUS/8/900, National Archives of Ireland, Dublin, 
Ireland. 
4 The selection process was loosely defined, but usually was a collaboration between the two most 
prominent Republican organizations, the Sinn Féin Ard Chomhairle and the IRA Amy Council. From 
Robert White, Ruairí Ó Brádaigh: The Life and Politics of an Irish Revolutionary (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2006), 90. 
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connected the Easter Proclamation to the current IRA campaign saying “[the ideals] had 
been carried on by the men of 1916 and again 2½ years ago another blow had been struck 
for Irish Freedom” and despite internment in the South “the fight for Irish freedom must 
go on and if we made a concentrated effort now we would achieve that freedom, for 
which Tone lived and died.”5 
 
Figure 1.1: Pamphlet of “Seachtain Bhulf Tone – Wolfe Tone Week,” cover (1), 2, Garda 
report on 1957 Wolfe Tone Commemoration, JUS/8/900, National Archives of Ireland, 
Dublin, Ireland. 
 
                                                        
5 Typescript of “I.R.A. Commemoration Ceremony at Bodenstown on 21st, June, 1959,” 3, JUS/8/900, 
NAI. 
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That event’s Garda report stated that the speech contained little of a seditious 
nature and was relatively mild, however spirited it may have been. Tellingly for the 
Republican movement, the same security force report also gave full names and addresses 
for nearly all major Republicans involved in the march, from known IRA man O 
Brádaigh through to identifiable figures forming the color party. So thorough had the 
Southern security forces infiltrated the organization that they paid little heed to the fact 
that a letter from Crumlin Road IRA men was read off by Thomas Gill, a former Curragh 
internee himself, in a most assuredly “seditious” manner.6 Yet, what the speech most 
illuminated was the Republican movement’s inability to move beyond romanticizing the 
past. What’s most spectacular was just how unspectacular O Brádaigh’s speech was for 
the crucial timing - it could have been made in 1955 or even 1945, long before the Border 
Campaign. The fact was the Republican movement’s physical force campaign needed an 
injection of energy and yet all Ó Brádaigh’s could muster, pointing to Tone’s grave, was 
that “to this spot succeeding generations have come to do him honour and to derive 
inspiration to complete his unfinished work.”7 Precisely what that meant, Ó Brádaigh’s 
organization was at a loss to explain. Much like the unambitious address, the armed 
struggle in 1959 lacked purpose and momentum amidst IRA internment and widespread 
disillusionment. With the close of the 1950s came the end of an era in which 
Republicanism made a grand effort to implode the Northern Irish state by force, and yet 
unwilling to evolve itself would ultimately falter. 
 
                                                        
6 Typescript of “I.R.A. Commemoration Ceremony at Bodenstown on 21st, June, 1959,” 3, JUS/8/900, 
NAI. 
7 White, Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, 91. 
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1.1 The border divides Republicans, 1919-1925 
 The ideological underpinnings of modern Irish Republicanism can be traced back 
directly to the 1916 Easter Rising and the proclamation read out by Patrick Pearse. The 
popular and political mandate for Republicanism was given in the 1918 General Election; 
shortly after the armistice of the First World War, the Irish public went to the polls and 
overwhelmingly endorsed two divergent policies of governance. The mantle of 
Republicanism was grasped by the Sinn Féin party, and their electoral success in winning 
73 seats led to the sitting of the first Dáil in January 1919.8 The other stark reality was the 
unwavering Unionist support in Ulster, strongest in the constituencies of the far north-
east, religiously and economically unique from the rest of the island.9 It would be here 
that Edwards Carson and James Craig would build out their hegemony in government 
and security with a “near impregnable position” holding six counties and a two-thirds 
majority identifying as Protestant Unionists.10 The Irish War of Independence beginning 
at the start of 1919 and culminating with the Anglo-Irish Treaty at the end of 1921 mostly 
confirmed the inevitable: a bisected island with two governments reflecting the will of 
the majority of the (partitioned) population in its midst. It was not surprising that each 
government would disproportionately cater to the population reflecting their political 
                                                        
8 Sinn Féin trailed only Bonar Law’s Conservatives and Lloyde George’s Liberal Coalition in the 
number of seats won in the United Kingdom. Additionally, Sinn Féin won 70 of the 75 seats in what 
would become the Irish Free State. From Peter Mair and Weeks, Liam, “The Party System” in John 
Coakley and Gallagher, Michael, eds., Politics in the Republic of Ireland, 4th ed. (New York: Routledge, 
2005), 11, 140-141. 
9 Michael Farrell, Northern Ireland: The Orange State (London: Pluto Press, 1980), 21. Specifically, 
Ulster Unionists won 22 of 37 constituencies in nine-county Ulster, 20 out of 30 with a vote share of 
2:1 in the area of the future Northern Ireland. 
10 R.F. Foster, Modern Ireland, 1600-1972 (New York: Penguin Books, 1989) 503. 
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mandate, but the level of institutionalized sectarianism was pervasive in Northern Ireland 
from its inception.  
 
1.1.1 Irish Republicanism: The view from the South 
As the Government of Ireland Act (1920) divided Ireland, so did it divide 
Republicanism. By setting up two governments on the island, both subservient to 
Westminster, it triggered the inevitable rejection by Southern Irish Republicans who 
wanted a 32-county all-Ireland nation. Quick to retain links to the United Kingdom, the 
Unionists accepted the February 1920 proposal and swiftly moved to establish a Belfast-
area authoritative body for the administration of the six nearest counties, what would 
comprise Northern Ireland. Even with major objections to treaty stipulations for a 
Council of Ireland and Boundary Commission, the Unionists were well positioned 
particularly with the British government’s backing of the new border and military support 
in 1920 and 1921.11 The border that would come in to existence split the Catholic 
population, the island’s population most sympathetic to the notion of the Irish Republic, 
and created divisions among the movement politically and physically that would have 
long-lasting effect on ideological viability.  
A few issues plagued Irish Republicanism through the 1920s. Centrally, there is 
the issue of what precisely forms the “Irish nation,” in territorial space and governmental 
terms. Would anything short of a total-island, 32-county state with full independence 
from British control be inadequate? While Ireland has natural island boundaries and was 
                                                        
11 Farrell, The Orange State, 23. Particularly, the Council of Ireland was designed “with a view to the 
eventual establishment of a parliament for the whole of Ireland and to bring about harmonious 
action between the parliaments and governments.” 
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administered as a single political unit from the Act of Union (1801) onward, it had 
persisted as a deeply fractured entity for much of its pre-modern history.12 In his 
thorough survey of the movement, Richard English identifies separatism as a key 20th 
century hold-over from late 19th century Fenianism, which extolled the near inevitability 
of physical force means to securing political objectives.13 The calculation by Pearse, Tom 
Clarke and Sean McDermott to use militarism in declaring the Republic made the 
subsequent military action against Britain, evident in policies shaped by Michael Collins, 
necessary, but also set in motion the Civil War.  
The 1922-1923 Civil War was a direct result of Sinn Féin ’s commitment to the 
1916 Rising, as Fearghal McGarry has observed. By the time it was realized that the Irish 
Republican Army – evolving from the earlier Irish Volunteers – could not defeat the 
British, it was too late as “the Republic had been elevated to more than a mere political 
objective.”14 Members of the IRA had sworn to defend the living Republic, and the terms 
of the Treaty did not satisfy significant individuals within the movement, most notably 
Éamon de Valera and Liam Lynch. Through draconian measures by the pro-Treaty Free 
State government and horrific reprisals from the anti-Treaty IRA side, the Civil War 
caused far more deaths than the War of Independence before arms were dumped by the 
‘Legion of the Rearguard,’ the Republican rump in May 1923.15 As the Civil War 
hostilities faded, it was clear a new norm would settle over Ireland; Catholics in the 
                                                        
12 Niall Ó Dochartaigh, “State, Nation, Island: The Politics of Territory in Ireland” in Niall Ó 
Dochartaigh, Hayward, Katy and Elizaeth Meehan, eds., Dynamics of Political Change in Ireland: 
Making and Breaking a Divided Island (New York: Routledge, 2017), 15-16. 
13 Richard English, Armed Struggle: the History of the IRA (New York: Oxford University Press. 2003), 
8-9. 
14 Fearghal McGarry, The Rising, Ireland: Easter 1916 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016), 287. 
15 Foster, Modern Ireland, 512-513. 
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Northern Ireland state had to come to terms with the new reality of Partition as the Free 
State government seemed unwilling to challenge it. For the remainder of the early 1920s, 
Dublin would consolidate control and administer over the territory it had, spending little 
time concerned with territory ceded to the Belfast administration.  
 
1.1.2 Irish Republicanism: The view from the North 
One lesson lost on Irish Republicans of the 1950s looking back on the War of 
Independence (1919-1921) was the fact that it was not solely an Irish struggle against a 
foreign force. A significant number of IRA victims were Irish people – deemed 
“collaborators” – made legitimate targets as members of the Royal Irish Constabulary or 
individuals working for the British governmental apparatus. As “objectively the 
representatives of alien oppression,” these mostly Catholic and Irish individuals were 
ostracized from their local communities, particularly in rural areas of Munster and 
Connaught, and many were killed during the years of conflict.16 Yet, the Northern Ireland 
state mobilized a far more passionate native born security force as the RIC would evolve 
into the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and a paramilitary apparatus, the Special 
Constabulary (their formation and composition is explored in greater detail in the next 
chapter). While the IRA of that era could portray the Black and Tans as a faceless, 
foreign-born, extraneous force brought out of the trenches after the First World War 
suppress the Irish Nationalist uprising, the IRA of the 1950s could not claim the RUC to 
be as such. The Northern security forces were almost entirely native-born, albeit self-
                                                        
16 Foster, Modern Ireland, 494. 
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describing as “Ulstermen” more so than “Irish.” Their core beliefs aligned with the 
defense of the realm, not for any imperialistic cause but because their demise as a force 
was an existential threat to their families and their communal way of life. Yet, in this 
respect the RUC was also completely foreign to Catholic, Nationalist-leaning areas of 
Ulster, for example the future borderland of south Armagh and east Tyrone where almost 
no members of the force mirrored the community. It is in this exceptional way that the 
security situation in Northern Ireland evolved rapidly in the early 1920s to differentiate it 
from the other three provinces of the island. 
As events in the South pointed to a stalemate and negotiations between the IRA 
and the British government, the IRA campaign in the North faced significant setbacks. 
The British military moved to quickly subdue unrest in Derry City at the outbreak of the 
War of Independence; when June 1920 fighting between IRA and UVF units erupted, the 
military sealed off the Catholic Bogside and imposed a rigid curfew; the city of just over 
40,000 people was cordoned off with a massive security presence of 1,500.17 While 
historian Pearse Lawlor’s research lists a number of subsequent disturbances in Derry 
City between 1920 and 1922, Northern Ireland’s second largest city would remain mostly 
at peace for the remainder of the period known colloquially as “the Outrages.” In Belfast, 
it was the population and Protestant vigilance groups who inflicted a fairly coordinated 
intimidation campaign against the minority Catholic population; while some sectarian 
violence did occur in the South, no area rivalled the sectarian bitterness of Ireland’s 
second city. Belfast was unique in settling the policy agenda for Sinn Féin and the IRA in 
                                                        
17 Farrell, The Orange State, 26. Additionally, while the IRA was targeted the UVF was not asked to 
disarm, leaving them “unmolested” in Farrell’s words. 
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the newly created Northern Ireland. Once the border was erected, the minority population 
in each state suffered, though the Northern Catholics who were one-third of the state 
suffered disproportionately more than the less than 10% of Southern Protestants (which 
would rapidly decline to only 3% of the Free State population).18 The Free State’s 
attention would be drawn towards internal matters of operating the new government and 
combatting the anti-Treaty IRA in 1922-1923. Michael Collins and others were left with 
little more than economic measures (namely the Belfast boycott) and attempted pacts 
with the Northern Ireland government to remedy partition as they awaited the Boundary 
Commission. 
Years later, when the hollow Boundary Commission was finally exposed as 
satisfying neither camp, the three governments involved moved to bury it for good.19 It’s 
narrow sights and substantial roadblocks had always set the prize as too small while 
potentially resulting in massive disruption to political and daily life.20 By December 1925 
it was clear: the border would persist, regardless of its unpopularity among the Catholic 
Nationalists people most affected by its presence. The newly created borderland would be 
at the crossroads of Irish politics and militancy, as rival nationalist groups contested the 
space most aggressively in evenly divided parts of Ulster. Fergal McCluskey’s survey of 
Tyrone from the Home Rule crisis to the end of the Civil War reveals the persistence of 
                                                        
18 James Dingley, “Northern Ireland and the ‘Troubles’,” in James Dingley, ed., Combatting Terrorism 
in Northern Ireland (New York: Routledge, 2009), 25.  
19 Farrell, The Orange State, 77-78. The Boundary Commission report was leaked in November 1925, 
with sensational details including the Free State transferring of East Donegal and possibly part of 
Inishowen peninsula (North Donegal) to Northern Ireland and only gaining strips of South 
Fermanagh and South Armagh in return. Panicking, the Free State government traveled to London 
and signed off on the existing border also striking the Council of Ireland provision. 
20 Peter Leary, Unapproved Routes, Histories of the Irish border, 1922-1972 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), 56. 
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centuries old persecution and discrimination along religious lines but under a revised 
imperial policy promoted by the Conservative government and Unionist sympathizers.21 
Tyrone’s colonial past led to garrison towns aligned with the Protestant Unionist element 
and a Catholic Nationalist countryside with a slight majority: 55% in the 1911 census, 
maintained at that level in 1920.22 Securing the border and subduing a population on the 
periphery of the state would be paramount for the survival of the young state. Subsequent 
chapters will consider how the Northern Ireland state did so and how its security forces 
were mobilized in cultural and territorial battles. 
 
1.2 Republicans during transition years, 1926-1945 
The leading political manifestation of Irish Republicanism continued to be the 
Sinn Féin party. Sinn Féin, in its many reincarnations from 1919 to the 1940s, had 
attempted to stay true to its republican roots and the ‘national question’ while responding 
to the realities of state and society.23 Yet, defections by key members throughout that 
period, often times to political parties more willing to explore constitutional means, 
stunted the party’s development and robbed it of dynamic leaders that could promote its 
aims and agenda. 
 
                                                        
21 Fergal McCluskey, Tyrone, The Irish Revolution, 1912-23 (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2014), 134-
135. 
22 McCluskey, Tyrone, 1. 
23 Eithne MacDermott, Clann na Poblachta (Cork: Cork University Press, 1998), 3-5. MacDermott 
convincingly traces the divergence and convergence between democracy and nationalism in modern 
western-nation states. In an Irish context, she shows that Sinn Féin has fragmented and regrouped 
numerous times around class and citizen rights corresponding with the right-left political spectrum. 
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1.2.1 Republicanism: Defections and defeats, 1926-1939 
How did Irish Republicanism maneuver the 1920s political landscape? In the 
early Free State era, the group’s impact diminished sharply as militancy lost its place in 
the fabric of Irish life. Politically, Sinn Féin remained excluded from both the Belfast 
Parliament (first at Belfast City Hall then Stormont) and the Dáil, refusing to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of either state. The IRA in the South declined sharply in the 
late 1920s as inactivity and intelligence service penetration wreaked havoc. In the North, 
the Civil War and fall out was even more devastating, as it split the organization, halted 
the source of arms and lead to leadership losses: “The commanders of two of the four 
Northern divisions were to be executed by Free State troops – Joe McKelvey from 
Belfast in December 1922, Charlie Daly from Tyrone in March 1923, while Sean Larkin, 
the local IRA commander in South Derry, was executed with Daly in Drumboe Castle in 
Co. Donegal.”24 Depleted of men and arms, the IRA’s Northern Command was 
demoralized by the 1923 IRA ceasefire and weapons dump; less concerned with the Free 
State force, they had to contend with a massive Northern Irish security apparatus: 
“sixteen battalions of British troops and nearly 50,000 police and Specials [...the most 
extreme estimates placed] the IRA’s pre-civil war strength in the six counties [at] 
8,500.”25 It is no wonder that most IRA supporters placidly acknowledged the realities 
they would be living in, putting aside issues with the Nationalist Party and re-subscribing 
to a force of Northern Nationalism tied to the Belfast firebrand, Joseph Devlin. Catholics 
attempting to navigate their role in the state while maintaining some of their historical 
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allegiances (like the Ancient Order of Hibernians) would proscribe to “Devlinite” 
Nationalism as a political opposition to the strongly organized Unionist Party.26 Michael 
Farrell aptly writes of this era:  
[T]he Unionists set about constructing an Orange and Protestant state with almost 
all political power and patronage in their own hands – right down to the humblest 
rural council – and operated an elaborate and comprehensive system of 
discrimination in housing and jobs which kept the minority in a position of 
permanent and hopeless inferiority.27 
 
To counter Farrell, there were some councils (for example Newry and Mourne), 
controlled by Catholics, but even in areas with substantial Catholic populations this was 
not a certainty. Another Northern historian of the era labels the character of the new 
Northern Ireland administration as reflecting the socio-economic and political Unionist 
relationships that had long pre-dated the failed Irish revolution, from a Northern 
Nationalist position.28 Northern Ireland was a state born in bloodshed, reinforcing a “no 
surrender” mentality that had existed in Loyalism for centuries. 
Political developments in the South from the mid-1920s through the 1930s also 
redefined how people self-identified with the notion of Republican politics. The rules 
most dramatically shifted with the most outspoken anti-Treaty politician, the former Sinn 
Féin stalwart de Valera. When he left Sinn Féin to create Fianna Fáil this signified 
another rupture moment for Irish Republicanism since the Treaty fallout. Sinn Féin’s 
electoral support had been declining through the mid-1920s, as its abstention policy did 
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little to harm the state’s growing legitimacy.29 The movement’s largest defender, in 
Ireland and abroad, had decided to enter the Dáil in opposition in 1927, finding a way 
around the difficult matter of an oath.30 De Valera had founded Fianna Fáil a year earlier 
after leaving Sinn Féin, and the IRA’s miscalculation in assassinating the government 
minster Kevin O’Higgins forced de Valera to adjust tactics. The newly formed party 
would enter the government and eroded the Sinn Féin vote share in the next general 
election. In June 1927, Fianna Fail would gain 44 seats in that inaugural contest to Sinn 
Féin's 5 seats; their vote share fell by almost a quarter to 3.6%.31 By 1932, Fianna Fáil 
had caught W.T. Congrave’s Cumann na nGaedheal, besting them by 15 seats to gain its 
first lead in government, with support from the Labour Party. In doing so, the self-
proclaimed “Republican Party” won over public support and continued to create Sinn 
Féin defections and obscure their message for the remainder of the decade. Similarly, 
IRA was in a dark window for the decade from 1926 to 1936, attempting to evolve and 
find a new footing in a well-changed domestic landscape. The organization did benefit 
from having steady leadership, led by the enigmatic Chief of Staff Moss Twomey, and 
experienced military leaders like Sean Russell and Frank Ryan with clear political 
motivations.32 However, as a secret army known well to the state forces, the IRA rarely 
posed a sizeable threat to stability of either the Free State or Northern Ireland in the late 
1920s and through the start of the Second World War in 1939. 
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1.2.2 Republicanism: deficits and self-destruction, 1939-1945 
What was the status of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), fully outlawed by both 
governments on the island of Ireland, between 1939 and 1945? Simply, the IRA would be 
run down by the Irish Free State government during the length of the Second World War.  
Attempting to replicate the opportunism of the 1916 rebels who struck during the First 
World War, the IRA attempted to strike out at Britain during the slide into the Second 
World War. With a bombing campaign in Britain and attacks on the island of Ireland, the 
IRA showed its relative strength and brought about its significant weakening. The 
domestic IRA attacks on customs huts in late 1938 succeeded in gaining the attention of 
each Irish government. The IRA Army Council statement in December 1938 and the IRA 
proclamation in January 1939 served each government in strengthening the emergency 
powers act allowing arrest and internment of IRA members.33 The Northern Irish 
authorities wasted no time in arresting leading Republicans in an attempt to stabilize the 
province amidst Nazi air-raids, but more shocking was the Southern response. Only a 
little over a decade from formally breaking with his more radical Republican past, Éamon 
de Valera pursued the IRA with a stunning gusto that bordered on the personal, 
“show[ing] no mercy to those who still believed in physical force.”34 De Valera’s 
government used internment and special courts to devastating effect: six IRA men were 
executed and the government “stood its ground” when two hunger strikers - Tony D’Arcy 
and Sean McNeela - died in prison during the Emergency.35 In an effort to maintain 
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neutrality, the Free State government was unwilling to give the IRA any opportunity to 
draw Britain into an open conflict south of the Irish border. 
Any progress in the Republican movement through the late 1930s was disrupted 
by the war, and a recession struck north and south. Writing on Ireland’s persistence of 
conflict, Henry Patterson observes that little good happenings are known of 
Republicanism in Derry and Belfast during the war, and little is known (in general) in 
rural Northern Ireland – “indicat[ing] a sense of disorientation and a lack of energy or 
direction.”36 A 1950s IRA historian is equally blunt: “The IRA was almost militarily 
bankrupt as the clouds of conflict cleared over Europe in 1945.”37 Aiming to increase its 
profile, the inverse occurred when a de Valera-led government vigorously pursued the 
organization, rendering its operational capacity deeply limited by the conclusion of the 
conflict. There does occur a cogent ideological shift crucial to the Republic’s place at the 
table at the end of the Troubles: did the 1950s begin the “Republic’s shift from a thirty-
two-county anti-partition nationalism to a twenty-six-county state patriotism”?38 If the 
‘Emergency’ was particularly quiet for Ireland, the IRA took the brunt of the action from 
the Irish security forces, and were at an organizational low ebb by 1945. 
The IRA public relations wing did attempt to press on, as indicated by a series of 
publications: War News was in Ireland during the Emergency and The Irish Republic and 
Irish Republican Bulletin were sold in the US before and after the war. In June 1940 War 
News, published by the Irish Republican Publicity Bureau, would self-describe as a Lamp 
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of Truth to keep alive Ireland’s sacred flame of freedom as Europe fell dark.39 The 
message could be scattered, even within the same issue, however. There would 
sometimes be encouragement for the Irish people, like the February 1941 edition asking 
vigilant citizen-soldiers to not submit to the “current of events around you” and the cons 
by “the selfish and unscrupulous men” in both governments. Yet, that same edition had 
stern words of discouragement towards American President Franklin D. Roosevelt who 
was pursuing the US-UK Lend-Lease Act, a move that aided Britain.40 By wars end, its 
circulation seems to have declined sharply. Similarly, the Irish-American publications 
promised imminent mobilization with scant details of precisely how this was to occur.41 
Publications by Republican groups in the early 1940s aimed to remain relevant, provide a 
current events slant while continuing to provide education on political matters since 
partition. 
Yet for all that was promoted publicly, behind the scenes there was substantial 
organizational breakdown that was never alluded to in the literature of the time. There are 
few words dirtier among clandestine armed organizations than “informer,” but the IRA of 
this period was heavily infiltrated by them. The IRA did not too often move undetected 
by the security forces. The security forces on each side of the border seemed to remain 
one step ahead of the IRA volunteers, often having advanced knowledge of the moves 
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and maneuvers. An IRA man, Michael Ryan relayed an eye-opening conversation from 
the early stages of the Border Campaign. In January 1957 he was being transported from 
Tyrone in to Donegal by former IRA man Frank Morris, who was disillusioned and had 
no faith in the IRA headquarters: 
It didn’t do much for our morale to hear Frank, a veteran of the 1940s campaign, 
recount how he’d been tortured by the RUC and sentenced to a flogging with the 
cat o’nine tails, every stroke of which was meted out. He then spent eight years in 
Crumlin Road Jail, Belfast, because of a betrayal by an informer in HQ. I had 
never heard, or read, anything about floggings, torture, or an HQ informer.42 
 
Morris was also instrumental in the 1950s training of a Republican group from the 
borderland, Saor Uladh, which will be examined in greater focus in Chapter Three. As for 
this reference, it appeared to Morris that informers had long been active in IRA circles 
undermining the organization. While the IRA was sound at controlling the narrative it put 
out during the early 1940s, Frank Morris’ experience speaks to its ability to also conceal 
some of its darker elements. 
 
1.3 Wolfe Tone commemorations 
As Republicans struggled to maintain relevance in the Southern Irish political 
discourse, they also sought ways to keep an anti-partition message in the public 
consciousness. They would increasingly look to their Republican forbearers - martyrs 
from Tone to Robert Emmett and Thomas Davis - as a cultural heritage worth preserving. 
Perhaps no single figure, including the famed martyrs of 1916, held more resonance with 
Republicans north and south than Wolfe Tone. 
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Tone’s death and burial in the rural townland of his birth created a veneration 
point for future generations of Irish Republicans. Annually, Irish Republicans travel from 
across Ireland and even from overseas to participate in ceremonies of Tone’s 
remembrance. Particularly in the 1940s and early 1950s, representatives of the diaspora 
in Australia and America tied their public support – and financial support43 - to the 
persistence of radical Republicanism. In measuring the impact of the nationalist 
movement in the 20th century, one can examine the annual June commemoration as a sign 
of the political climate at the time. For example, in the turbulent stretches of the 1920s 
and 1930s the site was weaponized by the opposing sides of the established state forces 
and those still working towards the idealized “Irish Republic.” 
The commemoration, with its symbolism and the retelling of the history of Tone 
and subsequent figures like him allowed for a passing of traditions from old to young. 
Security analyst Gordon Clubb, in studying a century of the IRA’s persistence in Irish 
life, elevates the value of inter-generational continuity:  
Family networks provided the network linkages for a traditionalist Republican 
movement to exist independently on any substantial support. Through the 
occupation of space in Republican commemorations, parades and clubs, the IRA 
could tap into latent community support by utilizing the credibility that appeals to 
Republican culture bestowed. It also provided an alternative route to continue 
mobilisation at a grassroots level, placing them in a good position when 
opportunities arose.44  
 
Indeed, even though the IRA was defeated in the early 1920s and forced underground 
through the 1930s it retained a monopoly on cultural symbolism, namely Easter Rising 
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commemorations, as well as other subsequent freedom fighters like Tone.45 By the end of 
the 1930s, and the normalizing of relations between the opposing Treaty sides, the 
commemoration settled in to a familiar pattern of rituals. From an analysis of Garda 
records, patterns of behavior and divergences in rhetoric and norms indicate wider 
continuity and change within in the Republican movement from 1945 to 1959. 
  
1.3.1 Republicans regroup: 1944-1951 
By the early 1940s, the annual event had evolved alongside the dual states on the 
island of Ireland; security personnel north and south would gain a pulse check for 
Republican sentiment. It allowed the Gardaí a window into the secretive organizations of 
Sinn Féin and the Irish Republican Army, long a legally prohibited organization. The 
yearly records persist as a comparative of the IRA’s size, its scope and substance over a 
decade and a half. The reports are extensive, naming members and including excerpts of 
stirring speeches made. These records paint a picture of a movement continuing to 
wrestle with its aims and motives, its loyalties to its past and the realities of the present. 
As a proscribed organization, the 1944 and 1945 reports only identify members of the 
‘Old I.R.A.” and make no reference to active members. This changes in 1946, a year of 
renewed organizational vigor around the death of Sean McCaughey on hunger strike in 
Portlaoise Prison. 
                                                        
45 Clubb, Social Movement De-Radicalisation, 47. He mentions the persistence of the monopoly and 
the central role of Easter Rising commemorations: “First the IRA had a monopoly on Republican 
cultural symbols and parades, such as the Easter Rising commemorations, specifically the 50th 
anniversary in 1966 which had a substantial impact on improving the IRA’s strength, even if it was 
still officially disengaged.” 
 39 
 The growing level of detail by the late 1940s indicates the heightened awareness 
of the IRA by Garda Siochana as well as, perhaps, a public indication of the resuscitation 
of the movement. The IRA was known to have undergone a reorganization in 1947 with 
an infusion of new members, a fresh direction politically, and the commitment to 
planning a new offensive against the Northern Ireland state set for commencement in the 
early 1950s.46 
There is a standard composition to the annual commemorations in the 1940s that 
shifts by the end of the decade. The infusion of Clann na nGael support in 1947 and 1948 
is noteworthy for its denouncement of the Southern government policy towards partition 
under Fianna Fáil. A letter was read out from Clann na nGael which contained “a 
reference to the ideals for which Tone died and that the only way to break the connection 
with England was by force of arms in spite of the persecution inflicted by Leinster House 
and the hirelings from Dublin Castle,” according to the Garda report from June 1948.47 
There was an effort to integrate Irish organizations from the diaspora sympathetic to the 
Republican cause. The American lobby had become louder in the shadow of Sean 
McCaughey’s protest but failed to make a massive impression on IRA policy into the 
1950s. The year 1949 served as a watershed moment north and south; for Eire, new 
legitimacy sprung from a self-declaration while the Government of Ireland Act re-
envelops Northern Ireland in the embrace of the United Kingdom. Between the two states 
would remain the border and the organizations aiming to dismantle it. 
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By the resumption of physical force Republican activity in the early 1950s – 
specifically the arms heist at Gough Barracks in Armagh, June 195448 - the pattern of 
commemoration was well set. Rain or shine, the Sunday nearest Tone’s 20th June 
birthday was set out as a special day. The choreographed rituals to follow, venerable 
events to those that participated, were yearly hallmarks of the Republican calendar. 
Special trains from Dublin and often Cork and Belfast would arrive midday in Sallins, the 
town of Tone’s birth. Cars were rare but bikes were often used, and the buses and trains 
were the most popular form of transit. This sleepy Kildare countryside would spring to 
life throughout the early afternoon and between 2:30 and 3:30 the assembled mass would 
begin the procession roughly two miles to Bodenstown cemetery. 
Typically, the parade featured a number of steady participants: the National 
Graves Association were well represented each year along with – what one Garda report 
called – marchers “under the auspices of the I.R.A. and kindred organizations.”49 There 
were separate columns of men marching with the Old IRA and then those representing 
the active IRA of the 1940s and 1950s; these numbers fluctuated however. In the 1940s 
the expansion of the official ranks of the National Association of the Old IRA further 
drew a distinction between men of the former struggle and those maintaining a presence 
in IRA decisions and the GHQ of the organization.50 Similarly, women were organized 
by affiliations with Cuman na mBan and Cuman na Cailini, with organizational support 
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ranging from two dozen some years to two hundred at its peak.51 Republicans also made 
significant efforts to integrate younger males through annual incorporation of the Fianna 
Eireann Scouts, peaking with participation in the 1959 commemoration with 139 
members marching.52 Occasionally sporting organizations would take part, as evidenced 
by participation in 1947 by Thomas Williams GAC, a Gaelic athletic club believed to be 
from South Armagh.53 Numerous speakers through the late 1940s and 1950s spoke of the 
need for engagement with the youth who had to maintain a level of fitness, as they would 
be the next generation to participate directly in the armed military conflict. 
More than sport, music was a commonplace at the annual meeting. Over the years 
surveyed a number of bands traveled in from various corners of the country: the Newry 
Pipe Band (in 1953), a Cork pipe band (in 1957) and multiple years of Dublin-based 
bands and the local Newbridge Brass and Reed Band. The 1959 parade consisted of a 
Colour Party, six Pipers Bands, one Fife and Drum Band.54 Why such an emphasis on 
music? Beyond the cultural significance provided by music since the Gaelic Revival of 
the late 19th century, music magnified the event to the greater community. It also 
provided an air of order and continuity among the various elements turning up at Sallins 
field. It is clear the Republican movement aimed to engage a strong cross-section of Irish 
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society, from both genders and mixing in the young with veterans from the decades of 
conflict. By fostering this sense of continuity across age groups, Republicans could 
continue to sync struggles present to past. Additionally, the community feel of the 
commemoration allowed for casual observers an annual remembrance of Republican 
concerns, namely the maintenance of partition by both governments in Dublin and 
Belfast. 
It is also evident that music, marching and the general order of the Republican 
commemoration fostered a militaristic tone which pervaded the march from Sallins to 
Bodenstown as well as the oration and rituals around the gravesite. Tone wrote that in his 
youth he favored military marching, so in a way this element truly honored the man and 
his interests.55 The keynote oration was delivered beside the grave of Wolfe Tone during 
a wreath-laying ceremony. Often there is a chief marshal of the proceedings and an 
introductory speaker ahead of the main speaker. The main speaker, often a rising star or 
known name in the Republican movement, was given the platform each year to publicly 
state Republican policies. As indicated in the table below, a few important realities of the 
Republican movement emerge.  
Foremost, when examining the various speakers across a decade and a half, there 
is a high turnover in the keynote speaker. This is also reflective of the lack of continuity 
across the years, but also – by the resumption of the armed conflict – the toll that 
internment would take on the movement. While some, like Frank Driver of Kildare, are 
mainstays from the early 1940s through the 1950s, every few years there are new names 
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added and participants from the year prior missing. Some of the speakers, however, 
would not be considered highly prominent Republicans; for example, in 1946, less than a 
year after the ending of the Second World War and in the wake of Sean McCaughey’s 
death on hunger strike, the speaker was Edward Quinn, a man unknown to the Gardaí 
until only two months prior. He is identified as not being prominent in the Republican 
movement, only delivering one notable speech in April of that year in Dublin, and 
making little impact on the movement after his June 1946 graveside oration. 
Secondly, and perhaps more crucial than the revolving door of leading figures in 
the Republican movement, was their places of origin. A frustration to some Northern 
Republicans – notably Liam Kelly a long-time IRA volunteer from Tyrone – was the 
muted involvement of individuals from Northern Ireland. Kelly, frustrated with Southern 
inaction, would form his own breakaway political and paramilitary organizations in 1953 
and 1954. Years later he would summarize his logic as Northern Republicans galvanizing 
their Southern counterparts, in a way that could lead to a war of liberation akin to 1919-
1921: “[W]hen young men and women in the Six Counties die in the fight, perhaps the 
people who drove out the Black and Tans might awake again out of their slumber.” 
Jimmy Steele, one of Belfast’s most prominent Republicans alongside Joe Cahill, is 
recorded by the Garda as present in the parade and ceremony, but does not one time 
speak in an official capacity. Had there been a concerted effort to select Southern 
speakers either to increase their influence or to limit any Northern-based IRA men from 
gaining too much influence? The evidence would suggest so. 
The commemoration, despite yearly busloads and trains from Belfast, is heavily 
southern Irish in origin. If a keynote speaker is chosen from an area other than Dublin, in 
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the instance of the 1953 event and speaker Tomás MacCurtain, it is a hat-tip to Cork or 
another south location. In the decade and a half surveyed, only two Northern Ireland-born 
speaker were featured, the 1952 oration given by Joe McGuirke and the crucial 1957 
Commemoration by Sean Duggan of Antrim (see Figure 1.2).56  
Considering even introductory speakers - sometime brought in from the Irish 
diaspora in Britain, Australia and the US – Belfast’s Joseph McGuirke and Antrim’s John 
Duggan appear to be the only Northern Ireland speakers out of nearly thirty individuals 
over these crucial fifteen years surveyed. Neither man would have carried significant 
clout in their respective home areas, certainly more figures of the past than figures of the 
present. Joe McGurk appears to have been active during the 1920s and 1930s, interned in 
Northern Ireland for his IRA membership.57 Comparatively, the Irish American advocacy 
group Clann na Gael had a massive presence at the turn of the mid-century mark; 
Michael McGinn, of Philadelphia, reads off letters from the American support network at 
a handful of commemorations. It is a curious indication of Sinn Féin priorities to give 
Irish-America a more direct voice in the most sacred Republican day of the calendar than 
members from the northern six counties under the foreign domination the IRA so 
vehemently hoped to destroy. It seems that publicity in the US – and the associated fund-
raising – was given priority over cultivating speakers and leadership in Northern Ireland. 
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Figure 1.2: Chart compiled by James Rynne from information contained in typescripts of 
Garda reports on 1944-1959 Wolfe Tone Commemorations, all from JUS/8/900, 1, 
National Archives of Ireland, Dublin, Ireland. 
 
From a politically-focused lens, it is difficult to describe Sinn Féin as anything but 
passive in the decade leading to 1954. While the president of Sinn Féin, Margaret 
Buckley, is mentioned through the late 1940s reports, she makes minimal impact beyond 
the laying of wreaths. Sinn Féin  political awareness is lacking particularly amidst the 
strong IRA rhetoric espoused by the keynote speakers; for example, in 1947 Sean 
McCool, the former IRA Chief of Staff turned Clann na Poblachta TD for Donegal, 
labeled “one part of Ireland [...] a Crown Colony and the other part a British 
Wolfe Tone Commemorations – Bodenstown, Kildare 
 
Year Keynote Orator County Affiliation 
1944 Sean MacBride  Dublin 
1945 Brian O’Higgins Clare 
1946 Edward Quinn  Dublin 
1947 Sean McCool Donegal 
1948 Tomás MacCurtain  Cork 
1949 Christopher O’Neill Dublin 
1950 Speaker unclear 
1951 Anthony McGann  Dublin 
1952 Joseph McGuirke  Belfast 
1953 Tomás MacCurtain  Cork 
1954 Gearoid O’Broin  Dublin 
1955 No access to reports 
1956 No access to reports 
1957 John Duggan   Antrim 
1958 John Joe McGirl  Leitrim 
1959 Ruairí Ó Brádaigh  Longford 
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Dominion.”58 A year forward Tomás MacCurtain, later to be a leading IRA figure in the 
Border Campaign, spoke of the persecution from Leinster House and “deplored the lack 
of National spirit in the youth.”59 Multiple speakers in this period talk of broad 
frustrations with arrest and internment, political intransience and even economic morose, 
but Sinn Féin  remains silent as to alternative aims. 
One of the early speakers to have lasting political resonance is Sean MacBride, 
who apparently delivered a speech guarded in tone, according to the reports. MacBride’s 
speech came in June of 1944, only a few weeks after the Allied landing in France and, 
politically, a highly-sensitive time in neutral Ireland. Given MacBride’s former role as 
IRA Chief of Staff, this is unsurprising. Yet, it can be seen as a similar move towards 
more legitimate political means ala what Éamon de Valera did two decades prior; 
similarly, by the late 1940s, MacBride had formally broken with his IRA and Sinn Féin 
past and chosen to adopt a constitutional approach with a new political party. 
Clann na Poblachta, which formed in July 1946 but first emerged publicly with 
strong campaigning in 1947 and 1948, presented a challenge to Fianna Fáil as the rightful 
owners of the Republican tradition, publicly and politically.60 More than just a new 
alternative to Fianna Fail for disillusioned teachers and farmers, the party aimed to be 
broadly based with an economic focus and pressing domestic issues.61 Ultimately, the 
party’s philosophy was a combination of Irish Republican orthodoxy - with IRA-linked 
                                                        
58 Typescript of “Wolfe Tone Commemoration, Bodenstown, Sunday22/6/47,” 1, JUS/8/900, NAI and 
MacDermott, Clann na Poblachta, 11. 
59 Typescript of “Wolfe Tone Commemoration Ceremonies at Bodenstown on Sunday 20th June, 
1948,” 1, JUS/8/900, NAI. 
60 MacDermott, Clann na Poblachta, vii and Keane, Seán MacBride, 73. 
61 Keane, Seán MacBride, 73, 75, 78-79. 
 47 
individuals in its leadership – with social radicalism, in line with Christian Democratic 
parties on the continent.62 When the 1948 election returns came, Clann na Poblachta won 
10 Dail seats with 13% of the national vote share.63 
The inter-party Coalition government of 1948-1951 generally approached 
Northern Ireland through anti-partitionist propaganda and rhetoric (John A. Costello 
stated in a 1948 broadcast to the United States that the government would “bend our 
energies to the restoration of the territorial integrity of our native land”64) and attempts to 
engender co-operation with the government of Northern Ireland. When the Inter-Party 
Coalition returned to power in 1954-1957, the task would be made even harder by the 
events of 1949 that hardened the border.  
Yet, while in government, particularly the first inter-party Coalition many 
supporters of Clann na Poblachta became dissatisfied with a perceived lack of movement 
on the partition issue. The 1949 party Ard Fheis, as illustration, featured four branches 
proposed motions endorsing force to retake Northern Ireland, to which MacBride had to 
swiftly suppress such intentions.65 One defection from the party, Peader Cowan, would 
attempt to harness this support by early 1950 when he began organizing his own private 
army, although this only forced a security response by Northern Ireland Prime Minister 
Lord Brookeborough who mobilized the B-Specials to face-down the threat in November 
                                                        
62 F.S.L. Lyons, “The Years of Readjustment 1945-1951,” in Ireland and the War Years and After, 1939-
1951 eds. K.B. Nowlan and T.D. Williams (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1969), 69. 
63 Brian Girvin, “Stability, Crisis and Change in Post-War Ireland, 1945-1973” in The Cambridge 
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1950.66 Of course, stating that the border was under duress only further strengthened the 
Northern Unionist’s hand, and gave the security forces more of a reason to deal heavy-
handedly with Nationalist areas. 
 
1.3.2 Commemoration amidst the conflict: 1951-1959  
The Garda report on the Wolfe Tone commemoration of 24 June, 1951 indicates a 
major departure from previous public displays in numerous ways. Members of the IRA 
are counted and identified (if names were known to the authorities), but the procession 
was divided into provincial units. This calculation indicated the organization wanted to 
identify its  regional strength, and it could also seemingly have been used as a recruiting 
tactic. As a formal military would take stock of its gaps in specific ranks, this may have 
been the reorganizing IRA’s attempt to publicly take stock. Yet, for such a public event 
with a Gardaí presence, perhaps it was also window-dressing in the inverse: the 
purposeful playing down of regional strength to assuage Gardaí concerns. As indicated 
by the report, security forces begin paying particular attention to identify the provincial 
leaders: a leadership contingent features the emerging Charles Murphy, Leinster’s and 
Dublin’s dual units include Sean O’Neill and Frank Rogers, Munster’s volunteers are 
identified as the “Cork contingent” led by Tomás MacCurtain and another man Fox 
Collins.67 Of the dozen groups marching, including for the first time a Communist 
                                                        
66 McCullough, A Makeshift Majority, 126-128. Cowan’s public militant remarks were so startling they 
brought on the first instance of a raised question in the Dail by Eamonn de Valera since the 1948 
election. Cowan also gained the attention of security forces in Northern Ireland, as Brookeborough 
addressed Stormont saying that a man in the South had threatened to come and cut the throats of all 
loyalists. 
67 1951 Typescript of “Wolfe Tone Commemoration Ceremony on 24.6.51,” Garda report on 1951 
Wolfe Tone Commemoration, JUS/8/900, 2, National Archives of Ireland, Dublin, Ireland. Murphy, 
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contingent68 led by Sean Mulready, only two feature unknown leaders: the Ulster and 
Connaught IRA branches, respectively. For Ulster there are “84 men in military 
formation led by [an] unknown man,” which is reflective of the low level of intelligence 
on IRA activity in Northern Ireland as well as the lack of integration of Ulstermen into 
the IRA fold, or at least the annual commemorations. Unlike most of the previous decade, 
no differentiation is made between “Old I.R.A.” persons and members of the I.R.A. Does 
this indicate a shift in security perspective? If at one point men could have been 
commemorating a struggle long past, it could be inferred that anyone participating by 
1951 was viewed suspiciously by the state as still “active” in IRA planning.   
By 1952, it is apparent that Garda had increased their level of detail in 
observations of IRA activity more than previous commemorations. The Irish security 
forces likely were continuing to receive information pertaining to an impending 
Republican offensive. Where prior reports were a couple of pages, the report filed 30 
June, 1952 to Oifig na Choimisineara contains 9 pages of names and activities, the 
greatest detail in a decade. One year later, two major players in the movement emerged 
from the pages of the 1953 report. Conspicuous as their activities were in the pages of the 
report, the two men barely known to authorities at the time were Ruairí Ó Brádaigh and 
Seán Mac Stíofáin. On page 2 of the report, O Bradaigh is identified amongst a three man 
flag-bearing guard of the procession as well as “...and a man named McStephen on behalf 
                                                        
MacCurtain would later be IRA Army Council members with Rogers and O’Neill also emerging as 
prominent members of the movement. 
68 The inclusion of a Communist group appears to have been a phenomenon for a couple of years in 
the early 1950s, then vanishes as the IRA campaign ramps up in 1954-1955. Still, it is a curious 
inclusion that indicates the far left political components of the movement.  
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of London Irish Associations.”69 One month later Mac Stíofáin was part of a daring 
operation to procure arms from a British officer training school in Essex. If the Irish 
security forces and government had any lingering doubts about the seriousness of the 
IRA threat mounting through the early 1950s, the actions of 1954 and 1955 signaled a 
resuscitation of the movement and a need for counter-terrorism measures on each side of 
the Irish border. 
An awakening would occur within radical Irish Republicanism in the mid-1950s. 
Militancy would first lurch forward in two incidents aimed at procuring arms: the 1954 
arms raids in Armagh and Tyrone. The first, a highly successful arms raid on Gough 
Barracks in Armagh  happened eight days prior to that year’s Bodenstown 
commemoration, would be a publicity bump to the re-romanticized cause.70 Recruitment 
became easier71 and a second raid would occur in October targeting the Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers barracks in Omagh, Tyrone. After a fire-fight, no arms were 
procured and the IRA men fled, all eventually to be captured. In a sign of things to come 
with the Border Campaign, all of the ‘raiders’ were Southern-born, Eamonn Boyce 
commanding a group comprised of Dublin and Cork volunteers.72 Speaking in West Cork 
                                                        
69 Typescript of “I.R.A. Commemoration Ceremony at Bodenstown on the 21st June, 1953,” Garda 
report on 1953 Wolfe Tone Commemoration, JUS/8/900, 2, National Archives of Ireland, Dublin, 
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 51 
later that year, Tomás MacCurtain called on all those who “were physically fit” to join 
the IRA while those who were not were to join Sinn Féin .73 MacCurtain’s seniority in 
the IRA leadership indicated that the division of the political and militant was a widely 
held belief. There remained a prevailing effort to split Republicans between the physical 
force and the political poles of the movement, even at a time that others were fusing the 
two. At precisely the same time a movement in Mid-Ulster spearheaded by Liam Kelly 
was attempting to do precisely the opposite (explored more in Chapter Three).  
It is also known, through Irish government records, that from 1953 onward Sinn 
Féin was increasingly under IRA-control. Closely linked through their common aims, but 
differing methods, the organizations came under practically common control by the onset 
of the physical force campaign. Garda noted that “change from two separate and 
independently-controlled organisations commenced at the annual Sinn Féin Ard-Fheis in 
1953, when the following resolution was adopted: ‘Sinn Féin assumes equal 
responsibility with the Army Council, I.R.A., for any military action taken in future.’74 
From there, the IRA moved to increase its supplies and continue training exercises in 
anticipation of the military campaign, with the political aspect minimally nurtured. The 
excitement of arms procurement and a plan to retake Northern Ireland spilled out in 
orations from the next few years. Speaking in the immediate aftermath of the Gough 
Barracks raid, Gearoid O’Broin stated “...it was said that the cinemas and dance halls of 
Ireland were sapping the strength of the young men, but anyone that thought that need 
                                                        
73 Flynn, Soldiers of Folly, 29. 
74 Typescript “Review of the I.R.A. Organisation” in “Copies of various confidential memoranda, 
letters and a report concerning external affairs, finance, the IRA and Agriculture,” P190/708 (7), 8, 
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only enquire at Gough Barracks, Armagh.”75 O’Broin indicated that the tide had turned, 
and presumably this palpable energy remained in the 1955 and 1956 commemorations, 
the final two events to be held before the formal commencement of Operation Harvest in 
December, 1956.76  
If 1957 can be seen as a watershed year for the Republican movement, then the 
Wolfe Tone commemoration (as the security forces observed “the biggest for many 
years”77) was extremely telling for numerous reasons. The oration given by Duggan, 
bilingual and “one of the Freedom Fighters from the Glen of Antrim,” explained that 
force was the only language British tyranny understood. Yet, his speech salutes the many 
Irishmen already interned, citing Wormwood Scrubbs, Crumlin Road and Mountjoy 
Prison before also mentioning the men killed in the Brookeborough RUC barracks attack, 
Sean South and Fergal O’Hanlon: “their names are now part of Irish history.”78 There is 
also some deception in Duggan’s description of the Border Campaign as he thanks the 
IRA men from Southern counties saying, “the men of the North were carrying out the 
fight themselves but were glad of the assistance of the men from the Twenty-Six 
Counties. The fight for freedom would continue until the last vestige of British rule, both 
visible and invisible would be cleared out of Ireland.”79 It is known from internal Gardaí 
and RUC communications as well as public arrest records that an overwhelming number 
of IRA men originated from the Republic of Ireland and were not native to Northern 
                                                        
75 Typescript of “I.R.A. Commemoration at Bodenstown – June 20, 1954,” Garda report on 1954 Wolfe 
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Ireland. In a March 1957 government report issued to the newly installed Minister of 
External Affairs, Liam Cosgrave, there is evidence of strong IRA infiltration by the 
Southern security forces. Marked “secret” at the time, the thorough 10-page document 
lists numerous organizational elements known to the Garda, from numerical strength to 
training and armament details.80 Sources of funding were well known to have been drawn 
from America and some long-standing Republican sympathizers on each side of the 
border. 
Ominously for the IRA’s subsequent attempts to remain a clandestine operation, 
the 1957 report notes that Army Council and Sinn Féin executive meetings held in Dublin 
“were invariably observed by members of special branch and particulars of those who 
attended noted,” showing any hope of organizational anonymity had vanished.81 While 
1957 was a high point in the Border Campaign with public support pouring in after the 
Brookeborough attack in January, the electoral gains in March 1957 would be the last 
significant political achievement for the movement. Militarily, the IRA’s campaign 
would be on a nearly uninterrupted decline from 1957 to 1959, when functionally the 
group was defeated. By then, mass internment and a loss of moral ravaged the 
organization. As the Garda knew full names and addresses of all members of the IRA 
Army Council by 1957, it was only a matter of time before the movement was 
suppressed. As the March 1957 Garda report to the government also indicated, the Sinn 
Féin executive was “completely dominated by the I.R.A.” – specifically as “several 
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persons appear both in the I.R.A. and Sinn Fein at top level where policy is decided and 
which leaves no doubt but that both are being directed toward a common policy.”82 
If the commemorative energy of 1957 indicates a high tide for the Border 
Campaign, the lack of vigor in 1958 and 1959 indicates the decline of momentum. One of 
the major contributing factors to the inefficiency of the Border Campaign was the 
inability to sustain public support, and the bland, unimaginative orations from 1958 and 
1959 give a glimpse of tired rhetoric. The removal of identifying signage from the parade 
– gone were the triumphant “Ulster Contingent” of the IRA – or any other markers, 
indicate an organizational desire for privacy. Yet, by this point, the movement was deeply 
infiltrated, North and South, and internment had decapitated the IRA leadership. The 
crippling effects of the arrest and internment policy of the Irish Republic and the 
government of Northern Ireland will be explored more in Chapter Two. 
 
1.3.3 Republican commemorations in comparison 
In analyzing broader trends across the Wolfe Tone Commemorations, there is a 
strong divergence between the commemorations occurring 1944 to 1951 and then those 
from 1951 to 1959. Foremost, there is an allowance early on in politically deviating 
interests that is not seen from 1955 onward. For example, in the 1940s groups like the 
fascist-leaning Ailtirí na hAiséirghe were present, emulating some of the Catholic Fascist 
movements on the continent.83 The Communist Party of Ireland was also represented at 
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least twice, the 1951 and 1954 commemorations. Without the ability to analyze Garda 
records from 1955 and 1956, there is a discernible shift in the tone, focus and language 
for 1954 and 1957-1959. The 1953 Gardaí observances are standard: logging names, 
identifying car registrations and maintaining the observance of peace. The noticeable 
shift in 1954 can be epitomized by military language in identifying and classifying IRA 
men: “About 524 men were in columns of four as I.R.A. Units but it was noticed that 
personnel from the several contingents were mixed up with other Units and some from 
the southern Counties were marching with members from Northern Units and vice 
versa.”84 There is a telling awareness of the IRA’s promotion of its regional strength, and 
there is also a Gardaí  awareness of “active members” and leaders, for instance the 
identification of Jimmy Steele of Belfast leading the Ulster IRA men.85 Yet, within a few 
short years the IRA changed policy amidst the Southern state’s aggressive arrest policy: 
the 1958 report claims “[n]o member of the IRA participated in the parade.” By that time, 
as the Border Campaign moved into its twentieth month, the IRA had ditched the signs 
and removed its key leaders from the Wolfe Tone commemoration. This attempt to avoid 
Gardaí surveillance proved futile, as consistent arrests and internment continued. The 
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final report surveyed, taken at 21 June 1959, shows the security force’s deep level of IRA 
membership figures (see Figure 3.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Typescript of “I.R.A. Commemoration Ceremony at Bodenstown on 21st, 
June, 1959,” Garda report on 1959 Wolfe Tone Commemoration, JUS/8/900, 4, National 
Archives of Ireland, Dublin, Ireland. 
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The reports, always compiled by the Garda Soichana of Carlow-Kildare based in 
Naas and sent to the Commissioner’s Office in Dublin, contain a discernible tonal shift as 
they progress. The earlier reports (1945-1952) are shorter, more dismissive and portray 
the participants as ultimately unthreatening. Multiple reports reference the “mild tone,” 
the “orderly and peaceful” nature of the gathering which features “no untoward incident” 
nor “breach of the peace;” reports through the last commemoration of the 1950s indicate 
that things were “conducted and controlled; there was no cause for complaint.”86 While 
the Gardaí were looking for provocative moments, the Republican establishment 
carefully toed the line between remaining principled and proclaiming inflammatory 
words that could spur further police actions. 
The Wolfe Tone commemorations also provide an annual snapshot of mass 
support for the Republican movement. The most significant illustration of Irish public 
support for Republicanism occurred in 1957 in the wake of IRA men being killed in the 
Brookeborough RUC Barracks raid. This is reflected in confidential reports made by the 
Garda Detective Branch to the Department of Justice in June of 1957 following the 
annual Wolfe Tone commemorations. The beginning of the report states that “total 
parade of approximately 2,000 persons was the biggest for many years.”87 A statistical 
analysis of the previous decade confirms that this is well above the Gardaí-stated figures 
(see Figure 1.4).  
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Figure 1.4: Chart compiled by James Rynne from information contained in typescripts of 
Garda reports on 1944-1959 Wolfe Tone Commemorations, all from JUS/8/900, 1, 
National Archives of Ireland, Dublin, Ireland. 
 
Specifically, the IRA strength is cited as 648 persons, with 168 from Leinster, 240 
from Munster and another 240 from Ulster.88 There is strong evidence, however, that a 
number of the men marching under the banner of Ulster were native to Leinster or 
Munster.  These figures are also refuted by the secret government memorandum “Review 
of the I.R.A. Organisation” dated to 19 March, 1957. The IRA’s early 1957 strength is 
listed at 943 members, the largest figure since September 1945.89 Tellingly, the 
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Wolfe Tone Commemorations – Bodenstown, Kildare 
 
Year Participants Public Total 
1944 208 200 408 
1945 76 150 226 
1946 c. 350 c. 300 650 
1947 449 300 749 
1948 800 c. 100 900 
1949 600 c. 180 780 
1950 750 est. 100 850 
1951 840 est. 100 940 
1952 758 300 1,058 
1953 607 c. 100 707 
1954 650 c. 200 850 
1955 No access to reports 
1956 No access to reports 
1957 1744 256 2,000 
1958 2000 est. 200 2,200 
1959 1860 c. 200 2,000 
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Republic’s security apparatus knows that nearly all of the IRA volunteers are located in 
the South with an extensive being Dublin-based, almost 40%, with another 10% from 
Cork. With such a significant Southern-based membership, there were logistical issues 
with a sustained campaign in which cross-border attacks meant lengthy periods in foreign 
terrain; furthermore, movements could be more easily tracked over time as border ‘hot 
spots’ emerged from 1956 to 1958. The local population of the borderland was also less 
likely to embrace volunteers from Cork and Wexford, arriving for sporadic attacks and 
then leaving across the border. The creation of “liberation zones” across the Irish 
borderland could hardly be helped by a transient and non-Northern-based fighting force 
of IRA men. 
The government report also claims roughly 350 active IRA personnel in May 
1954, with incremental increases over the next year and a half: 500 members by the end 
of 1954, over 650 by the end of 1955 and 800 by the end of 1956.  The Garda believed 
the increase in numbers would continue “as the militant activities in the Six Counties will 
attract youths and the emergence of Sinn Féin as an active political party will help to 
secure members for the I.R.A.”  For example, the United Irishman had rebranded appeals 
from “Join the IRA” to “Join the Republican Movement,” an attempt to evade 
prosecution under the state’s Offences Against the State Act, 1939 which had been 
reinstated post-Border Campaign. 
All of the late 1950s Garda reports were also quick to conclude that even with the 
attendance bump, “the whole proceedings were well conducted and controlled.”90 
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Nothing “untoward happening” was a staple of previous reports. Surely this was partly 
meant to assuage worry among higher ups and was also indicative of the customary 
nature of the commemoration. Where Wolfe Tone was fiery, the wick on the candle of 
commemoration has grown short, the flame dim. Still there is traceable developments in 
the Republican movement from these events, rebirth in the 1950s and then a sudden 
decline.  
 
1.4 Conclusion: Republicanism revived and rebuked 
From the organizational low-point of 1945-1946, the IRA would rebuild, 
reorganize and make new plans for a 1950s offensive. The IRA and Sinn Féin maintained 
a strong organizational presence at the annual Wolfe Tone commemorations. Yet, the 
Irish security apparatus kept intelligence on the organization and collected information 
that would lead to its undoing once the Border Campaign commenced. The seeds of the 
eventual IRA arrests and mass interment were sown through public events like the annual 
June ceremonies at Bodenstown, Kildare. In an attempt to venerate the past, the present 
IRA made miscalculations that alerted the authorities to key figures, institutional strength 
and political motives.  
After years of surveillance on the Wolfe Tone commemorations, charting IRA 
and Sinn Fein developments, the Gardai again needed to assess and address the threat of 
an active Republican physical force movement. Chief Superintendent Patrick Carroll 
would write the March 1957 report to Liam Cosgrave that addressed the IRA threat and 
gave an indication of the Southern state’s planned response. Carroll was a long-standing 
member of the security forces and had a long and honest police record of attempting to 
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maintain order in the Irish state protecting all its citizens regardless of background or 
political beliefs.91 In the final description of the IRA, its military campaign and the 
Southern response to curtail its attacks on the Northern Irish state, Carroll lent fascinating 
insight:  
The current policy of the I.R.A. [in early 1957] is to continue their militant attacks 
in the Six Counties and recent instructions have been issued to all units to be 
ready to move at the shortest notice from I.R.A. Headquarters. Practically all arms 
are located in the Six Counties. The organization has also given consideration to 
the question of extending its activities to England. Repeated statements have been 
made by I.R.A. and Sinn Fein leaders that they will not interfere or take any 
retaliatory action against the State forces or institutions here, and written 
instructions on these lines have been issued to all their units.92 
 
With weapons dumps in the North, it was then the RUC’s matter to confine and eliminate 
the movement; the manner in which they did will be expanded upon in Chapter Two. 
Additionally, the desire by the IRA to not engage the Southern forces showed an 
unwillingness to provoke the Southern authorities into more severe actions. Carroll 
acknowledges the crippling effect of internment on the movement, but adds that soon 
enough “these leaders will again be in circulation,” and advises more strict policy against 
them.93 This would ultimately come when Fianna Fáil re-took the government and 
successive internment measures by de Valera and Sean Lemass tightened control in 1960 
and 1961, culminating with the reinstatement of military tribunals. Lastly, the intelligence 
indicating an extension of activities to England shows a true desperation setting in to the 
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IRA only one year into its campaign, as Operation Harvest was only intended to impact 
Northern Ireland. 
The Border Campaign featured over 1,000 coordinated attacks by members of 
Irish Republican paramilitary groups intent on facilitating the implosion of the Northern 
Ireland state and bring about its demise. Launched with lofty hopes in 1956, after almost 
a decade of fresh planning, it failed in less than two years. It claimed the lives of dozens, 
its own members and those it declared war on, and it disrupted the lives of communities 
along the border in ways that lasted into the Civil Rights era of the late 1960s. By 1962, 
the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland was more secure than 
ever before. Republicanism had been soundly rebuked, and the IRA ceasefire in February 
of that year indicated nearly as much.  
Ultimately, the Border Campaign was less a loss war by the IRA and more a 
victory in defense for the security forces of Northern Ireland. How had the police and 
support personnel so roundly rebuked the efforts of physical force republicans? In 
exploring the force, their style and substance, one gets a greater understanding of the state 
of Unionism in the 1950s as well as the Northern Ireland state identity. The Northern 
Irish political stance and security response to the Irish Republican Army and other 
Republican groups will be the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO, THE NORTHERN STATE 
 
2.0: The security forces defend the border 
It would take the security forces of Northern Ireland less than one hundred hours 
to assess the threat posed to the state in December 1956. The launch of Operation Harvest 
by the IRA in what would become commonly known as its Border Campaign, was never 
more effective than in its earliest days. The IRA sent 150 raiders across the Irish border 
with multiple attacks beginning in the late evening of Wednesday, 12 December. The 
IRA leadership was stationed across the border in Monaghan as mobile units were 
deployed against targets in Fermanagh, Londonderry, Tyrone and Armagh with 
significant success.1 The element of surprise was on the side of the IRA, who had not 
been truly active in Northern Ireland since isolated instances fifteen years previously, at 
the time of the Second World War.2 This would be a far different level of commitment 
from the IRA which had the strategic aim of forcing an end to Ireland’s partition. 
The outcomes of the campaign were clear: the IRA was intent on destabilizing 
Northern Ireland by targeting state and military objectives. However, the IRA leadership 
was adamant that the security forces were absolutely not to be attacked, unless it was an 
act of self-defense, and instead the IRA were to engage the British military. A chief 
architect of the campaign, Charlie Murphy, would later state that targets were ruled out 
                                                        
1 Michael Ryan, My Life in The IRA, The Border Campaign (Cork: Mercier Press, 2018), 83.  
2 Notably, an IRA attack on the RUC in Belfast resulted in the last Republican to be hanged in a 
Northern Irish jail, the Tom Williams execution of 1942. Henry Patterson, Ireland Since 1939, The 
Persistence of Conflict (Dublin: Penguin, 2006), 33-34. 
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just as carefully as they were selected, as the IRA was hyper-sensitive to touching off a 
Unionist backlash:  
In no way did we want Operation Harvest to be perceived as a campaign against 
the Unionist community in the Six Counties, that is why we were forbidden to 
attack police officers. We wanted to draw the British Army from their bases, but 
they, typically, were shrewd and in a typical ploy refused to present themselves 
which posed a problem, initially, for the campaign.3 
 
While not originally intended for targeting, the security forces of Northern Ireland were 
rapid in their response. Damage was minimal – a far cry from the destabilizing of 
essential services that the IRA had aimed for – and amounted more to a shock set of 
attacks than any clearly coordinated initial aim of an armed conflict. The strategic aim 
was to gain London’s attention and demonstrate the futility in maintaining a colonial 
paradigm with Ireland, namely by “increase[ing] the perceived price of ‘occupation,’ so 
that the government” would eventually abandon Northern Ireland’s link to Great Britain.4 
Foremost, the RUC responded to the border area where attacks where conducted, where 
sympathizers could hide and billet IRA men, and where the Southern-based raiders would 
perhaps try to cross back in to the Republic of Ireland for immunity. The B-Specials were 
also quickly mobilized (see Figure 2.1) by the end of the year; they had been an “at 
ready” force for years as occasional communal disturbances along the borderland – 
especially when Republican events displayed the Irish tricolor – provided an opportunity 
to reinforce the RUC with the supplemental Special Constabulary. 
                                                        
3 Barry Flynn, Soldiers of Folly: The IRA Border Campaign 1956-1962 (Cork: The Collins Press, 2009), 
67. The fact that Brookeborough RUC barracks were targeted by January 1957, three weeks in to the 
campaign, shows how swiftly operational tactics shifted. 
4 Peter Neumann, “The Rise of the Paramilitaries,” in Combatting Terrorism in Northern Ireland, ed. 
James Dingley (New York: Routledge, 2009), 37. 
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Figure 2.1: Photograph “His Grace the Duke of Abercorn inspecting the Parade” from 
“North Tyrone Specials Parade” in The Tyrone Constitution, July 30, 1954, 3, The 
Newspaper Library of the Belfast Central Library, Belfast, Northern Ireland. 
 
The geographic isolation of the IRA along the border, even in the earliest days, 
was not by accident. Accounts from IRA members active in the Border Campaign show 
the raids into Northern Ireland were minimally penetrating. Michael Ryan, active from 
1956 through the ceasefire in 1962, relayed how he was one of the few in an Antrim-
based unit operating 50 miles from the nearest border crossing. This mobile unit was 
intended to target a British Army barracks in Ballymena and an RAF installation in Torr 
Head, yet both targets would be abandoned reflecting the campaign’s border-centric aims 
from the start.5 In Belfast, there was not only an absence of attacks but even a lack of 
                                                        
5 Ryan, My Life in the IRA, 73. 
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general awareness. Joe Cahill, a leading Belfast Republican at the time, was made aware 
of the attacks when he was taken in by the RUC the morning after.6 This reality, that the 
borderland would be a focal point for Republicans, had been central to the militarization 
of the border from its inception. The RUC, supported by the Special Constabulary, was 
designed to withstand defending against Southern incursion, and had stayed suspiciously 
vigilant for over three decades. 
The public reaction was mild on each side of the border, caught more off-guard 
by the news than incensed by any of the incidents. The “mildly stunned populace” would 
awake to the reports of what had been “the largest concerted attack on the fabric of the 
state” in its 30 years of existing.7 Naturally the Unionist press delivered condemnation, 
yet the Nationalist press was not immediately prepared for a cohesive reaction. When 
three further attacks were launched two nights later, the element of surprise had been lost. 
Two Fermanagh raids on RUC barracks at Lisnaskea and Roslea, twelve miles apart, 
were unspectacular and met with resistance; a third attack on Derrlin RUC barracks, a 
mere five miles over the border from Cavan was anticipated by the RUC and repelled 
violently.8 The Northern Ireland Prime Minister, Basil Brooke, paid a visit to the stations 
within a few days pledging support for any desired defensive improvements in an 
apparent boost to morale.9 Easily within four days, less than one hundred hours, the 
security apparatus had sprung forward ready to meet the IRA challenge. Once the initial 
                                                        
6 Ryan, My Life in the IRA, 75. 
7 Flynn, Soldiers of Folly, 75. 
8 Flynn, Soldiers of Folly, 82-83. It seems that RUC barracks that had initially been attacked had 
communicated with Derrylin that evening, pre-empting the third attack. In the ensuing firefight, Noel 
Kavanagh of the IRA would be injured, the first casualty for the Republican side in the campaign. 
9 Sam Logan, The Life of Sir Basil Brooke, Bart., the first Viscount Brookeborough (Kibworth, 
Leicestershire: The Book Guild Ltd., 2018), 147. 
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shock of the IRA attacks on security installations and strategic targets subsided, the 
campaign lacked that initial edge and was forever dulled. 
While the Irish government, led by John Costello, deliberated in the immediate 
aftermath of hostilities, raids by the Irish army in Monaghan on 16 December did net 
over a dozen IRA men in a safe-house.10 The Southern government’s response would 
draw criticism in the early years of the campaign as Costello’s government was viewed as 
too lax. Still, in a scathing response to his government’s perceived lack of action, 
Costello wrote a letter to a prominent critic the weekend the IRA first struck condemning, 
in part, the IRA’s disregard for constitutional power and the mandates of state and church 
limiting unauthorized force.11 The response from the Northern Ireland government was 
swift in condemnation and action; as the South debated reinstating Second World War-
era anti-IRA legislation, Stormont quickly passed additional Special Powers legislation 
allowing for “arrest without warrant, detention and internment without trial.”12 This 
Unionist hegemony was a well-established norm in the province and members of the 
political establishment quickly used the Unionist press to decry the IRA and to call for its 
                                                        
10 Flynn, Soldiers of Folly, 85. It appears the ‘safe house’ was owned by a known IRA sympathizer 
making it an easy target for the security forces of the Irish Republic. 
11 Correspondence from John A. Costello “—to Deputy J. McQuillan, Ballyforan, Ballinasloe, county 
Galway concerning a telegram received from McQuillan urging the government to stop using the Irish 
Army and Gardaí as ‘instruments of British Policy in helping to maintain partition,’“ P190/837(311), 
1, John A. Costello Papers, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin Ireland. In response to criticism 
by Deputy Jack McQuillan (later to form the National Progressive Democrats with Noël Browne), 
Costello wrote on December 18, 1956 that “[t]he organization which is responsible for the unlawful 
use of armed force has arrogated to itself the determination of policy as to the means that should be 
adopted to bring Partition to an end and has defied the authority of the Dail to withhold its assent to 
engagement in war.” He elaborated that the IRA’s actions “contravene the constitutional provision 
which vests in the Oireachtas alone the right to raise and maintain armed forces and are contrary not 
only to the principles of democracy, but to the moral law, as enunciated by the Catholic Hierarchy in 
their statement of the 18th January, 1956.” 
12 Flynn, Soldiers of Folly, 84. The Costello-led government considered whether to reinstate the 
Offense Against the State Act of 1939 for much of the early Border Campaign, even though it 
technically had still officially been on the book the previous decade and a half. From Flynn, Soldiers of 
Folly, 83-84. 
 68 
suppression by the Southern government. Simultaneously, the security apparatus came 
alive in ways that had long been anticipated.  
 By the time the Border Campaign formally sputtered to a conclusion in 1962, the 
RUC and the Northern Irish security forces had soundly defeated the IRA. While efforts 
by the government and security apparatus in the Republic of Ireland was also crippling, it 
was the unwavering defense of the Irish border that made the task of ending partition by 
physical force unobtainable. Always a lofty objective, even the threat of border violence 
propelling forward the politics of anti-partition never materialized in the 1950s campaign. 
The Northern Ireland security forces viewed the fight in existential terms and, in 
numerous ways, had been preparing for its inevitability since the foundation of the state. 
Standing formidably against the Republican threat, Northern Ireland by the end of the 
1950s had a more secure political Unionist hegemony than at any point previously in the 
twentieth-century.  
 
2.1 Ulster’s Exceptionalism, 1800-1919 
Contemporary commemoration in Northern Ireland celebrates events from the 
17th and 18th centuries as part of the historical evolution of the modern state. Ian McBride 
has identified that the core of Ulster Protestant culture “lies a cycle of myths concerning 
the seventeenth-century struggle between Protestant and Catholic, settler and native, for 
supremacy in Ireland”13 From Northern Ireland’s establishment after World War I, there 
was a conscious effort to promote an established, separate ‘northern’ history and culture, 
                                                        
13 Ian McBride, The Siege of Derry in Ulster Protestant Mythology (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1997), 9. 
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centered on a reconstituted Ulster exception from the rest of the island. However, the Act 
of Union between Great Britain and Ireland, in 1801, serves as the most appropriate 
starting point for assessing the unique case of Ulster. The 19th century is a period in 
which the hardening of communal norms and expectations occurred over time, and when 
many of the institutional divisions within the state today began to form. In Northern 
Ireland, divisions between Presbyterians – Dissenters from the established church – and 
Anglicans began to be mended as they created a political solidarity through the 19th 
century. Catholic Emancipation, spearheaded by Daniel OConnell, in the 1820s redefined 
the political and social landscape in Ireland, albeit gradually, and created a greater sense 
of communal solidarity among different Protestant Irish groups in Ulster.14 Divisions 
persisted through the famine and turbulence of the late 19th century with land agitation 
and the emergence of the Irish Parliamentary Party and the brilliance of Parnell.15 In his 
rich history of the Irish border, Peter Leary traces the rise of Irish nationalism as initially 
gaining a democratic base among the Protestants of Ulster, particularly after the time of 
the famine.16 However, as rumblings for Irish self-rule, eventually Home Rule, grew 
amidst the Catholic population, the Protestant population moved generally to the Unionist 
cause. The Conservative Party continued to look out for Irish Unionist interests – at least 
those of the Ascendency – as they saw a shrinking share of the population and a 
                                                        
14 Patrick M. Geoghegan, King Dan, The Rise of Daniel O’Connell 1775-1829 (Dublin: Gill Books, 2010), 
266-270, 323. O’Connell’s efforts through the 1813, 1821 and 1825 bills that culminated with the 
Catholic Relief Act in March 1929, even amidst challenges from within the Catholic Association. 
15 Frank Callanan “Parnell, Charles Stewart,” Dictionary of Irish Biography, James McGuire, James 
Quinn, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), Cambridge Core. Callanan writes 
extensively about the multiple layers of Parnell, particularly that after “Parnell's death, his 
posthumous myth embarked on its strange odyssey.” Still, his immense statue in Irish Nationalist 
politics cannot be overstated. 
16 Peter Leary, Unapproved Routes, Histories of the Irish border, 1922-1972 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), 4. 
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weakening hold on the institutions of power. The 20th century dawned amidst 
intercommunal tensions manifested in mirror organizations: the Orange Order and the 
“Peep O’Day Boys” were rivalled by the Ancient Order of Hibernians and localized 
agrarian Catholic groups.17” As communal allegiances to churches, orders and political 
ideologies ran along a clearly defined line, political mobilization around significant 
causes – like the proposal of Home Rule legislation - occurred rapidly. When the Third 
Home Rule bill was set to pass, Unionism in Ireland organized politically and militarily 
around the north-east corner of the island. The Ulster Unionist Council (founded in 1905) 
and the Ulster Volunteers (founded in 1912) ensured that Unionism would have a loud 
voice heard at Westminster.18  
Politically, Unionists were advocating for Ulster’s exclusion 1912-1914 from a 
self-governing Ireland centered on a Dublin parliament. When Home Rule was delayed 
by the First World War, and a rebellion in Dublin in 1916 pushed political developments 
rapidly ahead, the debate re-emerged post-war with Ulster Unionists believing their 
society and culture was under threat. While certainly exaggerated, Ulster Unionism 
succeeded in galvanizing support and was fervently sincere managing to unite a diverse 
people behind a shared ideology. By the First World War, it was undeniable that 
Unionism had cut across class and regionalism to create a mass movement “founded in a 
passionate sincerity, a genuine belief that a culture and future was in deadly peril.”19 This 
                                                        
17 Leary, Unapproved Routes, 4. 
18 Kimberly Cowell-Meyers, Paul Arthur, “Ulster Unionist Party,” Encyclopedia Britannica. 
(Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc, 2019). The modern day Ulster Unionist Party, the leading political 
party in Northern Ireland for nearly its entire history, traces its origins to the Ulster Unionist Council 
and the militant Ulster Volunteers. 
19 Michael Foy, "Ulster Unionist Propaganda against Home Rule 1912-14," History Ireland 4, no. 1 
(1996), accessed March 1, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/27724315, 
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belief in a unified Unionist fate would guide a shared vision of Ulster’s past and Northern 
Ireland’s future.  
 
2.2 Northern Ireland state formation 
In what manner was the state of Northern Ireland created and secured during a 
time of conflict on the island of Ireland? Armed militants using guerrilla warfare tactics 
targeted the security forces of the state at the time that Northern Ireland was created. This 
seems to have had a profound effect on the ethos of the Northern Ireland police and 
reserves through the century of Northern Ireland’s existence. 
As the state was formed on a Unionist-Protestant ethos, the security force was 
inherently at odds with a segment of its own community – the Irish Catholic population. 
The RUC was born out of the division of the island, and the creation of two states in the 
course of political upheaval. The Government of Ireland Act of 1920 designated the 
authority for a devolved Northern political and security presence in Belfast and the 
surrounding area. In protecting against threats of the IRA in the Irish War of 
Independence (1919-1921), extending in to 1922-1923 with the Irish Civil War, 
contained mostly to the Southern state, the RUC made no attempt to hide a suspicion of 
the Northern Catholic community. This mutual distrust would linger through the first five 
decades of the state until the disaster of the Troubles (1968-1998) and a plunge into 30 
more years of internal strife. 
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2.2.1 A state of conflict: 1919-1925 
The modern state of Northern Ireland was born into conflict, or perhaps it was 
born from conflict: unrest before and after the First World War and dissatisfaction from 
Home Rule left a void for a new political reality to fill. The immediate effect was a 
solution that angered Irish people of a separatist nationalist persuasion, and it was a 
compromise that only partially satisfied Irish people of a unionist mindset. Irish Unionists 
would find a welcoming home in the new state: whether native, like James Craig and his 
inaugural ministerial cabinet (three of the five in fact hailed from within 10 miles of 
Belfast City Hall), or non-Ulstermen like the Dublin-born Edward Carson.20 It was in 
Ulster they would make their stand. Faced with Home Rule, they decried Rome Rule; 
they signed their protest in blood and then spilled blood on continental battlefields,21 
notably the Somme in 1916. Ultimately - and ironically given the Home Rule objections - 
Loyalism allowed for the establishment of a domestic parliament first in Belfast from 
1921 so as to avoid inclusion in an all-island government.22 Their interests would be 
respected by their allies in London, ensured by themselves in Belfast City Hall, and 
safeguarded by their frontier-protectors along the newly devised Irish border. 
                                                        
20 Craig’s 1921 Cabinet featured the following ministers, native to Belfast, Bangor, Comber, 
Fermanagh and England: Prime Minister James Craig, East Belfast; Minister of Finance Hugh Pollock, 
Bangor; Minister of Home Affairs Richard Dawson-Bates, East Belfast; Minister of Education Charles 
Vane-Tempest-Stewart (Lord Londonderry), England; Minister of Agriculture Edward Archdale, 
Rossfad, Fermanagh; Minister of Labour John Millar Andrews, Comber. “Biographies of Members of 
the Northern Ireland House of Commons” Northern Ireland House of Commons Election Results, 
accessed November 10, 2019, http://www.election.demon.co.uk/stormont/biographies.html. 
21 It must also be noted that thousands of Irish of the Nationalist political persuasion also fought in 
the First World War, especially after John Redmond and the Irish Parliamentary Party encouraged 
enlistment, which eventually reached over 200,000 Irish. From Foster, Modern Ireland, 1600-1972 
(New York: Penguin, 1989), 471 
22 The seat of governmental authority would shift in 1932 to the regal Stormont parliamentary 
building which would open in the heart of Unionist East Belfast. 
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The partition of Ireland to protect the will of Ulster was all but decided by 1919: 
The Paris Peace Conference affirmed the rights of independent nations like Luxemburg 
as the first sitting of the Southern state’s parliament, Dáil Éireann, met in Dublin. There 
was no Unionist representation, and the future state of Northern Ireland concerned itself 
with the task of post-war rebuilding. Initial efforts were centered on the economic 
behemoth of Belfast, with its linen industry, ship-building and docks, during the early 
economic development of the state.23 When it was time to reward citizens’ loyalty, 
security was maintained at the expense of the feared ‘disloyal,’ Northern Irish 
Nationalists, many of whom were Roman Catholic, who identified significantly more 
with the government on the other side of the newly mandated border.  
The Irish border was created as an artificial barrier between two competing 
political ideologies. It was designed to be a check on an encroaching, dangerous 
ideology: Irish separatist nationalism - in the form of the major Irish Republican party 
Sinn Fein - had already won a significant electoral mandate from the majority of the 
island in December of 1919. Yet Unionists could claim a majority of the 6 north-eastern 
counties of Ulster. The 1911 Census, just on the eve of the passing of the third Home 
Rule bill, showed Ulster to have a 44% Catholic provincial population, problematic for 
Unionism to claim a clear mandate.24 Post-war, as the ruling coalition gradually moved 
from Liberal to Unionist, the Conservative interest would be in line with the cause of 
leading Ulster Unionists. They would mobilize support for the Northern Ireland 
                                                        
23 Bardon brilliantly points out that sovereign Luxemburg was smaller than County Antrim; that post-
war boom in Ulster was fueled by “the need to replace what had been destroyed, by pent-up 
consumer demand, and by desperate food shortages in central and eastern Europe. Bardon, A History 
of Ulster, 462-464. 
24 Peter Leary, Unapproved Routes. Histories of the Irish border, 1922-1972 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), 7. 
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government based in Belfast, but extending out to the Irish borderland, much of which 
was a patchwork of Catholic Nationalist areas and Protestant Unionist enclaves, with 
significant Catholic populations in Derry City, and counties Fermanagh and Tyrone. The 
Southern-based IRA forces made clear that any effort to withhold any portion of Ireland 
from independence would not be tolerated; the stage was set in 1919 for conflict.  
Republicans moved first, requiring the Unionist build-up to respond once the gun 
was placed back in Irish politics. The IRA commenced its armed campaign in 1919 
behind general public support throughout Catholic Ireland. Henry Patterson has been 
critical of the overly simplistic design of the IRA campaign in Ulster, where the 
assumption was that British rule was the only obstacle to Irish self-determination; yet, 
when sectarian attacks flared “beginning with the mass expulsion of Catholics from the 
shipyards and engineering plants in Belfast in July 1920” there would be over 450 deaths, 
5,000 evictions and 7,500 workplace expulsions in the following two years.25 The unrest 
disproportionately affected Catholics as the dominant heavy industries had long been 
Protestant-controlled and centered in greater Belfast, which also had the island’s smallest 
Catholic population. 
From the Belfast garrison outward, the Unionists quickly worked to create, defend 
and legitimize Unionist territorial claim. The frontier was marked by new outposts in 
South Armagh, Tyrone, Fermanagh, and west county Londonderry. Included for 
economic sustainability, the Catholic majority counties of Fermanagh and Tyrone would 
be contentious points but deemed necessary for maintenance of the state. In his survey of 
                                                        
25 Henry Patterson, Ireland Since 1939, The Persistence of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 3. 
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Tyrone from the Home Rule crisis through the Irish Civil War, Fergal McCluskey 
synthesizes that Tyrone Unionists followed the lead from Belfast and élite British circles 
not only because of shared philosophical assumptions but also out of a basic self-interest. 
They collectively built and endorsed a “paramilitary police force, a gerrymandered 
electoral system, preferential economic treatment in government and private employment 
[which] explained the devotion of Tyrone unionists to the Belfast regime.”26 Aware of 
their position on the frontier of the state and of Northern Unionism, the borderland 
Protestant population offered its service in the defense of the state in return for patronage 
and favor. Forged in the early 1920s, this Unionist understanding would persist for 
decades. 
 
2.2.2 The borderland and security: 1920-1925 
Policy on the borderland would emanate from Belfast and London in the early 
1920s with the intent to safeguard the security of Northern Ireland. Speaking at 
Westminster in February 1922 as the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Winston Churchill famously conjured up “the dreary steeples of Fermanagh 
and Tyrone emerging once again” after war had subsided.27 This language was stirring 
and pointed, as the two rural counties had a stark congregational divide, as later 
illustrated in the sharpening of support for either Orangeism or Hiberianism in the 1920s 
and 1930s; as traditional outlets for each community, indeed this era showed everything 
                                                        
26 Fergal McCluskey, Tyrone, The Irish Revolution, 1912-23 (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2014), 129. 
27 Liam de Paor, Divided Ulster (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970), 101. 
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changes although nothing changes.28 Yet, another line from Churchill’s speech to the 
House of Commons would more aptly signal the impending cultural clash along the 
borderland of the two newly born states. While Churchill called the Ulster Unionist 
position “morally and materially” strong, if it had a weak point it was along its newly 
created borderland: 
Certain of these districts in Fermanagh and Tyrone, even in the county boundary, 
may be districts in which—I am not pre-judging—the majority of the inhabitants 
will prefer to join the Irish Free State. If that be true, and to the extent to which 
that is true, one feels that the tremendous arguments which protect the freedom of 
Protestant Ulster have, in those districts, lost their application and have, possibly, 
an opposite application.”29  
 
Churchill further anticipated the virtue of political compromise between the two 
governments and, ultimately, the Boundary Commission. Churchill, however, had already 
failed to see a central reality of the new Northern Ireland state: the border would not 
budge and the security forces sworn to uphold it would remain in place long after the 
state’s establishment to ensure the ‘opposite application’ would be stifled before the 
steeple bell was ever rung. 
If the borderland would become the ‘frontier,’ what did this signal for the entire 
security apparatus and how did it affect their function? Churchill would be determined to 
back the Northern Irish security forces, even during efforts to promote conversations 
between James Craig and the IRA man turned Free Stater, Michael Collins, in 1922. The 
Northern security concerns were well founded, as one month after Churchill’s speech the 
                                                        
28 McCluskey, Tyrone, 129-130. 
29 Winston Churchill, “Irish Free State (Agreement) Bill,” House of Commons Debate, February 16, 
1922, Vol 150 cc1261-372, Parliament. UK, accessed January 20, 2020, January 20, 2020. UK 
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IRA would make incursions into the heart of Mid-Ulster on 19 March there was an arms 
raid on Pomeroy RUC barracks in east Tyrone, and on 20 March Maghera RUC barracks 
in south Derry were similarly raided.30 The RUC would be different than the RIC as 
targeted in the Irish War of Independence in that they would be empowered through “the 
policy of police primacy” 31 in countering attacks, and a far more aggressive reactionary 
element persisted in the force in the early years. Shortly after, Collins would approve an 
attack on security personnel that would end up in the death of six RUC men and Specials; 
IRA aggression would propel the British government to even more firmly endorse the 
Northern security apparatus publicly and financially.   
The British Army withdrawal from the Irish Free State in early 1922 allowed a 
further security presence across the borderland in to Northern Ireland. Still, the fight had 
been highly inter-communal in much of Northern Ireland, unlike many areas of the 
South. As the fighting along the border between the IRA and the B-Specials featured 
essentially the military-age men of those communities, massive bitterness would persist 
even after the Civil War shifted focus south and allowed the Northern Ireland state to 
consolidate its position.32 In that crucial year and a half, the Civil War would deal a 
deathblow to the Northern IRA effort.  
When the anti-Treaty IRA seized the Four Courts in Dublin in April of 1922, the 
Southern-focused Irish Civil War gave Craig’s expanding police force time to neutralize 
                                                        
30 Paul Bew, Churchill and Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 119. 
31 Neil Southern, Policing and Combating Terrorism in Northern Ireland, The Royal Ulster Constabulary 
GC (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018), 12. 
32 Peter Leary references intense fighting across areas of Donegal, Tyrone, Fermanagh and 
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the borderland while Belfast continued to be a sectarian hotbed.33 As the new Free State 
government needed British support to suppress the anti-Treaty IRA threat, the realities of 
their limitation to effect United Kingdom policy towards Northern Ireland were further 
realized. The Northern security forces seized the moment and launched a massive 
counter-measure against the Catholic population of the state: “500 A Specials launched a 
massive comb-out of the remote valleys of the Sperrin mountains between Draperstown 
and Greencastle,” rounding up hundreds of Catholic males on suspicion of IRA 
affiliation.34 Shortly after the Craig-Collins pact would be scrapped and the Northern 
IRA was left largely to stand alone.  
At the end of May, the IRA would officially be outlawed by the government of 
Northern Ireland with internment following. Over 200 men were arrested almost 
overnight and soon that would swell to 500 suspected Republicans, decimating the 
IRA.35 At stake was the survival of the young state, as Craig massively expanded the B-
Specials  to take the brunt of the border defense: Protestant farmers would go on duty in 
their spare time, armed with a rifle (that they could keep at home) and bayonet, one 
hundred rounds of ammunition and a British Army uniform dyed dark green.36 However 
unconventional, these tactics proved the difference and huge stretches of the three-
hundred mile borderland could be defensed by Protestant B-Specials  living near 
otherwise heavily Catholic rural tracts.  
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All the while the political mechanism was turning out security policy, James 
Craig made frequent border visits from 1920 through the 1925 Boundary Commission 
which validated his borderline. Beyond establishing the frontier of his political domain, it 
bolstered Unionist moral while simultaneously reminding the Nationalist population of 
their place in the state’s social order. One of Craig’s most trusted border Unionists would 
prove to be Basil Brooke, later the Prime Minister. Brooke was newly returned from the 
continental battlefields and kept his arms for the defense of his native Fermanagh. Born 
in Colebrook, less than ten miles from the border with Monaghan, Brooke was educated 
at Winchester and Sandhurst before winning the Military Cross and the Croix de Guerre 
for gallantry in the First World War. Upon his return, he organized a locally raised 
Unionist vigilante group to guard the religiously and politically mixed borderland.37 He 
would then be appointed the commandant of the Special Constabulary in 1922, 
instrumental in shaping border security policy before beginning, in 1929, a long and 
illustrious political career in the government. By the time Brooke would make his way 
from security to governance, Northern Ireland had moved from conflict to a period of 
relative calm, albeit with communal tension, that would characterize the next three 
decades. 
 
2.3 The RUC in a state of vigilance and preparedness 
The security measures outlined during the mid-1920s would generally be 
maintained for the next three decades. Despite the formal cessation of the conflict, the 
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security forces maintained the posture of an at-risk force for the remaining 1920s and in 
to the 1930s. When considering the broader ethos of the security forces, it is clear legacy 
played a major role: Northern Ireland was born out of conflict and policing was vital to 
sustaining the state. The conflict at the start of the state would linger in the minds of the 
Protestant Unionist population, and as they made up the bulk of the RUC, it is clear that 
was ingrained in the police force.  
The development in character for the RUC was vital to shaping its perceptions as 
a biased force. The Ulster Volunteers, created to defend the province against the threat of 
Home Rule, was reconstituted as the near exclusively Protestant “Special Constabulary” 
to defend against any threat to the new state. The Specials were conceived in four-tiered 
groupings38 was almost entirely Protestant in composition for the length of its 
existence.39 Despite no connection between Catholicism and disloyalty, the force carried 
over the previous decade’s suspicion of the Catholic community. The borderland would 
evolve through the early 1920s as an area apart from either of the newly formed states, 
with the Catholic community there equally suspicious of the Northern Ireland institutions 
that did not seem to function the same for them as it did for their Protestant neighbors. 
The borderland maintained a communal solidarity through the pull of kinship and local 
church affiliations which preserved “largely parallel, if overlapping, social spheres” that 
went rarely intruded upon for decades.40 While the police force settled into a responsive 
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and preventative role later in the decade, it would be drafted in the early 1920s to 
stabilize the borderland amidst uneasiness and open conflict. 
Touring the borderland in 1922, Prime Minister James Craig choose to agree with 
the recommendation of Henry Wilson, an important British security advisor, that 
substantial increases be made in Crown forces stationed along the border with the newly 
formed Free State. The British government agreed and by the middle of that summer, 
“the British garrison had been increased to sixteen battalions backed by 5,500 A Specials, 
19,000 B-Specials ” and an unknown number of C Specials were out to support the 
RUC.41 Northern Ireland’s border was demarcated with armed men in uniform stretching 
from south Armagh up to Derry City, prepared to defend the state. So extensive was the 
armament of the Unionist population in 1922, that the data reveals that for every five 
Protestant adult males in Northern Ireland, one was a member of the Specials.42 This left 
a legacy of division in the borderland and set delineations between those who would be 
defenders of the state and those who would be looked on with suspicion. 
During the intense period from 1922 to 1923, 14,200 Specials were mobilized to 
oppose the IRA and subdue the Catholic borderland, with another 1,200 RUC members. 
Yet the Northern Ireland government did facilitate the disengagement of militant 
Loyalism from the era of Home Rule crisis and First World War.43 While Unionist 
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militancy was channeled and normalized in the state security forces of the new Northern 
Ireland, the Republican movements efforts were curtailed to the south and the Civil War; 
there was little room for maneuver. The majority of the Ulster IRA would stay loyal to 
Collins’ Free State government, and the salaried men were explicitly told not to engage 
the security forces in Northern Ireland.44 Once it was clear order was restored, the British 
government was content with what it saw as its answer to the Irish Question, finally, and 
it remained minimally concerned with interfering in the affairs of Northern Ireland. As 
Bardon points out, the relative calm from 1923 onward, including perhaps the lowest 
ordinary crime rate in Europe in the 1920s, “intercommunal tensions had not been 
significantly reduced, and, while neither Craig nor his colleagues had created these 
divisions, they did little to assuage them.”45 Yet, some fascinating recent scholarship has 
shown discrepancies in how Belfast and the borderland would have viewed “criminality.” 
In a state of questioning their own belonging, the Catholic Nationalist borderland also 
seemed to harbor a general sympathy for smuggling, especially of small goods like butter 
and produce. Particularly in the years after the Second World War, women took a 
prominent role in smuggling and led to its domestication and a wider normalization.46 If a 
subversive spirit persisted in the political-social fabric of the borderland, it also continued 
to be a fertile breeding ground for more overt displays of public defiance. 
Force statistics also tell some of the story of the early years of border security in 
Northern Ireland. By the summer of 1922, Northern Ireland’s ratio of security personnel 
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to civilians was such that for every six families, there was one member of the security 
forces; given the religious dynamic, that meant there was one security official for every 
two Catholic families.47 Viewing this statistic from the level of family units more 
accurately conveys the ability to conduct surveillance on Catholic rural townlands; a 
RUC patrol of two or three officers could well keep tabs on four or six Catholic families, 
especially the military age males. The evidence suggests that Catholic males, even if they 
had military training, were unlikely to enlist in the RUC after partition. Bardon surmises 
that “Catholics were reluctant to seek employment in the service of a government they 
did not want,” although some Catholic RUC offers were hold-overs from the pre-1919 
RIC force, about one in six officers in 1922.48 With little honest effort to reach out to the 
Catholic community during the ensuing decade, the RUC Catholic recruitment decreased 
sharply. By 1936, Catholics comprised 17% of the force despite being over one third of 
the population, and only 9 of 55 RUC district officers were Catholics.49 By the late 
1930s, the RUC was a normalized police force with about 3,000 officers for a population 
of 1.5 million people. 
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2.3.1 Stabilizing state: security force culture 
While the size of the full-time force was dialed back, a vigilant attitude was 
generally maintained among the RUC. As the 1920s ended, the security forces would still 
claim 12,000 part-time B-Specials  to support the force of 3,000 RUC officers.50 In his 
two-hundred year survey of Ireland, Alvin Jackson cites militarism as playing an 
important role in 20th century Northern Ireland. There was a persistence of a strong 
military spirit in Northern Ireland, particularly among people in political and social 
leadership. Whether the descendants of soldiers sent to garrison towns in the 18th century 
or the sons of Boer War veterans, many politically-Unionist males envisioned their 
citizenship actively with weaponry near at hand. Their recent experience bore out the 
truth that, as Northern Ireland was created out of direct military conflict: “the new state 
was founded on the defeat of the IRA in the North, and not on the firmer clay of political 
consensus.51 To the contrary, as the state’s political foundation promoted a communal 
tension for electoral support, this would have to be institutionally maintained in the 
earliest decades of the state. 
Broadly, the RUC underwent more continuity than change during those first thirty 
years of Northern Ireland’s existence, unlike the multiple iterations of the Irish 
Republican Army at the same time. Peter Clarke’s historical view from the British 
mainland that the RUC was “deeply suspect as an agency of law enforcement; its 
paramilitary B-Specials were simply seen as Protestants in uniform,” an interesting turn-
of-phrase linking the state’s political and ethno-religious majority to its wider minority 
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status on the island as a whole.52 While many British observers knew Northern Ireland to 
be a sectarian state with a suppressive security regime, little concern seemed to be paid to 
it by the government or the public. 
As relative calm would come to the borderland through the 1930s and into the 
1940s, many Unionists continued to live uneasily with partition. It did not ensure security 
and stability, As one terrorism and security expert has established: “first, support of the 
British could not be relied upon; the Irish state to the south posed a threat to the north’s 
existence; and the minority Catholic population were viewed as a disloyal and potentially 
destabilising force.”53 It was this lurking threat of IRA action through the first 50 years of 
Northern Ireland which shaped the development of the RUC differently than its United 
Kingdom counterparts. Another law enforcement commenter, Neil Southern, has 
analyzed that the formidable and militarized force developed “to protect both themselves 
and law-abiding citizens from terrorist violence.”54 Yet, it is an odd notion to call the 
RUC’s tactics a proportional response to a perceived threat of violence, orchestrated by 
Irish Republican paramilitaries, over decades. It is logical that the RUC would raise their 
alertness to correspond with intelligence identifying a threat, but that is not evident in 
their force; instead, a hyper-vigilance seems to have always been maintained as if it was 
1922, yet the 1930s and 1940s saw almost no Republican attacks on the borderland.  
Southern rejects any conception of the RUC as a colonial-style police force and 
instead identifies the key motivation of the RUC: 
                                                        
52 Peter Clarke, Hope and Glory, Britain 1900-2000 (New York: Penguin, 2004.), 341. 
53 Clubb, Social Movement De-Radicalisation, 44. 
54 Neil Southern, “The Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Terrorist Threat” in Combatting Terrorism 
in Northern Ireland, ed. James Dingley (New York: Routledge, 2009), 177. 
 86 
The IRA always posed a threat to the Northern Irish state and the fact that its 
members came exclusively from the Nationalist community meant that that 
community – within which the IRA functioned as a potentially subversive force – 
always was under the watchful eye of the state.55 
 
Even if one disregards the unethical designs of policing in such a way, the psychological 
toll this would take on the Northern Catholic community is incalculable. In total, 
emigration from Catholics – though only one third of the population – was 90,000 out of 
the 159,000 who left Northern Ireland between 1937 and 1961.56 While there was not 
necessarily an IRA threat, there was certainly currents of opposition to the security 
apparatus. The IRA would persist as a force because Republican grievances continued to 
hold sway in Irish politics, north and south. Unionist hegemonic control in Northern 
Ireland perpetuated social and political grievances while minimizing Catholic identity. 
The institutional ethos of the RUC was certainly alien to Catholics57 in a number of 
ways, particularly the establishment of a number of Orange Lodges attached to RUC 
units.  
 
2.3.2 Stabilizing state: 1930s and 1940s political developments 
For much of the 1920s and 1930s, the rhetoric from Republican politicians north 
and south continued to decry partition and publicly call for a new political solution. But, 
it was with the adoption of the Irish Free State’s 1937 Constitution that an escalation of 
                                                        
55 Southern, “The RUC and the Terrorist Threat,” 178. 
56 Farrell, The Orange State, 92. 
57 Southern, Policing and Combating Terrorism in Northern Ireland, 36-37. The author mentions the 
“alien” institutional ethos as a deterrent in Roman Catholic recruitment, but equally offers that “the 
threat of being especially targeted by the IRA for a traitorous ethnic act is thought to explain the lack 
of recruitment amongst Roman Catholics” saying that the topic merged issues of cultural identity 
with a desire to avoid being marked out as traitorous within the Catholic community.  
 87 
the partition issue would occur. Most alarming to the Unionist hegemony were Articles 2 
and 3 of the Bunreacht, or constitution, Article 2 defined “the national territory” as “the 
whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas,” and Article 3 went further in 
claiming that laws apply to the whole island but remained suspended “pending the re-
integration of the national territory.”58 While the language of the Constitution would not 
shift Free State foreign policy and the physical Irish border, the symbolism of claiming 
control of the entire island remained a sticking point for Northern Unionists into the 
1990s. Taking a legal view of the 1937 Constitution, the language of Articles 2 and 3 
rejects the 1925 boundary agreement settled by the governments in Dublin, Belfast and 
London on the grounds of an imagined national territory.59 The Irish government, led by 
Eamonn de Valera’s Fianna Fáil party had indeed been distancing itself from Britain 
culturally, economically and politically since 1932; to Northern Ireland the constitutional 
claims were a further outrage and triggered an even greater British and Protestant ethos 
from the state.60 If each community was warily watching the other, driven more to their 
cultural distinctiveness in the 1930s, the late 1940s heightened the tension even more. 
 The next prominent moment of political angst that can be seen to have shaped the 
security response occurred in 1949 in an era immediately after the Second World War. 
The South’s neutrality was starkly contrast by the North’s involvement, particularly when 
German planes blitzed Belfast in the spring of 1940.61 In the aftermath of the war, the 
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expanding social welfare state of Britain extended its arms to citizens in Northern Ireland. 
This would lead to a further widening of the standard of living gap between the people in 
the two jurisdictions. Stormont used the economic advantages of United Kingdom 
membership in the 1950s and 1960s to provide access to welfare supports “as if these in 
themselves excused a state that remained encrusted with ethnic particularism.”62 It was 
clear that post-1945 the two governments were drifting farther apart in aims, policies and 
their dealings with Great Britain. By 1945, the contrast between the two states on the 
island of Ireland was stark: the southern state continuing to draw itself further away from 
Northern Ireland until the end of the 1950s. Bardon points to the divergence by 
specifically citing the foreign policy of The Second World War neutrality, the cultural 
arrested development of a “’thirties’ time warp” with censorship and Catholic Church 
influence (although many conservative Protestant churches in Northern Ireland were 
equally assertive), and economic policies like a high tariff wall.63 
 In Northern Ireland, 1945 also marked the formation of the Anti-Partition League 
which met in Dungannon, Tyrone for the first time with the hope of garnering more 
international attention concerning the Irish border.64 The political success of Labour in 
the General Election of 1945 was to the dismay of Unionists who sided with their 
Conservative brethren, but also to some Irish Nationalists aware of Labour’s creeping 
popularity, especially in working-class Belfast. 65 Once ousted from government, de 
Valera would embark on an international anti-partition tour in 1948 and 1949. Despite 
                                                        
62 Patterson, Ireland Since 1939, xv. 
63 Bardon, A History of Ulster, 588. 
64 Bardon, A History of Ulster, 598-599. 
65 Brendan Lynn, "The Irish Anti-Partition League and the Political Realities of Partition, 1945-9." 
Irish Historical Studies 34, no. 135 (May 2005), 326. 
 89 
efforts to raise the issue in the United States, the government of Harry S. Truman made it 
clear they had no plans to intervene in Irish partition.66 Broadly, the position of the 
United States towards partition exists between neutrality and deference towards Britain; 
as Britain maintained it would not act unless a majority of the Northern Ireland 
legislature consented. America remained on the outside of what it concerned an Anglo-
Irish issue.67 It would be news made north of the border in Canada that would send 
shockwaves back to Ireland. In September 1948, while on an official visit the Taoiseach, 
John A. Costello, announced Ireland’s intent to become a formal Republic. 
 Without informing or consulting Britain, the Irish government would re-define 
itself, its relationship with Britain and the central ideal of Irish Republicanism. The 
Northern Irish government, understandably, sought reassurance from the Labour 
government now in power. Conditions in Britain at the time, especially given the Cold 
War context of controlling the north Atlantic, also drew Belfast closer to London. In the 
context of contested space in 1948-1949, Northern Ireland held strategic sway given its 
ports and natural inland harbors on the north Atlantic; Britain valued naval supremacy 
amidst tensions like the Berlin blockage. Meeting with Clement Attlee in January 1949, 
Lord Brookeborough was given full reassurance of British commitment to Northern 
Ireland. The Northern Prime Minister would promptly, and confidently, call an election 
“to demonstrate once more that Northern Ireland was British,” and rallied Unionists by 
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warning “Our country is in danger [...] No Surrender, We are King’s men.”68 The Anti-
Partition campaign reached into the Republic for help, yet Unionist would gallop to a 
resounding victory.    
The 1949 “Chapel Gate” election was one of the most bitterly-fought in Northern 
Ireland’s history. The contest resulted in an increase in the Unionist share of the vote as 
they won 40 of 52 seats in Stormont.69 Efforts by Southern Republicans, notably the 
Minister for External Affairs Seán MacBride, to assist Northern candidates only 
backfired and split opinion in the Republic over perceived meddling in a foreign 
election.70 Further assurance by London was granted in June when Westminster passed 
the Ireland Act which copper-fastened Northern Ireland to the United Kingdom and 
reinforced the Unionist veto.71 Alvin Jackson identifies a blossoming of political 
confidence across mainstream Unionism from this moment onward: “The generation of 
Unionists elected in the late 1940s, and particularly in the election of 1949, received their 
political education at a time of relative loyalist confidence as well as southern 
braggadocio; and though sometimes bright (as with Brian Faulkner), they were not at this 
time open to even tentatively consensual gestures.”72 The 1940s drew to a close with a 
new normalcy was descending on the Irish borderland as each government endorsed the 
separation of Northern Ireland from the Republic of Ireland in legislation, security and 
society. 
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2.4 Northern Ireland: state solidification in the 1950s 
After the legislative changes in 1949, security again became essential in the 
defense of the state. The RUC and B-Specials  were always intended to operate as a 
hostile fighting force, so vigilance and suspicion was maintained even in times of peace. 
Unlike the other policed areas of Great Britain, the benefits of modernization were 
unevenly distributed in Northern Ireland and had profound effects on community policing 
and views of authority. Even though the Prime Minister, Basil Brooke, often spoke of the 
superior educational opportunities, health and welfare systems north of the Irish border, 
the government remained fixed in its political attitudes and rigid structures. The lack of 
pressure from Westminster and Whitehall in the 1950s was a policy continuation from 
the 1920s; the “ancient divisions in the region had survived the war intact and were older 
and more profound than the political frontier weaving its way through the province of 
Ulster.”73 Even if they were excluded from the higher rungs of the socio-economic ladder 
in the state, Catholics would see their standard of living increase compared to the 
Southern population.  
The Northern Ireland political apparatus applied the “no surrender” Unionist ethos 
of prior generations to its new twentieth century establishment. There was a need to 
prove self-worth and necessity within the British Empire after the First World War, that 
was revisited in the changing landscape after the Second World War. The Empire had 
been shrinking for five decades, and Northern Ireland’s border with the Republic had 
shifted from the nearest reach of a large British possession to, now, something of a 
Commonwealth outpost. The decade of the 1950s would open with Northern Ireland a 
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secure part of the United Kingdom and its state solidified behind legal justification, an 
electoral mandate and a firm security apparatus. Simultaneously, the realization of the 
Irish Republic would be as much a crisis moment for Irish Republicans as Northern 
Unionists. Bardon fittingly identifies the opening of the 1950s as a low-point in modern 
Irish Republicanism: “The prospect of Irish reunification never seemed so distant as it did 
in 1951”74 Drastic measures seemed prudent, the question was who would emerge as the 
flag-bearers of Republicanism? R.F. Foster concurs, writing that the actualization of the 
Irish Republic, even a 26-county one, ended a significant chapter in the island’s history. 
Still, Northern Nationalists continued to use the term “Free State” implying that the 
Republic was a title only; the Irish Republic remained sacred “platonically preserved for 
the visionary thirty-two-county separatist state,” yet this was further away than at any 
point that century.75 Those Northern Nationalists had coalesced around the 1940s Anti-
Partition push, employing constitutional means and attempting to rally public support on 
both sides of the border. The Anti-Partition League’s collapse in 1951 meant another 
door closed for the minority population. Michael Farrell has written the Catholic 
community “had failed to reform the Northern state from within, they had been unable to 
end it existence by constitutional means.”76  The two outcomes that flowed from this was 
a return to the physical force resistance as well as something new: the culture clash of 
open confrontation with the security forces of Northern Ireland. 
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2.4.1 The culture clash: 1950-1954 
The 1950s opened with Irish Republicans in Northern Ireland engaging in more 
public defiance of the state through events that engaged with symbols, actions and 
pronouncements affirming the Irish Republic and rejecting the state of Northern Ireland. 
For decades, dissent had been discouraged and forced off the street, but as a later 1960s 
Civil Rights agitator put it, Irish politics would return to the street. If the ruling 
establishment of Northern Ireland perceived a growing threat, the security response 
shows the tactics desired to repel it. The RUC was, one of contemporary Catholic activist 
called, a “para-military force” due to their training and access to high powered rifles and 
machine guns as well as armoured cars; from the 1950s onward the force included “a 
special Commando or reserve force whose functions were almost entirely para-
military.”77 The makings of a culture clash between the police force and Catholic border 
population were well underway by the start of 1951. 
There would be public order legislation devised in the 1950s that had not existed 
prior and would show state refusal to allow communal expression of Republican 
sympathies in Catholic areas. The Public Order Act in 1951 heightened the probability of 
public-police confrontation and, even in the opinion of one legal analyst unsympathetic to 
the Northern Catholic community, “appeared biased towards loyalism and against 
Republicanism.”78 The proof would be in the contentious points between the RUC and 
civilians, nearly all in Catholic areas and commemorations. At the same time, Stormont 
showed an unwillingness, or perhaps just an inability, to ban the often more provocative 
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Orange parades, during the July marching season. Some, like the Orange parade through 
Longstone in county Down, had long been a source of local protest – still the RUC failed 
to curtail instances of Unionist provocation.79 The contrast between what the state 
sanctioned and forbid was clear: a perceived rising from the predominantly Catholic, 
Nationalist (if not Republican) areas would be suppressed, often violently, by the security 
forces. One of the last major events before the Anti-Partition League went into full 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Pamphlet of “Beannacht na Féile Pádraig,” cover (1), Anti-Partition League, 
D2991/B/81/2, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast, Northern Ireland. 
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decline was a St. Patrick’s Day march in Derry City in March of 1952 (see Figure 2.2). 
While parading through the walled city with tricolors and people adorned in green and 
gold, the RUC baton-charged and disrupted the group with force, even battering Eddie 
McAteer.80 The RUC, with its Protestant majority, battering Catholic marchers led by a 
high-profile MP like McAteer in a Catholic majority city along the border with Donegal 
was brazen. It also showed that the Northern security forces saw any challenge to their 
authority as a threat, and any symbols of the Republic as an encroachment on the status 
quo that required responsive force. 
A year later a different type of street celebration was fully embraced by the 
government of Northern Ireland. Great Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II, freshly crowned as 
monarch after the death of her father George VI, embarked on a tour of her realm. She 
traveled to Northern Ireland in early July of 1953. Her visit – just ahead of Orange 
marching season - contained all the jubilation and pageantry that corresponded with royal 
affairs, particularly in Belfast. If asked, many of Ulster’s Unionists would likely have 
agreed with the Times of London’s assertion that the Coronation was "the nation's feast of 
mystical renewal."81 Perhaps the sight of streets blanketed with Union Jacks and the 
national colors inspired the next piece of legislation from Stormont. Still, some Unionists 
were incensed that predominantly Catholic areas did not join in the jubilation. In a 
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shocking disregard for the royal visit, locals in in Dungiven, County Londonderry had not 
permitted a special Coronation Day Orange band to march through the predominantly 
Catholic town.82 Another instance of civil disobedience occurred in Cookstown, Tyrone 
where locals had pulled down bunting erected for the queen, only to have it re-hung and 
then guarded by a member of the RUC until the celebrations ended.83 When legislation 
protecting the flag of the United Kingdom was proposed a few months later, it was 
shaped to allow the RUC powers to remove “foreign” symbols of state and arrest those 
possessing them.  
Norther Ireland’s political apparatus had enacted legislation to cover the RUC’s 
policing policies. To catch up with events on the ground, where the RUC were already 
accosting tricolor-carrying protesters, Stormont passed the Flags and Emblems (Display) 
Act in April of 1954. The bill became law just two weeks ahead of Easter and the 1916 
commemorations that had long been moments of popular nationalist expressions in 
Catholic areas. Two years before, a group of Republicans in east Tyrone had taken 
control of Pomeroy town for an Easter 1916 commemoration in a paramilitary style show 
of force: the town was sealed off my armed men and the Proclamation of the Irish 
Republic was read out.84 Stormont moved to ensure that type of dissent would not spread, 
and the RUC were directly supported legislatively to pre-emptively remove cultural 
symbols that could be used in such a Republican ceremony. The Act provided protection 
to the flying of the Union Jack, allowed for the RUC to remove a flag or emblem 
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displayed including if it required their entry into a secure location: “a police officer may 
without warrant enter any such lands or premises, using such force as may be necessary, 
and may remove and seize and detain such emblem.”85 The flying of a foreign flag, such 
as the Irish tricolor, was deemed an offense against the state. The government was 
pushing against the existential threat posed by Irish Republicanism on display in public 
demonstrations. Defying the state was deemed extremism; the state intended to suppress 
subversion, whether it employ peaceful or militant tactics. The legislation’s intent to 
suppress Republican disorder along the border was targeted at one movement in 
particular, the Fianna Uladh Republicanism of Liam Kelly from Tyrone.   
Kelly had increased his local clout among the Catholic townland of Mid-Ulster in 
the early 1950s, culminating in an electoral victory in 1953. He would over-step in a 
victory speech, and was given a prison sentence for seditious activity. He was allowed 
out early in August 1954 after serving eight months of his twelve-month remand. As 
news reached back to rural Tyrone, a spokesperson from Kelly’s political party, Fianna 
Uladh, shared that there would be a massive reception with a torch-lit procession and 
welcome band through town with bonfires ablaze in the surrounding townland.86 The 
crowd swelled in to the thousands as evening came and Kelly made his way in from 
Dungannon. Simultaneously, the RUC had massed in order to maintain the peace; they 
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also intended to enforce the Flags and Emblems Act, especially any flying of the flag of 
the Republic of Ireland.  
Years earlier, Kelly’s supporters held an Easter commemoration with Irish 
tricolors and other symbols of Irish nationhood, explicitly made illegal by this new 
legislation. The RUC, led by County-Inspector Hamilton, made it clear fighting would 
ensue if a tricolor was produced; once Kelly’s car arrived the crowd erupted and, as the 
pipe band processed to the parish hall for the Church of the Assumption, a tricolor was 
produced.87 The town of 450 people had swelled to 10,000 to welcome Kelly home, so 
the RUC was ready in full force. Violence between the baton-wielding RUC and the 
stick, stone and bottle tossing crowd quickly escalated.88  
The melee on 19 August, 1954 was classified by the Unionist Tyrone Constitution 
as a “clash” between police and republicans assembled to welcome Kelly home. The 
newspaper reported that as the evening and festivities wore on, 100 members of the RUC 
confronted an estimated 1,000 Republicans. According to the reporting the crowd had 
“showed determination to resist the order that had been made earlier, that the tricolor 
would not be permitted.”89 Members of the RUC would make multiple attempts to seize 
one tricolor in particular, encircled by an estimated 500 protesters, in what descended 
into hand to hand fighting. Bottles were thrown and the police wielded their batons. Forty 
people were injured as even Liam Kelly received a head injury before, after a few tense 
hours, the town returned to normal order. Fianna Uladh’s vice-chairman Laurence 
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Loughran and some committee members were among the arrests afterwards, charged with 
rioting.90 The political and policing constraints on Kelly and his movement would have 
major implications from 1955 onward (dealt with more depth in Chapter Three). 
After the August clash in Pomeroy, there was an RUC policy response to avoid 
certain confrontation over the tricolor, particularly by not engaging the crowd the 
following weekend; a large Nationalist event was planned for nearby Carrickmore, 
Tyrone with members of the Dáil present and a speaker from the American League for an 
Undivided Ireland.91 With national attention on the RUC, and some notice from Irish 
America, the security forces wisely curtailed the vigor by which they apprehended illegal 
flags, at least for the short-term. The 28 August follow-up event featured 5,000 marchers 
in the town where tricolors dotted almost every house on the lavishly decorated main 
street; there was minimal police presence in the town but the RUC maintained a strong 
“at the ready” stand-by force at the Pomeroy barracks.92 In another Nationalist rally, one 
week later in Newry, 10,000 gathered to protest the RUC response to Kelly’s 
homecoming event.93 The RUC created a line of demarcation near a Unionist area of the 
city, and two priests interceded to de-escalate the situation.94 Over the coming months the 
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situation simmered down and Kelly re-oriented himself to conventional politics: he was 
set to speak in the Irish Senate in November.  
But by the end of 1954, after years of sporadic conflict in the streets and electoral 
frustrations, many Nationalists had seen their constitutional efforts dashed. It wouldn’t be 
long before Kelly himself showed signs of frustration with the existing political 
structures, gaining little traction in the Seanad. The Northern Ireland security response to 
street demonstrations and peaceful protest was to respond heavy-handedly with force. 
Republican frustrations would soon boil over, and it was clear as 1955 opened that the 
physical force option increasingly appealed to a growing segment of the Northern 
Catholic population.   
 
2.4.2 The IRA’s Border Campaign: 1956-1962 
In his provincial history of Ulster surveying from the Vikings to modern 
devolution, Jonathan Bardon has labeled the period from 1945-1963 as the quiet years, 
characterizing it as a “long period of internal peace” despite persistent concerns over 
political and economic stagnation.95 Quite to the contrary, these years were far from a 
transition period from the Second Wrold War to the era of Civil Rights agitation. Instead, 
they featured the strongest threat posed by Irish Republicans to Northern Ireland since its 
creation. 
The 1956-1962 IRA Border Campaign was officially named in IRA circles as 
“Operation Harvest,” meant to conjure up the metaphoric reaping of support seeds sown 
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for re-unification, as well as signifying its planned launch of spring 1956. The campaign 
actually began in the winter, a bad omen for any reaper hoping for dividends, and in the 
end the IRA reaped few. The winter frost came in the form of a prepared, aggressive 
security response from the RUC and Special Constabulary. What began with 12 
December, 1956 night raids had crash-landed with an IRA ceasefire in February 1962, 
long after the operational capacity for the IRA in Northern Ireland was extinguished. The 
campaign began with hope and promise of Nationalist “liberation zones” along the 
borderland which would spread towards the whole of Northern Ireland consuming it, 
exhausting the British occupier into submission due to “its ability to pose a persistent 
threat.”96 Quite the opposite, the campaign would bolster the existing power structures in 
Northern Ireland and leave the IRA in ruins. 
The general historical opinion questions the IRA’s military motivations, training 
and funding, and casts its members as misguided and naïve. This criticism has also come 
from volunteers themselves, as Michael Ryan’s revealing and raw memoir My Life in the 
IRA describes a ground-level view of “the hardship, frustration and near-constant 
disappointment” of the Border Campaign.97 Ryan recalls numerous instances where an 
attack was planned, a target chosen, volunteers following orders just up to the point of 
attack before an operation was cancelled. Where targets chosen the beginning of the 
campaign (1956-1957) seemed purposeful and part of a wider scheme to destabilize the 
state and batter the security forces, the years 1958 to 1960 were characterized by more 
dissatisfaction than triumph. Jonathan Bardon summarizes the Border Campaign as 
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making little dent in the armour of the state, as “the IRA campaign continued fitfully 
without ever seriously disrupting the life of the people of Northern Ireland.”98 With 
nearly universal condemnation, it can be surmised that perhaps the campaign destined 
from the start to end in failure. What drove it to such a disastrous end?  
While the Border Campaign failed for a number of reasons, three causes can be 
highlighted as most deeply detrimental. Foremost, the Republican movement lacked 
political capital across Northern Ireland and no significant grassroots movement 
materialized to coincide with the armed struggle. When, in October 1959, Sinn Féin got a 
clear run from Nationalists at the Westminster election they lost all 12 seats they 
contested and had half the vote share that was won in 1955; their small window of public 
support had slammed shut.99 Once the IRA was completely operationally stranded, the 
security forces could crater roads to secure the border and actively patrol the borderland 
for pedestrian attacks.  
Secondly, the IRA devised a strategically-flawed and ideologically-misguided 
plan for reunification based on “liberation zones” that never formed. Logistically, it was 
ill-fated from conception and did not take in to account the reality of the RUC as a native 
police force, not some foreign army of occupation. As the support from the public was 
limited to the borderland, the RUC and B-Specials  had a quick grasp of the problematic 
areas. Patrols were increased and the border was militarized again within a month of the 
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beginning of the IRA campaign. The government of Basil Brooke, Lord Brookeborough, 
responded by eventually ordering that all but seventeen manned border roads be cratered 
or spiked, and then “calling up for duty the full complement of the B-Specials ” this was 
complete by mid-January 1957.100 And, as the Border Campaign dragged on, Northern 
politicians weaponized roads and applied political pressure on the Republic; Minister 
Walter Topping even saying in June 1959, “it would be of great assistance... if people on 
the other side of the Border brought their best endeavors to bear on the public authorities 
in those areas” in combatting illegal activities.101 The assistance Topping was requesting 
would soon materialize and help deliver a final blow to the fledgling IRA. 
In its security response, the Northern Ireland security apparatus made the Irish 
border more defensible and more real than at any point since 1925. This had been the 
opposite intent of the IRA, which had hoped to swiftly brush aside the state and border in 
its hope of Irish reunification. With limited activists, especially in Northern Ireland, the 
RUC could use internment to cripple the organization in the period 1957 to 1959. In 1957 
alone, over 250 IRA supporters were arrested in raids, heavily concentrated on the 
borderland.102 Supporters quickly became known to the RUC and ‘safe houses’ that 
billeted IRA men were just as easily identified. A familiar cat-and-mouse game 
developed as an attack, often at night, would occur and the security forces would track 
the IRA unit either to a safe house or to an attempted border crossing. With internment 
measures introduced in the South, the IRA would have no safe haven on either side of the 
border, and the campaign was stifled.  
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A final security force advantage came in the form of at least one informer within 
the Republican movement. The RUC had a highly placed informant who they codenamed 
“Horsecoper” who provided crucial information for a number of years.103 While details of 
this figure’s position within the organization and place of operation has remained 
concealed, he was able to provide membership details to the RUC: as of March 1958, 
nearly half of the active IRA was based in Dublin, with total numbers just under 1,000 
volunteers.104 Knowing this, the RUC could assume any attackers operating in Northern 
Ireland would attempt to flee back to the Republic for cover; the routes were well known 
by the end of the conflict and the RUC was apt at swooping up fleeing IRA men. The 
informant was also able to identify policy positions and intent within the movement; for 
example, recognizing that the IRA lull in attacks in the summer 1959 was intended to 
create a public outcry for the release of Northern interned IRA volunteers (this would not 
occur). The RUC had hoped that publicizing the IRA interest in a British bombing 
campaign could force London officials to pressure Dublin to bring greater legislative 
measures against the IRA. With the return of Fianna Fáil to government, this would 
indeed transpire. 
Lastly, with little money and resources the cause of Irish Republicanism along the 
border would be given up in the south, long after citizens in the north realized the cost 
outweighed the benefit. With few supplies and little support, the security forces of 
Northern Ireland – and the Republic of Ireland - could finally end the IRA’s efforts. The 
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end of the campaign was unspectacular: there would be twenty-seven incidents in 1959 
and only twenty-six in 1960.105 Isolated shootings would persist among massive IRA 
arrests north and south, and when an RUC constable was killed in Armagh, the Fianna 
Fail government led by Taoiseach Sean Lemass reintroduced military tribunals in 
November 1961. By this point the campaign was finished as internal fighting and 
resentment between the IRA and Sinn Fein rendered the effort futile.106  
The IRA ceasefire was officially called in January of 1962. A published 
declaration on 26 February claimed that issues of “arms, men and finance” ended the 
fight. The statement set the IRA against “5,000 regular troops, 12,500 B-Specials , 3,000 
RUC, 1,500 specially trained commandos and sundry other security forces totaling nearly 
30,000 men” and identified the IRA’s valiant effort despite inefficient public support.107 
The fight would be renewed at a later date, and the statement lauded the campaign’s 600 
operations that had been carried out at “enormous cost to the enemy.”108 In the May 1962 
Northern Irish election, Unionism maintained 65% of Stormont seats and it was clear that 
partition was here to stay as “the IRA campaign could kill policemen but it could do little 
else.”109 The New York Times proclaimed not merely the end of the campaign but also the 
end of the IRA, which belonged to better men than those of 1956-1962. “So dies Sinn 
Fein,” the newspaper stated, “Let us put a wreath of red roses on their grave and move 
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on.”110 The extent to which the RUC and B-Specials  were directly responsible for laying 
the 1950s IRA to rest cannot be understated. They had met the thrust by physical force 
Republicanism and given back just as good as they got. In the end, they emerged as a 
stronger force more confident in their defense of the state and the defense of Unionism. 
 
2.5 Conclusion: state survived, state strengthened 
One of the more astounding things about the Irish border, surveyed at almost any 
point in its history, is how difficult it is to find. With few natural barriers, like rivers or 
loughs, it is often delineated by the color of post boxes and sign posts. The Irish border 
was actually made real by the individuals who defended it: the security forces of 
Northern Ireland. The Royal Ulster Constabulary with support from the Special 
Constabulary desired to remain vigilant against the internal threat posed by disloyal 
Catholics, particularly in the highly concentrated areas along the borderland. Across that 
mostly invisible line, hundreds of miles from Lough Foyle in the northwest around to 
Carlingford Lough in the southeast, was that foreign nationalism seemingly always 
poised to encroach and to reclaim land long lost but not forgotten. It was in this intense 
moment of response that the 1950s security forces stepped in and smashed the 
Republican threat. The threat foremost came from cross-border raiders, but they also 
moved to suppress the fifth column, the Nationalist Catholic borderland, within their 
state. The decade had opened with attempts to minimize the public projection of Irish 
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Republican culture, and it closed with the refutation of an armed incursion meant to 
destabilize the state. 
 Looking back from the 1960s, the 1950s can be viewed as a time where the border 
was tested, and the security forces rose to the challenge. However, this view obscures the 
underlying dysfunction of the borderland in which the IRA Border Campaign, if only for 
a moment in time, seemed to grab the general public’s attention. If Jonathan Bardon’s 
acknowledgement is true – that “[n]o advantage was taken of the long period of internal 
peace and the isolation of the IRA to remedy obvious wrongs and soothe intercommunal 
resentment still stubbornly alive, especially where pockets of disadvantage were 
dangerously concentrated”111 – then one can infer the 1950s was not an era of persisting 
peace but an illustration of the dangers of letting wrongs fester, particularly among a 
disillusioned minority. It would only take a fresh generation, born around 1940 and 
reaching its political awareness by the late 1960s, to demand more from a state unwilling 
to bend to their demands.  
By the start of the 1960s, the Northern security forces could self-congratulate over 
bravery, but also not rest: they had a spirit of vigilance and preparedness, knowing that a 
future Republican challenge may not be so under-resourced and ineffective. By hoping to 
destroy the Irish border, the IRA actually more deeply established it as a defensible 
barrier for the Northern Irish state, which had long worried about the Catholic population 
in its midst. The setback for the Northern Catholic population was sizeable as grassroots 
Republicanism was returned to square one. 
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CHAPTER THREE, AN ALTERNATE STATE 
 
3.0: To free Ulster? 
Just beyond the reach of the Donegal Gaeltacht lies Tory Island, an enchanting, 
timeless place one hundred miles northwest from Dungannon in Tyrone. Separated by the 
Irish border, and under the jurisdiction of two different governments on the island of 
Ireland, each of those places is central to the story of one man: Liam Kelly. Kelly was 
reared in nearby Pomeroy but educated in Dungannon. It was there that the pupil Kelly 
first interacted with the Irish language, beginning a lifelong interest in Irish culture. Kelly 
would spend time in the Donegal Gaeltacht, mainly in Ranafast where he became 
immersed in the local customs and way of life. Years later and once retired, Kelly would 
return to Donegal to fulfill a dream of building a home in Magheraroarty, with a view of 
Tory Island off in the open Atlantic. 
Liam Kelly is best known for a rare distinction: he would hold political office in 
both legislatures on the island of Ireland in the 1950s. An elected member of Stormont 
for Mid-Tyrone in 1953, Kelly would also be appointed to Seanad Éireann in 1954. He 
was a physical force Republican, expelled from the IRA only to form a splinter 
organization maintaining the armed struggle; he would partake in the Border Campaign 
with a foot in both worlds – political and militant – before leaving Ireland in 1961. By the 
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time that Kelly and his family emigrated, the IRA campaign was doomed to failure1 and 
Kelly’s legacy was swept up with the misguided efforts of radical republicanism of the 
1950s. But Liam Kelly was much more than the few lines cast to him in the IRA histories 
between the end of the Second World War and the outbreak of the Troubles. 
Generally, Kelly’s legacy is one of a number of “border raiders” who blew up 
customs huts and fired on RUC barracks along the Irish border in the 1950s. With his 
knowledge of the Irish language and Celtic mythology, Kelly would have been well 
aware of the connotation behind “raiders,” the term the Unionist government and press 
applied to the men participating in the Border Campaign. Celtic mythology often 
involves raids between rival groups in an effort to acquire wealth and prestige. The 
concept of “ruathaire” conducting a raid or “ruathar” was most famous in the national 
epic, Táin Bó Cúailnge. Raiders from the south launching an attack on the warriors of 
Ulster, the narrative would fit with the defense of the realm promoted by the RUC of the 
mid-20th century, a romanticized struggle between ‘warriors’ on both sides of the divide. 
 Kelly presumably came across the Ulster Cycle when he was first learning the 
Irish language as a student at St Patrick’s Academy, yet many years later he would be in 
the role of Irish language teacher: while interned in Crumlin Road in the 1940s, Kelly 
taught classes.2 Kelly would mirror the experiences of later IRA internees in HMP Maze 
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during the 1970s and 1980s3 who enhanced their language skills from prison. Post-
retirement, Kelly would return to Ireland – Donegal’s Gaeltacht - to build a home in 1981 
and spend a portion of his year there ever since: returning around Easter and staying 
through the end of the summer.4  Kelly never lived again in Northern Ireland after 
emigrating, but he would keep a watchful eye on it from just over the border. 
Liam Kelly would find peace there in the language and the people who kept it 
alive: “It was my wish from the first day that I set foot on the Donegal Gaeltacht land, to 
have a small house and live there.”5 Corresponding with a distinguished Irish language 
advocate, Pádraig Ó Baoighill, in the 2000s, Kelly conveyed an awareness of his age and 
circumstances with a hint at the fire still within the proud Tyrone man. Kelly would share 
details about his upbringing, his experiences in prison and in politics, his views on 
government and on armed resistance. There is a detectable militancy, as well. Kelly 
reminisces in a detached way about the 1955 Roslea RUC barracks attack (“I was 
reasonably happy with the job that was done”) despite it resulting in the death of Connie 
Green, “...a distinguished man. He was a soldier.”6 Green’s death and that of another 
Saor Uladh volunteer (see Figure 3.1) Aloysius Hand in July 1958 would forever linger 
with Kelly, who prayed each day for the repose of their souls.7 Between time in Tyrone 
and Donegal, Kelly had lived two decades in New York. There, Kelly named his local 
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Official IRA association as “the Connie Green Club” and it remained active into the late 
1970s.8 His later interview would also shed light on why he left Ireland for New York  
 
Figure 3.1: Photograph “Funeral of Aloysius HAND of Saor Uladh at Clones, Co. 
Monaghan on 4/7/58.” From RUC file HA/32/1/955A, Public Record Office of Northern 
Ireland, Belfast, Northern Ireland. Liam Kelly is at the head of the coffin, carrying from 
the left side. 
 
and why he has since returned. All the while, the border was inescapable; as it was a 
force throughout Kelly’s life, it separates his Donegal home from his native Tyrone. The 
                                                        
8 Brian Hanley, Scott Millar, The Lost Revolution: The Story of the Official IRA and the Workers’ Party 
(New York: Penguin Group, 2009), 388-389. The Connie Green Club in Queen’s, New York was one of 
the final Republican associations in America to remain connected to the OIRA during a time of 
internal feuding and punishment killings that repelled most supporters. In an acknowledgement to 
OIRA prisoners in HMP Maze, the NY Transport Workers’ Union president was given a gift made by 
men in “the Long Kesh concentration camp,” June 1978. 
 
 112 
border divided the two jurisdictions to which Kelly was a representative in government – 
separate jurisdictions which he had hoped to see made one.  
In his lifetime, Kelly attempted to forge a new path for radical republicanism in 
Northern Ireland that was, in many ways, revolutionary for the era. Central was his 
attempt to legitimize the Southern state, acknowledging the mandate of the Irish 
Constitution and the Dáil. In maintaining a physical force threat, Kelly wished to apply 
pressure on the Northern Ireland state to cooperate with the Republic of Ireland in ways 
that could bring about the end of partition. In this context, the Border Campaign was 
meant to supplement the political program Kelly spent years building. When his electoral 
base declined and the fight appeared doomed, Kelly would choose to emigrate from 
Northern Ireland like many of his generation. In this way, his legacy is a mixed one: 
while opportunities were there, he mostly represents a path not taken and an outlook not 
embraced by radical Republicans until the 1980s. However, Liam Kelly is owed a 
modification to his general identification as a 1950s “republican” – he was an 
ideologically forward, cultural Irish nationalist. 
 
3.1: Political developments, north and south 
Life normalized in both Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State as the 1920s 
progressed. After the tumultuous start to the decade, each government was able to 
implement security controls that stopped internal strife and restore a relative piece. Along 
the Irish border, a new realization was being processed. An evolution in the philosophical 
underpinnings of Irish Republicanism occurred with a series of political developments in 
the Irish Free State through the 1930s into the 1940s. 
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3.1.1: Republicanism in Mid-Ulster, 1920-1940 
Liam Kelly was born 22 September 1922 in Dungannon, County Tyrone, 
Northern Ireland. The state had existed and persisted for a little over a year at that point, 
and James Craig was in the autumn of 1922 fortifying his border defense around Armagh, 
Tyrone and Fermanagh: Craig would answer the question of the frontier with “not an 
inch,” referring to Unionism’s desire to maintain the borderland with a readily-armed 
force: “what we have we hold.”9 The government south of the border was stabilizing as 
only a week before W. T. Cosgrave had introduces the Constitution of Saorstát Éireann 
Bill to the Dáil, implementing the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty.10 The foundation of an 
independent Irish self-government, albeit not an all-island state as imagined in Easter 
1916’s Irish Republic, had been laid.  
At that time, the Irish Civil War in the South was entering a more serious stage: in 
August, Michael Collins had been killed and in November the Free State government 
would begin a series of IRA executions, many by firing squad.11 The public was split as 
was the IRA, some supporting and some resisting the terms of the Treaty. The events of 
the Civil War convulsed the Northern IRA, which had a set of leaders also executed 
amidst further splintering and arrests. The RUC in Northern Ireland was stabilizing and 
becoming more formidable along the borderland, as communal dynamics would settle 
into the loyal suspicious of the disloyal, maintaining a watchful eye. In the Free State, the 
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security forces were also becoming formidable and would force the anti-Treaty IRA to 
relinquish its arms in the middle of 1923. 
For Kelly, like so many prominent 20th century Irish nationalists, Republicanism 
was in the blood: his father William and grandfather Billy were both involved in local 
activism in east Tyrone.12 The area had long been demographically split between 
Catholics and Protestants, the last census before Kelly’s birth showing Tyrone to have a 
55% Catholic majority of almost 80,000 Tyrone Catholics to 64,000 Tyrone 
Protestants.13 The communal divide would hold steady and the Catholic percentage of the 
population would actually decline almost a percentage point by 1961, showing the effects 
of emigration on the county (both communities had declined, the Catholic population to 
73,400 and the Protestant population to 60,500 in 1961.)14 Kelly was a product of a 
mixed marriage, as his mother was a Tyrone Protestant converting to Catholicism in 1919 
upon marrying his father.15 
Communal tension in Ulster has long featured local leaders drawing on a reservoir 
of popular memory stretching back, in some cases to the 17th century; yet by 1925, as 
many Unionists left the Free State they brought with them fresh stories and experiences 
of political and sectarian violence and, for Nationalists the B-Specials who “terrorized” 
their border communities could be added to communal memory bank with the Famine, 
penal laws and land dispossession.16 However, what divided people near the border also 
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gave them a cross-communal commonality not shared with their co-religious in, say, the 
west of Kerry or the north of Antrim. Still, Ireland’s partition left many Irish Nationalists 
adrift and presented an abrupt break with the past which was not straight forward. 
Charting the unapproved routes that the Catholic borderland would take, one historian 
points out that many of “the hitherto rising Catholic middle classes found themselves 
stranded politically, culturally, and emotionally by the sudden ebb of the nation-building 
tide,” and by inclusion in Northern Ireland they were perpetuated in a history they were 
attempting to exit.17 If curious to the alternate political reality, opposite them on the Free 
State’s side of the border was the prospect of a future they had envisioned for themselves. 
For the people living in Kelly’s Tyrone through the early years of the Northern 
Ireland state, there was a period of adjustment to the new norms of the state: 
gerrymandered politics and an unequal distribution of social services, divided cultural 
institutions in education, housing, and communal organizations which stemmed from the 
congregational divide. For security, the RUC sustained a membership base almost 
exclusively from the Protestant community, primarily in the former garrison towns 
established three centuries earlier. Rural Tyrone, and much of Mid-Ulster, continued to 
be strongly Irish Catholic with Republicanism an almost dormant ideology. Yet, 
Republican politics would take a backseat to more constitutional Nationalism during the 
1930s and 1940s, paralleling the evolution of republican nationalism in the South, as 
demonstrated by the “Republican Party” of Éamon de Valera, Fianna Fáil.  
By the 1930s, changes to the Southern political order would bring the first Fianna 
Fáil-led government to power. The process of a shift in domestic and foreign policy as 
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directed by de Valera would begin and take place over the next two decades. Many of the 
dismal economic outcomes of the 1950s would be instigated during this time, as post-
1932 Fianna Fail attempted to “build an Irish industrial base behind protective tariff 
barriers” which continued well beyond their Emergency-era “sell-by date” as labor 
demands never reached the levels needed given the high population increase.18 If the 
seeds of later economic collapse were first sown in the 1930s, the government would put 
in motion another monumental factor. The writing of the Irish Free State Constitution, the 
Bunreacht, would be another monumental moment in the development of Republicanism. 
While not accepted by the majority of radical republicans, this would be one of the first 
fracture points for Kelly’s brand of Republicanism: “[The hope was for] the Bunreacht to 
be extended throughout the country and the goal they set out [in it] to be achieved and 
they have no means of doing that only the old one.”19 Kelly came into his political 
awareness, as most do during secondary school, as the Constitution was making legal 
claim over the whole of Ireland. Kelly would join the IRA by 1940, and participate in 
operations during the Second World War, perhaps frustrated at the lack of political 
movement at that time.20 
After the time of state formation in the early 1920s, Northern Ireland moved 
towards a solidification of institutions and processes from the late 1920s into the 1940s. 
During that time, the borderland development was minimal in all governmental areas 
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19 Ó Baoighill, “Liam Ó Ceallaigh,” 24. 
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midnight during the week at the Dungannon cinema, earning seven shillings and sixpence a week, 
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outside of security. Security became a greater emphasis during the Second World War as 
the divide grew between belligerent Northern Ireland and the neutral Free State. 
Politically, the scale continued to be tilted towards the Unionist party and Protestants 
more broadly. The voting blocks were maintained, and minimal impact was made by 
Nationalist politicians at Stormont or local county councils. The largely agrarian Tyrone 
would see deprivation characteristic of much of Ireland in this era; Kelly remembers the 
hunger of his childhood, “In those days, my youth, my memory was of being cold, wet 
and hungry.”21 Kelly’s formative years of schooling in Dungannon would have seen the 
Nationalists oscillate between abstentionist policy and attempting to work within the 
constraints of Stormont. Neither amounted to much. 
Perhaps more than many of his contemporary Republicans, Liam Kelly 
understood the realities of life in Northern Ireland particularly regarding the Unionist 
community. The Dublin-based leadership’s inaccurate picture of Northern Irish society 
would later be an undoing of the Border Campaign. Co-opting the language of the 1950s 
IRA, Kelly also knew the blunt reality of Partition: “It was clear that that the Brits could 
not just be forced out, and that both governments would be obliged to play a role in doing 
away with the Government of Ireland Act 1920 and re-examining the terms of the 
Treaty.”22 That self-awareness was forged on the borderland, and would later guide the 
political philosophy of Liam Kelly, the Stormont candidate, and then his political party, 
Fianna Uladh. 
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3.1.2: Republicanism in Mid-Ulster, 1940-1959 
From the 1940s onward, two changes occurred. Foremost, the people of Northern 
Ireland generally enjoyed identical social welfare benefits to those of mainland Britain in 
a post-war embrace of government programs. Secondly, development, particularly after 
the Ireland Act of 1949 continued to occur disproportionately in Unionist-controlled 
Protestant areas of the Northeast. There was a divide between services that would be 
provided ‘west of the Bann’ and those east of the Bann River which ran vertically from 
southeast of Portadown through Lough Deagh on to Coleraine, bisecting the province. 
The waterway did mark a split between the Protestant areas of north Londonderry, 
Antrim, Down and north Armagh and the Catholic majorities farther westward. 
Precedence existed from the start of the 20th century. The failure, or perceived 
betrayal, of constitutional means led to the gun being inserted in to Irish politics on the 
eve of the First World War. This process happened relatively quickly with the formation 
of the Ulster Volunteers followed by the Irish Volunteers shortly after.23 In the middle of 
the century the process was more nuanced, as militancy had gone in two divergent paths: 
Ulster militancy to the security forces, Irish militancy in Northern Ireland to a smaller, 
milder IRA.  
Counter-measures by the RUC had long-made the Northern IRA a shadow of its 
former self, but still physical force Republicanism persevered. Not long after joining his 
local IRA unit, Liam Kelly would be arrested by the security forces. He was placed on 
remand in Belfast’s Crumlin Road gaol where, like Republicans before and after, he 
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would keep his mind sharp through the use of the Irish language. “There were Irish 
classes in the Crum – years God will never give me back! God forgive me! - and I was 
supposedly teaching some of them,” Kelly would recall years later.24 It can be inferred 
that Kelly gained a boost in confidence with this authoritative role in the gaol, not just 
deriving respect through a military persona but as a cultural authority. Upon release in 
1945, Kelly would make his first trip to the Gaeltacht, forever to be changed. 
The years 1946-1947 were crucial for both Liam Kelly and the IRA as a 
movement. Kelly was back living in Tyrone when he was granted a summer teaching 
opportunity in Ranafast, Donegal, his first experience living outside of Northern 
Ireland.25 The experience would be extremely formative on Kelly who immersed himself 
in the local culture, and it certainly would fuel his cultural advocacy shortly thereafter 
when he began a foray into politics. Returning to Tyrone, Kelly would continue teaching 
the Irish language at the primary school level. A year later, in 1947, the IRA would also 
make its first substantial tactical adjustments since their disastrous efforts coinciding with 
the Second World War. Kelly was an active IRA man and recalls the IRA meeting as a 
reformulation of the movement’s political and military aims: 
When we started the reorganization of the IRA in the 1940s (say, 1947) some of 
us had made our minds up that we would not get caught with the foolishness of 
the 1930s: we would abandon the claim that the IRA Army Council retained legal 
authority over the country; to give full recognition to the Oireachtas as the lawful 
government of the country and the acceptance of the Constitution as the sole legal 
body in the land.26 
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While Kelly would be central to re-organizing the IRA in Tyrone, his stance on 
acceptance of the legitimacy of the 26-county legislature was certainly unique among the 
organization. Sinn Fein was still strictly abstention for both of Ireland’s legislatures.  
As the IRA attempted to stay relevant during rapidly changing times, the social 
life of Northern Ireland was changing along with the rest of the United Kingdom. The 
extension of the welfare state would occur as the Cold War descended on the world, 
security against the foreign threat became an obsession to some in Westminster, as well 
as in Belfast and even Dublin. With the end of the Second World War, and a new era of 
post-colonial politics seemed to abound; yet, there still was no cohesive nationalist 
opposition to the Protestant Unionist ascendency. In continuing to withhold participation 
and pretend the state did not exist, Republicans were actually playing into the hands of 
the ruling regime at Stormont. Alvin Jackson deduced that “Nationalism had for long 
been debilitated, not only by the restrictive political rules devised by the state but also by 
their own divisions,” which were partially alleviated with the launch of the Anti-Partition 
League in Dungannon in  November 1945.27 Northern Nationalism had hoped to rally 
around a renewed push against partition, aided by the Free State’s inter-party coalition 
which came to power in 1948. One of the political parties to gain power, Clann na 
Poblachta, would attempt to drive forward a Republican vision more aligned with views 
held by Liam Kelly and his supporters. The Republican fragmentation and reforming of 
the central strands of nationalist republicanism and egalitarian-social republicanism was 
ongoing for much of the Free State and early Republic period, but this post-war energy 
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did represent something new in light of developments north and south from 1949 
onward.28 With the declaration of the Irish Republic by Taoiseach John A. Costello, and 
the assurance of Northern Ireland’s place in the United Kingdom with the Ireland Act, 
each government seemed squarely at odds on the partition issue. In this way, 1949 began 
a decade of the 1950s where political mobilization of Republicans seemed absolutely 
vital.  
The social and economic situation along the borderland continued to be dire into 
1950. As sustained disproportional Catholic emigration continued out of Northern 
Ireland, some to the Free State but most farther afield, many republicans would face a 
decision of how to act. Some chose to pursue the constitutional route politically, some 
chose active resistance against the state, some chose physical force resistance against the 
security forces, while some would choose to just leave. Liam Kelly would, in the span of 
a decade, do all four. 
 
3.2: Liam Kelly’s politics  
Beyond the political and social convulsions and irregularities of the early decades 
of the Northern Ireland state, there persisted a strong Republican spirit in the context of 
everyday family life. For ardent nationalist areas, there remained a continuity with their 
Southern counterparts in communal reverence for Fenians of the past and more recent 
heroes of 1916 and 1919. Liam Kelly showcased a pride in his own families connections 
to the 1916 Proclamation of an the Irish Republic, relaying that his grandfather was a 
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close associate of one of the signatories, Tom Clarke.29 If the Dungannon-born Clarke set 
an example of anti-British resistance to young men in the early 20th century, that spirit 
remained alive during Kelly’s formative years. 
 The RUC’s thorough file on Liam Kelly as of September 1958 charts his 
involvement with the physical force republicanism from the Second World War to the 
IRA’s Border Campaign in significant detail.30 Kelly’s recruitment to the IRA occurred 
in 1940 and within a year, despite still being a teenager, had risen to be an intelligence 
officer. Arrested in Tyrone in September 1941 for possessing documents relating to the 
affairs of the IRA, Kelly was sentenced to two years in Crumlin Road. When the May 
1943 release date came, Kelly found his imprisonment extended as he was deemed “a 
danger to the security of the State,” remaining in jail until the conclusion of the war and a 
general amnesty to IRA men in September 1945. Despite his preoccupation with the Irish 
language, Kelly must have been frustrated spending the first four years of his twenties 
locked away. It was widely known that the Northern command of the IRA was infiltrated 
with informers and rife with internal feuds and powerful localized fomenters, primarily in 
Belfast.31 What impact would the disastrous IRA efforts during the early 1940s have on 
Kelly, who spent years interned because of disorderly-planned missions?  
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Kelly appeared to channel any misgivings about the recent history of the 
Republican movement towards productive means and new directions. The RUC recorded 
a decline in Kelly’s direct engagement in physical force activities between 1945 and 
1950, stating he was more or less inactive, but noting he remained an avowed Republican 
speaking at Easter 1916 commemorations in April of 1949 and 1950.32 Behind the 
scenes, however, Kelly was distancing himself from what he saw as outdated and 
corrosive Republican rhetoric.  
From the 1947 Army Council meeting that reset policy for the organization, the 
IRA and Sinn Fein entertained a series of new approaches from political and military 
perspectives. If the Republican political apparatus cracked open the door to 
acknowledging elements of the Southern State being the idealized ‘Irish Republic,’ then 
Kelly’s motives seem to kick the door in. The IRA reorganization in Mid-Ulster by the 
late 1940s was a sincere attempt to explore new challenges as Ireland approached a new 
decade with post-war realities. Northern Republicans like Kelly had no illusions as to 
what could be accomplished given the entrenched Unionist culture: “It was clear that the 
Irish Republic would not come about in one leap, even if Sinn Fein or the IRA were to be 
involved in the talks.”33 By “talks” Kelly means the trilateral government discussions 
between Dublin, Belfast and London over partition that would come out of a successful 
IRA campaign against the Northern Ireland state. Kelly’s logic was that a British policy 
shift on the status of Northern Ireland would not be facilitated by force alone, and that the 
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32 Kelly read out IRA proclamations at the Easter 1916 commemorations in Carrickmore, Tyrone. 
From typescript of RUC report “LIAM KELLY AND SAOR ULADH,” PRONI, 1. 
33 Ó Baoighill, “Liam Ó Ceallaigh,” 24. 
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threat of force with real political mobilization could necessitate talks between the two 
governments on the island of Ireland. Because of this, Kelly believed that militants had a 
critical role to play in maintaining a tense atmosphere for political change: 
We knew well that the IRA and whatever other [militant] movements there might 
be would have to put up a good fight and would continue the fight for as long as 
necessary. We had to show the two governments that this fight would not end 
until they accept their part in arranging an agreement.34 
 
It is unclear precisely when Liam Kelly would come to the realization of cross-border 
cooperation as a political necessity to addressing – if to ultimately end – partition.  
From a series of key events between late 1948 and the end of 1951, it appears 
Kelly charted an irreversible path forward for himself and his radical aims. From 
Costello’s public declaration of the Irish Republic through to the Ireland Act, 1948 and 
1949 were years of state solidification. The border arrangement would persist as each 
government prioritized economic progress. The promise of change once held by the inter-
party Coalition began to fade by 1950, and its loss of government to Fianna Fail in 1951 
certainly showed a return to older modes of governance under Taoiseach de Valera.35 
Significant, too, was the collapse of the Anti-Partition League at that time, which had 
been thoroughly infiltrated by more radical republican elements. Lastly, the creation of an 
IRA military council in 1951 commenced planning for a full-scale, meticulously devised 
campaign against the security forces of Northern Ireland.36 Key Dublin-based IRA men 
like Sean Cronin (later Chief of Staff and the Director of Operations during Operation 
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Harvest) went about formulating plans for flying columns to create “liberation zones” 
first along the borderland that would expand towards Belfast by crippling the state’s 
functionality (targeting security installations and vital infrastructure) forcing inevitable 
surrender from the Unionist hegemony.37 This plan appears to have been devised with 
little to no consultation from Northern Ireland-based Republicans, even though they 
would have been essential collaborators for stabilizing the “liberation zones” along the 
border. In light of this disregard for their input, it is not surprising that Liam Kelly would 
act on his own accord around the time of operational planning. At the least an obvious 
sign of hierarchical indifference, Kelly also may have been showing his own capacity to 
lead unsanctioned missions on targets he deemed legitimate. After carrying out an 
“illegal” raid in Derry, an area outside of his official operational capacity, Kelly’s rogue 
spirit would get him cast out of the IRA, officially expelled for insubordination.38 In 
September 1951, Kelly was sanctioned by IRA GHQ in Dublin as the officer 
commanding an East Tyrone unit; he then used this group to engage in unapproved 
behavior one month later. The RUC believed that cell to feature only three to four men 
and that Kelly was “reluctant to submit to any authority.”39 Overly-simplistic, it is 
doubtful that the cell was that small and Kelly’s departure so small-minded: he knew full 
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well what a formal break with the IRA and Sinn Fein could do in allowing him to chart 
an alternate republican path along his own ideological lines. 
Tragedy producing triumph is a common theme throughout revolutionary 
movements in Irish history, and here Liam Kelly would seize the opportunity to assert 
himself with new institutional independence. Having built a reputation and gathered 
considerable clout during the previous decade of activity in the IRA, Kelly would 
immediately build a dual political-militant organization. Saor Uladh would be, as 
Michael Farrell later called it, “a new Northern organization born directly out of the 
frustration of the minority,” those frustrated by Sinn Fein and IRA inefficiency.40 Farrell 
claims that Kelly took most of the Tyrone IRA membership with him, and evidence 
suggests he also attracted disillusioned IRA members in Derry and Monaghan, indicated 
by the IRA leadership’s desire to reign back in Kelly’s expanding group as late as August 
of 1952.41 By that point, Kelly had taken his followers along a different path. With Saor 
Uladh, Kelly tapped into reserves underutilized by Sinn Fein and the Southern-based 
IRA, as he “won the support of a new generation of northern republicans impatient at 
IRA inaction and contemptuous of the Anti-Partition League’s constitutional 
campaign.”42 They remained militant with attacks on government civil servants in 
Dungannon in January 1953 and customs post bombings in April.43 The border attacks 
were a sign of things to come, as Kelly selected what he perceived to be security weak 
points in  Culmore, Molenan, and Galliagh Cross, Derry. The RUC also gained 
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intelligence – perhaps from informants or Specials in the borderland – that Saor Uladh 
men were engaging in training exercises in the Ballygawley area of South Tyrone, just 
across from the Irish border.44 
Two public declarations twelve months apart would alter the Irish Republican 
landscape in Northern Ireland for the rest of the decade. In October 1952, the IRA 
released a statement publicly repudiating Kelly as “an erratic individual” and warning 
Republicans against joining him. The statement asserts that Saor Uladh’s recklessness 
could “endanger the liberty of loyal volunteers in County Tyrone and bring the Army in 
general into disrepute.”45 One could scarcely imagine the IRA’s reputation being any 
lower after some of the incidents during the 1930s and 1940s, including botched arms 
raids and the court-martial of a sitting Chief of Staff. One year later, emboldened by his 
expulsion from the IRA, an organization to which he had dedicated decades of his life, 
Kelly was elected to the Northern Ireland legislature at Stormont. If his exclusion from 
the IRA surprised Kelly, his election stunned his former comrades. Resourceful and 
charismatic, Kelly ran for his local constituency, Mid-Tyrone, winning by a tight margin 
over a Nationalist Party incumbent.46 Still, the election of a known militant Republican 
was a change of direction for anti-partitionist politics used to the electoral and armed split 
as shown by the McAteer brothers.47 The RUC believed that Kelly’s entrance in to 
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politics was a calculation to obscure his paramilitary activity, but his candidacy for 
Stormont seems to have organically sprung from his desire to bring republican politics 
out of the shadow that had descended on the movement in the 1940s.48 Kelly’s victory in 
October 1953 catapulted him into the public sphere, and he would make a public 
declaration that immediately compromised his position.  
Once he became “Liam Kelly, Stormont MP,” the militant Saor Uladh moved 
aside to make way for a political wing: Fianna Uladh. Years later, Kelly would recall that 
his election was the catalyst for the party formation, calling it “an accident that Fianna 
Uladh came to be,” after his election.49 He was savvy enough to know he needed to 
standardize his party’s ideology, as well as put in place party officials who could assist 
him in day-to-day tasks. But while showing a clear political vision, Kelly was also over-
playing his hand with public pronouncements in a state still hostile to perceived dissent. 
Kelly knew well of the RUC’s attitude towards unsanctioned meetings, seditious speech 
and inflammatory proclamations, yet in the wake of his election victory Kelly would 
speak openly and unrestricted. “I believe in the use of force, the more the better, the 
sooner the better,” Kelly remarked on 23 October to a crowd of supporters at a victory 
rally; more pointedly, Kelly went on to state that the time for force was now and that 
“England does not understand what we mean by force but we will make them [...] 
understand by the strong-arm method.”50 Kelly also had directly slandered the Queen of 
England, calling her “a foreign queen in a bastard nation,” and succeeded in attracting the 
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ire of the Unionist state eager to suppress any perceived threat to the social fabric of the 
state. Kelly was duly charged and convicted for sedition, with more fireworks in the 
courtroom. Receiving a fine, Kelly refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the court 
before launching into an extended tirade stating that he had rejected the prison uniform: 
“you may hold me in your jails but you will hold me naked.51 The Northern Ireland 
security forces would hold the 1950s ‘blanketman’ Kelly, and in a place familiar to him – 
Crumlin Road – most of the next year. Yet, by 1954 Kelly’s incarceration would actually 
lead to a second political office, this time across the Irish border.   
 
 
3.2.1: Political foundation, maintained militancy 
Liam Kelly was more than an inflammatory orator and Republican rabble-rouser; 
he held political office in Stormont and had gained, in a little over two years, a following 
of committed physical force republicans as well as a sizeable portion of the Tyrone 
electorate. He had mobilized a significant grassroots Republican movement in the heart 
of Mid-Ulster behind a fresh vision of what accepting an Irish Republic could be, still 
rejecting partition in practice but building a cooperation towards a more tenable solution 
for the Northern Catholic community. Fianna Uladh was meant only to draw from the 
Northern Ireland electorate: “Fianna Uladh has no involvement with any party in the 26 
counties. Fianna Uladh has no intention of participating in the work of the 26 counties.”52 
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If the original design was local politics, Kelly’s party would gain all-Ireland attention 
when he was nominated by Seán MacBride to Seanad Éireann. 
MacBride, mystifying for his numerous complexities and varied iterations in Irish 
public and political life spanning seven decades, would be an IRA leader, party founder, 
international human rights activist and Nobel Prize recipient.53 The French-born son of 
John MacBride and Maud Gonne, was IRA Chief of Staff from 1936 until 1938 before 
becoming a barrister – obtaining Senior Counsel status of the Irish Bar in seven years, the 
quickest in history to that point – and committing to a constitutional route.54 MacBride 
remained a committed ideological Republican while also being practical about the state 
of Irish politics in the 1940s; he would take on de Valera’s Emergency-era IRA policies 
through legal means, particularly stirring in defense of Sean McCaughey and the rights of 
political prisoners held in the Irish Free State. Notably, in 1946 MacBride brought 
embarrassment to the state in forcing an admission that the prison conditions to which 
McCaughey was subject were inhumane.55 From leadership in the IRA to a leader in the 
legal profession, MacBride would bring a new approach to Irish politics after the Second 
World War in an attempt to bridge traditional Republicanism, contemporary social issues, 
and constitutional politics. 
                                                        
53 Elizabeth Keane, Seán MacBride: A Life (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 2007), ix-xi. Keane links 
MacBride to a myriad of Irish political figures who “move from revolutionary terrorist to 
constitutional politician” but states he was distinct in his later international role. 
54 Keane, Seán MacBride, 57, 68-69. MacBride maintained a relationship with the IRA post-1938, if 
not entirely clear how linked he was to armed militancy there was a clear defense of IRA men in 1942 
when six men were convicted of an RUC officer’s murder in Belfast. MacBride organized a reprieve 
committee and gathered 200,000 signatures, eventually contributing to 5 of 6 men avoiding 
execution. 
55 Keane, Seán MacBride, 69-70. MacBride questioned a Portlaoise prison doctor, T.J. Duane, with 
“would you allow your dog to be treated in this fashion?” Duane’s response was in the negative, 
affirming MacBride’s defense of McCaughey’s hunger strike as the desperate measures “that led this 
boy to go on hunger strike.” 
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While the fragmentation of Republicanism was the norm more than exception 
during the early 20th century, there was reason to believe MacBride’s party could 
demonstrate something new and opportunistic when it was founded in the late 1940s. 
After Fianna Fail’s drift to the right in anticipation of gaining ministerial posts in the late 
1920s, Saor Eire was formed in September 1931 as a republican combination of radical 
nationalism with Connelly-inspired socialism.56 Condemned by the Catholic Church for 
being a Communist organization, Saor Eire’s moment was brief – the political movement 
lasted less than a year – yet, it showed how a republican party could advocate for socialist 
programs and reforms in land and farming, workers’ rights, healthcare and housing.57 
MacBride’s new party the Clann na Poblachta would revisit some of Saor Eire’s key 
policy positions once in government, perhaps most notably in Minister for Health Noël 
Browne’s reforms popularly remembered as the disastrous “Mother and Child” episode.58  
Entering into the legislature in the 1948 inter-party Coalition government, Clann 
na Poblachta succeeded where previous splinter nationalist republican groups had 
faltered. The party made a discernible contribution to the new government – formed by 
radicals and conservatives, Free Staters and Republicans - a Coalition that would rule 
three years, from February 1948 to May 1951, before a return to Fianna Fail.59 In that 
                                                        
56 MacDermott, Clann na Poblachta, 6. Saor Eire, with strong IRA ties, was founded by Sean MacBride, 
Michael Fitzpatrick, Michael Price – later to leave the IRA and become a Labour Party member – and 
Peadar O’Donnell, all of a physical force Republican and left-leaning political background. 
57 MacDermott, Clann na Poblachta, 6-7. 
58 MacDermott, Clann na Poblachta, 84. David McCullagh, A Makeshift Majority, the First Inter-Party 
Government, 1948-51 (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1998), 202-209. McCullough writes 
of the “crisis” in the context of Ireland’s first – and perhaps only – 20th century church-state schism 
over public policy. 
59 McCullagh, A Makeshift Majority, 2-5. McCullough surveys the oddity of coalition governance in 
British-style Western democracies, citing the British reality of coalitions existing only in wartime or 
the economic low-point of the early 1930s. He further explains the uniqueness of the 1948-1951 and 
1954-1957 coalitions based on ideological adherence and political cleavage; for the partnership of 
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time a Republic was declared, and MacBride moved his party to attempt real cooperation 
with Northern Ireland. Simultaneously, MacBride had integrated Clann na Poblachta into 
mainstream public Irish Republicanism by participating in the annual Bodenstown Wolfe 
Tone commemoration first in 1948 and then in successive years.60 While some historians 
judge Clann na Poblachta to be a reactionary movement with a strange assortment 
forming the “negative consensus” of Ireland around 1950, this would diminish efforts to 
transition radical Republicanism towards constitutional measures fitting with the post-
1949 realities North and South.61 
MacBride would push for greater North-South cooperation, economically as well 
as diplomatically, during his time in office 1948-1951 and then again 1954-1957.62 In 
particular, MacBride made it a stated policy to bring Northern Nationalist voices in to the 
Oireachtas, something that de Valera and Fianna Fail had historically opposed. While it 
seemed implausible that a Northern representative could enter the Dáil, MacBride did see 
a path through the Seanad as guided by the rules of procedure; Clann na Poblachta would 
nominate Denis Ireland, a Belfast-born Protestant Nationalist, and the Taoiseach would 
appoint him in 1948.63 It was established that a path forward in North-South 
                                                        
Fine Gael and Clann na Poblachta, he points to the basic opposition to de Valera (for entirely different 
reasons), marking Ireland out as a “deviant case when it comes to coalition theory.” 
60 Typescript of Gardaí Report on “1948 Wolfe Tone Commemoration,” 20 June 1948, 1, JUS/8/900, 
National Archives of Ireland, Dublin, Ireland. 
61 Particularly, R.F. Foster in Modern Ireland described the emergence of Clann na Poblachta as a 
reactionary movement that “brought together old Republicans, anti-Partitionists, socialists and 
dissident members of the Fianna Fail in what has been called a ‘negative consensus’” adding that the 
inner councils of the organization were IRA-dominated. While broadly factual, this demeans the 
movement’s electoral windfalls in 1948 and 1954 and over-emphasizes the Republican roots in 
shaping policy once in ministerial positions. Foster, Modern Ireland, 565. 
62 McCullough, A Makeshift Majority, 116-122. Economic co-operation could be demonstrated in a 
shared interest in the Erne Scheme, the Foyle fisheries, and the Great Northern Railroad, although 
from 1948 to 1950 progress was certainly not linear. 
63 McCullough, A Makeshift Majority, 122-123.  
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collaboration could be the use of Seanad appointments, and MacBride would later look to 
Liam Kelly for such a nomination. 
It is worth examining the political events which brought Liam Kelly into the 
Seanad at a time when Northern Republicanism officially failed to recognize the legal 
authority of the Oireachtas. By April 1951, Sean MacBride was at odds with many within 
his party’s leadership, most notably Noël Browne, and he was wisely looking for allies 
elsewhere.64 While, it is a fair critique that Clann na Poblachta’s policies of Republican-
socialism left little impression or evidence of either on the 1950s landscape, it was not for 
want of attempts at institutional change.65  
Clann na Poblachta’s impact on the second inter-party Coalition, beginning in 
1954, was diminished from the first as its ‘external support’ role placed it more on the 
periphery of the government.66 However, it is at this time that MacBride would nominate 
Liam Kelly to the Seanad. Serving a sentence for sedition, Kelly would sign the Roll of 
House from Crumlin Road gaol.67 Kelly’s appointment was met with opposition from 
some in the establishment, notably the longtime Fianna Fail stalwart William Quirke; the 
Tipperary-born Senator spoke ahead of Kelly’s maiden speech to denounce the practice 
of incorporating Northerners in the Oireachtas: 
I fail to see that anybody could come in here from the Six Counties or anywhere 
else and tell us anything we did not know already. In other words, you would be 
preaching to the converted. Practically everybody in both Houses is keenly 
interested in the abolition of Partition. Everybody has made a very definite study 
                                                        
64 MacDermott, Clann na Poblachta, viii. 
65 Foster, Modern Ireland, 576. 
66 Keane, Seán MacBride, 210-211. MacBride biographer Elizabeth Keane writes that Clann na 
Poblachta’s two major contributions to the second inter-party government was the Kelly nomination 
and then its role in collapsing the government in 1957 with proposing the vote of no confidence 
(210). 
67 “Seanad Éireann debate - Thursday, 22 Jul 1954,” Seanad Debates, Parliamentary Debates, Office of 
the Houses of the Oireachtas, Leinster House, Dublin. 
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of the problem and would jump at any opportunity to bring about an end to this 
sore which has been festering in this country for a considerable number of 
years.68 
 
If the 1950s still demonstrated a period of economic transition for Fianna Fail towards the 
later efforts by Lemass with O’Neill, perhaps this sentiment fits. But as a continuation of 
previous policy, the anti-partition efforts were as unsuccessful by 1954 as any point in the 
post-Treaty era. 
Undeterred by the hostility of detractors in his midst, Liam Kelly would deliver his 
first, and only, speech before the Seanad. Opening in the Irish language, he thanked his 
fellow Senators before advocating for the inclusion of Northern representatives in the 
Oireachtas. Partition was an injury to the nation, a disruption caused by state formation; 
Kelly employed traditional Republican rhetoric, saying “Whenever a powerful State 
determines to disrupt a nation by lending its financial and military support to a minority, 
it can usually succeed in sowing seeds of internal dissension.”69 Britain had maintained 
this “scheme of disruption” throughout his lifetime, and Kelly believed the solution 
would first come through political re-integration and a 32-county representative 
parliament. By providing Northern Irish Nationalists the opportunity to place 
representatives in the Dáil, like Kelly and Charles McGleenan fellow Fianna Uladh 
Senator from Armagh70, the Irish Republic could move closer to representing the full 
                                                        
68 William Quirke, “Audience for Six-County Representative—Motion (Resumed)” (Seanad Éireann, 
Volume 44, 25 November, 1954), Seanad Debates, Parliamentary Debates, Office of the Houses of the 
Oireachtas, Leinster House, Dublin. 
69 All speech excerpts and quotes, unless otherwise noted, from Liam Kelly “Audience for Six-County 
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70 Charles McGleenan, a South Armagh-born IRA man from the War of Independence, had the 
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Irish nation. As Northern Catholics did not fully accept the Northern Ireland government 
which had not fully embraced them, Kelly believed that “the Irish people are prevented 
from determining their own affairs freely by democratic means” which would lead to “a 
section of our own people, the most courageous, generous and patriotic section, [seeking] 
to assert by any means available to them the sovereignty of the Irish people in our own 
country.” This aligns with political means, Fianna Uladh, maintaining a closeness with 
physical force tactics, Saor Uladh, to sustain pressure.  
To Kelly, partition had not occurred but was a thing continuing to occur daily in the 
borderland, calling it the ongoing “dismemberment of our nation.”71 The trauma of 
partition on people in Kelly’s constituency could begin to be addressed when the Dáil and 
Seanad allowed their voices to be heard, in accordance with the Irish Constitution that 
claimed territorial rights over the entire island. “It would be the first step towards the 
extension of the Constitution to the whole of Ireland,” Kelly added that this motion 
would “restore the confidence of the people not only in the Six Counties but of the whole 
of Ireland and in her national institutions.”72 In the absence of that chance at national 
political inclusion, the alternative route is armed resistance, to which Kelly warns will 
lead to a loss of faith and patience and the use of direct action. Like Republicans in the 
                                                        
Northern Ireland Elections, “Armagh 1950-1970” Ark – Northern Ireland’s social policy hub, accessed 
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physical force tradition before him, Kelly states that an unwillingness to advocate for the 
Northern Catholic population is tantamount to supporting Britain and upholding partition.  
On partition, he directly addressed Costello and the government asking: “Is the 
Taoiseach not aware that the maintenance of Oireachtas Éireann as a Partition Assembly 
in the eyes of a section of the people has forced successive Governments to accept the 
role of watchdog, jailer and hangman to the British Empire?” This point gained the ire of 
Liam Cosgrave, the Minister for External Affairs, who decried Kelly’s logic as 
incompatible with his party’s acceptance of the Bunreacht. If he pledges his support to 
the government, which is given sole authority by the Irish Constitution to raise an army, 
then he cannot also advocate physical force. Kelly believed that literal sovereignty 
extended to Northern Ireland, a point Cosgrave nor the government could unequivocally 
endorse. In the absence of working to integrate the Northern population, the government 
was being negligible and left people no other option but to act. At the closing of this, and 
other spirited debates around the motion, the proposal failed to pass. Later, when violence 
again broke out along the borderland in 1956, Kelly would link the Seanad repudiation to 
the resumption of conflict.73 
Ultimately, Kelly’s spirited maiden speech had no long-term effect on politics in the 
Republic of Ireland. Kelly’s voice in Southern politics more broadly never reached the 
audience MacBride had envisioned. While Kelly failed to leave an imprint on the 
Southern political scene that year, his return from prison to his native Tyrone only three 
months before was indeed a disruptive event in Northern public life. Originally assigned 
twelve months’ remand, Kelly was let out early in August of 1954. Liam Kelly would 
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travel from Belfast to Dungannon before planning a triumphant return to his home 
village. Word travelled fast, and a celebration was organized drawing many from the 
surrounding townland of Pomeroy.  
Despite the orders and recent actions of the RUC, flags and flutes would accompany 
this local hero home to Tyrone. And while often a quiet place, Pomeroy was certainly not 
that on August 19th, 1954. As detailed in Chapter Two, Kelly’s homecoming reception 
was met by RUC force. The security forces claimed they were enforcing the Flags and 
Emblems Act, forbidding the flying of the Irish tricolor, but they also wanted to send a 
message to Kelly. The Northern Irish security force response indicated that Kelly’s 
movement was seen as a significant threat not just to social law and order but also to the 
peace and stability of the state’s political apparatus. For the previous three decades of 
existence, the Northern government had enjoyed not facing any grassroots Republican 
challenges to their power. The RUC’s response indicated the Unionist hegemony felt at 
least nominally threatened in the borderland, and would move over the ensuing months to 
minimize Kelly’s impact. An examination of Kelly’s political party, Fianna Uladh, 
reveals the values that attracted MacBride to the Tyrone-man as well as what alarmed 
Unionist Northern Ireland. 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2: Fianna Uladh party and policy, 1953-1958 
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Fianna Uladh, “the Ulster Republican Movement,” was the most forward-thinking 
and ambitious attempt by Republicans in Northern Ireland to forge a new path since 
Partition. Its failure would leave a deficit in grassroots Republican activism for almost a 
decade, and signal a strong return to Unionist hegemonic control by the close of the 
1950s. As fast as Liam Kelly’s Fianna Uladh rose, it would fall and ultimately vanish 
from the political scene. What were the motives and aspirations of the individuals 
involved in the political party, and what made it truly revolutionary in an era of wider 
political conservatism and adherence to the status quo? 
Liam Kelly first publicly outlined his party policy in his 4 December, 1953 sedition 
trial: the party accepted the legitimacy of the Irish constitution and its claim that Northern 
Ireland comprised part of its national territory, which would be reclaimed politically and 
by force. His party accepted the legitimacy of the Dublin government as a manifestation 
of the Irish Republic, but rejected the authority of Stormont or Westminster. Kelly would 
also call on the Northern Ireland government to “realise that my election by the people of 
Tyrone is but the first indication of a new awakening.”74 However grandiose this 
statement was, Kelly did set in motion a new political moment in the Catholic borderland 
that represented something unique in the history of Northern Ireland.  
 Supporters made a formal declaration at a public convention of 600 attendees held 
in Pomeroy on 6 December, 1954. The event conveyed the groundswell of support 
around Kelly and his policy to “develop an organisation of Republicans in occupied 
Ireland into a disciplined political movement and to use every legitimate means to bring 
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about the re-unification of the territory of the Republic of Ireland.”75 Speaking to the 
Seanad in November 1954, Kelly emphatically pledged his party’s support to the 
Constitution and the Oireachas, particularly if it included representatives for the people of 
Northern Ireland: 
We in Fianna Uladh recognise the Constitution of the Republic of Ireland under 
which this State operates and we are prepared to work within its framework to 
extend its operation to the whole of Ireland. Recognising only the Constitution and 
the sovereignty of the Irish people, we naturally reject the claim of Britain and of 
any of her institutions to exercise sovereignty in any portion of Ireland. We decline 
to prostitute our nationality and our consciences by taking the Oath of Allegiance to 
the British Crown as a condition of parliamentary representation. The people of mid-
Tyrone who honoured me by electing me to be their candidate have unequivocally 
endorsed this and have given me a mandate to take a seat in Oireachtas Éireann and 
nowhere else.76 
 
That mandate was crystallized into a political party with its own organizational structure 
designed to both spread Kelly’s radical brand of Republicanism and establish outposts 
throughout the Catholic borderland or Tyrone, Derry, Armagh and Fermanagh.77 
Fianna Uladh published its constitution in a twelve-part pamphlet around 1954 or 
1955. The constitution declared, foremost, the objective of Fianna Uladh was “to secure 
the re-integration of Ireland as a complete, free, independent Republic, and its cultural 
and spiritual rehabilitation.”78 Initially employing standard Republican language, the 
intent to rehabilitate Ireland culturally perhaps was a nod to Liam Kelly’s Irish language 
passion. The declaration both affirms conventional Republican rhetoric from the post-
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Treaty era as well as delivers a new vision of desired collaboration with the Southern 
state. 
While it self-declared as open to Irish people in “any part of the world,”79 Fianna 
Uladh was foremost for citizens in the partitioned area: understandably, as a grassroots 
Northern party this was their primary target; however, it is interesting that membership 
was not initially extended to people across the borderland in, for example, Monaghan 
where Liam Kelly was known to have numerous contacts. This could have been a bluff, 
meant to keep the Garda at bay and not suspicious of political mobilization, or it could 
have been an admission that Fianna Uladh was focusing on Northern Ireland for its 
political base. Either way, the party was announced with some delicacy to not disrupt 
Clann na Poblachta’s electoral base but to act as a balance to new strands of 
Republicanism occurring South of the border. 
Regardless, membership was based on the recognition and acknowledgement of 
the Bunreacht as well as the Oireachtas, radical breaks from public Sinn Fein policy at 
the time. This was important to Kelly, who felt Sinn Fein’s reference to the second Dáil 
of 1919-1921 was keeping them in the past, stunting political growth at a crucial time. 
Kelly objected to the IRA Army Council maintaining a claim of legitimacy, believing it 
futile: “There’s no point in going through it again [deferring to 1921], old nonsense, that 
across the years turned Irishman against Irishmen, that left under the tide” of the Civil 
War and subsequent IRA arrests and deaths at the hands of the Free State.80 This break 
with long-standing Sinn Fein and IRA ideology would further lead to strain between 
Kelly and his former comrades in 1955. 
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The Fianna Uladh constitution further laid out a developed organizational 
structure (see Figure 3.2). The Supreme Council acted as the governing body, subject to 
the annual Ard Fheis.81 The fourteen-member Executive was created by annual election 
and was designed to meet at least once every three months. Local clubs of five or more 
could then form but were subject to Constituency Committees (each District Committee 
would send two representatives). Local clubs had their own leadership structure,  
 
Figure 3.2: Generated by James Rynne from information contained in Pamphlet “Fianna 
Uladh, Constitution and Rules,” HA/32/1/955A, Public Record Office of Northern 
Ireland, Belfast, Northern Ireland, 2-7. 
 
presumably to maintain a dispersed communal presence parallel to the local councils of 
the Northern Ireland state, with one year terms and monthly events and quarterly general 
meetings. Members were to pay an annual subscriptions and have the chance to attend the 
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Ard Fheis as delegates of their local club. Candidates for parliamentary elections were 
selected from “specially convened” conventions with representatives from each club in 
Northern Ireland, although the Supreme Council reserved the right to refuse all 
nominations. The clear party structure mirrored Sinn Fein and conveyed Fianna Uladh’s 
desire to build clear, sustainable policies. They structure was also highly localized and 
attempted to incorporate input from the various established clubs at the annual Ard Fheis, 
which set party policy for that year. 
As Fianna Uladh looked to expand its appeal from 1954 to 1955, it began 
publishing a periodical Gair Uladh. With its first edition in July 1955, the paper 
circulated in East Tyrone and carried statements clarifying political positions and 
justifying militant actions, such as the Roslea RUC attack that resulted in Connie Green’s 
death. As the Northern Irish government was looking to curtail Fianna Uladh’s influence, 
the paper was banned on 1 January, 1956.82 In addition to Gair Uladh along the 
borderland, two Belfast-centric83 publications - Glór Uladh and Resurgent Ulster - 
promoted mass mobilization and attempted to rally Irish nationalists to the more radical 
cause. They emerged in late 1951 and had print runs through 1957 when Border 
Campaign arrests crippled the movement. The September 1954 edition of Resurgent 
Ulster called people to heed the ‘lesson of Pomeroy,’ namely that any division among 
Republicans cannot be tolerated, especially from an electoral standpoint.84 There “must 
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be no more uneven struggles like Pomeroy,” and the Catholic population needed to equal 
the unified front of Unionism politically, and the RUC’s might with their collective 
support for Republican armed resistance.  
As the attempt to rally resistance in the North occurred, the RUC continued 
gathering intelligence on Kelly, who they labelled a “firebrand,” through his various 
public speeches. At the end of 1954 in Tralee, Kerry and Dublin, Kelly was reported to 
say the “rising generation is no longer prepared to follow the path of compromise and 
self-humiliation,” and, later on, that Irish reunification could only come about one way 
and that way “still lies open [...] the only way – armed force.”85 Kelly was maintaining 
the threat of force while also fully exploring the peaceful, political route of governance. 
The establishment of Fianna Uladh was initially reactionary, but quickly rooted in 
stable political underpinning and a desire for longevity. The structural basis was similar 
to Sinn Fein and Clann na Problachta at the time; policy and strategy was dependent on 
an annual Ard Fheis and would, ideally, link policy extending across the Irish border to 
Southern Republican parties. The ultimate prize would be expanding the voter base that 
elected Kelly in 1953 and subsequently gain more seats in elections for the Dáil, 
Stormont and even Westminster. To that end, Kelly would find his party at a loss, and 
again turn to a familiar tactic: violence. 
 
3.3: Soar Uladh and Fianna Uladh: border and political campaigns 
The increasing move towards militancy by Kelly and his followers occurred from 
1955 to 1956 on the eve of the Border Campaign and included training, weapons 
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procurement and ultimately attacks. The RUC believed that Saor Uladh had over 100 
adherents in Northern Ireland when it was officially outlawed on 29 November, 1955.86 
The RUC had tracked for years the existence of a training facility in townland around 
Tydavnet, County Monaghan, and had intelligence about weapons training with a former 
IRA man across the border in Donegal.87 Only a few days before the security forces 
outlawed the organization, the raid on Roslea RUC barracks occurred. This attack led to 
Connie Green’s death, the first casualty of the wider Border Campaign. Kelly had been 
present in the Seanad before and after leading the attack in Fermanagh, maintaining the 
dual political-militant strategy.88 Within a few months of banning Saor Uladh, the 
Northern Ireland government also banned Fianna Uladh in an effort to muzzle Kelly. The 
RUC Commandos were bolstered by the end of the year, transformed from a responsive 
riot squad into well-armed (Bren guns, mortars and grenades) paramilitary style unit; by 
the spring of 1956, there were 200 B-Specials  ready to be mobilized at any sign of a 
threat.89 Once the political organization was classified as a threat to the state, Kelly 
seems to have fully committed his efforts to the armed struggle.90 In a confidential report 
                                                        
86 Typescript of RUC report “LIAM KELLY AND SAOR ULADH,” 4. This number of volunteers from 
Tyrone, Fermanagh, Londonderry/Derry and Belfast did not include unknown volunteers and 
supporters from the Republic of Ireland. 
87 Typescript of RUC report “LIAM KELLY AND SAOR ULADH,” 4. The IRA weapons trainer (“a 
notorious IRA gunman”) was identified as Frank Morris of Convey, Donegal signaling an RUC 
informant at work around 1955 (RUC report, 3). Morris was quoted in Chapter One of this thesis in a 
conversation with Michael Ryan about late Border Campaign disillusionment. 
88 Flynn notes that there was widespread speculation that MacBride assisted with a ‘hush up’ effort 
around Green’s death and burial; Gardai reportedly took a coroner to the farmhouse where Green 
was in order to write a death certificate and quietly bury Green in Monaghan. From Flynn, Soldiers of 
Folly, 212. 
89 Flynn, Soldiers of Folly, 213. 
90 Flynn details some Belfast violence. On 2 July, 1955, a bomb exploded in the grounds of Stormont 
prematurely. Brendan O’Boyle, driving a car to the parliament’s telephone exchange, had just split 
with the IRA and formed Laochra Uladh, a similar break-away to Kelly, but although “O’Boyle’s death 
was the end of his organization [...] the drift towards violence had begun.” From Flynn, Soldiers of 
Folly, 211. 
 145 
made in 1958 for the government of John A. Costello, Saor Uladh is understood to have 
rebuked an offer by the IRA for re-intergration in to the organization. The report claims 
that sometime in early 1956, the IRA made attempts to “absorb” Saor Uladh but did not 
on account of Kelly’s desire to continue planning missions independently from the 
headquarters command in Dublin.91 
The Northern security forces had suspected Kelly’s paramilitary motives for 
years. The RUC believed that the acceptance of Southern institutions was a calculation to 
secure the goodwill of the authorities, and to provide further cover for illegal activities. 
These accusations aside, it is doubtful Kelly would have broken with IRA and Sinn Fein 
dogma in an attempt to deceive the Dublin authorities; he just as easily could have stayed 
the proscribed course from IRA GHQ and awaited the start of the Border Campaign. In 
the December 1955 issue of Gair Uladh, Kelly wrote that Saor Uladh operated solely in 
Northern Ireland and did not maintain bases or conduct missions in the Republic, 
specifically Monaghan.92 This is known to be patently false, and Kelly – at this point – 
was laying significant groundwork for an escalation in Soar Uladh attacks on border 
targets. Kelly was aware that there was a growing desire, particularly among young 
volunteers to act: “There was strong pressure on the leadership from young volunteers 
wanting the opportunity to act and if they weren’t given it would go elsewhere.” Despite 
a shortage of arms, ammunition and other resources, the armed struggle would lurch 
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ahead in 1956; Kelly would later remark, “we did our best and that was all there was to 
it.”93  
Training of Saor Uladh militants continued in Tyrone and Monaghan, as well as 
in Tipperary and Cork with disillusioned former IRA members, many of whom were 
followers of expelled Dublin IRA man Joe Christle.94 After an attack on an aged 
Ballygawley man, a former B Special, by Saor Uladh, Northern Ireland Minister of Home 
Affairs Terence O’Neill condemned the group and said “I would in this context appeal to 
the loyal people of this Province in so far as they can not to yield to provocation, however 
hard and difficult it may be…” before chastising the government in the South for its lack 
of action against the IRA.95 In July, the RUC engaged the militant group – with Liam 
Kelly and his brother Eamon reportedly leading - in a firefight as they attempted to set 
explosives off at the border. The RUC claim Kelly escaped over to the Republic’s side 
and, even though he was detained by the Gardaí, escaped the incident without any formal 
charges.96 Only temporarily deterred, Saor Uladh launched bombing attacks on six 
unguarded customs huts in Fermanagh, Tyrone and Armagh on 11 November, 1956 in 
what the RUC acknowledged was “probably the best planned and co-ordinated of all the 
Saor Uladh operations.”97 Another post in Derry was destroyed 9 December as an 
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afterword to the string of unsanctioned attacks; this final set of missions pushed an 
increasingly restless IRA to act one week later. The attacks were repudiated in the IRA’s 
The United Irishman, but according to a later government report in the Republic of 
Ireland:  
it [the Saor Uladh attacks] was undoubtedly the fuse that set off the big I.R.A. 
campaign which started in the Six Counties on the night of 11th-12th December, 
1956, because the position had developed that most of the I.R.A. in Dublin were 
either moving over to the “splinter” group or withdrawing from the parent 
organization and standing aloof.”98  
 
The IRA was forced to act because Kelly had pushed them to act. Subsequently, it 
appears that a mending of the relationship would bring some of Kelly’s operations back 
in line with IRA headquarters. Based on the frequency of attacks during this period, Kelly 
had clearly pivoted from politics to armed resistance. Once the IRA entered the equation 
in November, the focus would be on the security force response – North and South - and 
its effect on the paramilitaries and its public perception. Driven by Kelly’s action, the 
Border Campaign had begun.  
 
3.3.1: Decade ending decline: the Border Campaign flounders 
Sean Cronin and the IRA leadership built their 1950s campaign from tactics used 
in the 1919-1921 War of Independence. There is clear evidence of influence from 
Guerrilla Days in Ireland (published in 1949) by famed Cork IRA leader Tom Barry. A 
masterful tactician, Barry and the IRA of his era demoralized the forces of the crown 
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through sabotage, attacks and assassinations.99 The use of flying columns to launch 
attacks on the security forces of Northern Ireland in the hope of destabilizing was short-
sighted at best. If it had succeeded, Sinn Fein in the mid-1950s lacked the political 
apparatus to suggest any alternate path for Nationalist areas in the would-be “liberated 
zones.” If Barry provided the template, sensitive to the realities of 1920s Ireland – 
particularly in Nationalist-heavy West Cork - and not those of 1950s Northern Ireland, 
the IRA made few adaptations to tactics already being employed by Kelly’s Saor Uladh 
or other Northern-based commanders and volunteers. The Dublin-centric leadership 
stayed resolute that the plan could succeed if executed properly, although it appeared 
Sean Cronin knew the IRA could not face down British forces; he hoped that the 
campaign’s core of “short, sharp exchanges with the British Army” would allow the IRA 
to have the advantage in choosing the time and location.100  
 After the initial shock start to the campaign, the RUC and B-Specials  rapidly 
responded and restored a sense of order along the borderland. Condemnation came from 
Northern Ireland politicians, including the Prime Minister Basil Brooke. The greatest 
single hindrance to the military execution of Operation Harvest was that there was no 
corresponding political mobilization in Northern Ireland after the initial flurry of activity. 
Furthermore, the nature of the ‘raids’ in to the North from across the border made day-to-
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day life harder for locals and alienated even the most sympathetic of residents. The IRA 
failed to execute a key element of the campaign, ‘liberating’ nationalist areas along the 
border, and actually isolated local Catholic peoples over the course of the Border 
Campaign. 
Despite sporadic ‘successes’ from December of 1956 until December 1957, it was 
clear that within that first year the RUC and Gardaí had regained the upper hand. Barry 
Flynn’s Soldiers of Folly tells how early on “the names and locations of the prime movers 
in the IRA’s campaign were well known to the local Gardaí on the border,” which 
included safe houses and training facilities, meaning nearly no operational autonomy.101 
The RUC also went about arresting leading Nationalists and members of Sinn Fein in the 
initial weeks, and incapacitated the already sputtering Belfast IRA. Internment, in jails 
north and south, would be the largest detraction from the campaign. With Fianna Fail 
back in power after the 1957 election, de Valera brought back internment – by citing the 
Offense Against the State Act of 1939 - as “IRA activity had been fairly constant in the 
North in the spring and early summer, though the only major incident had been when the 
Kelly-Christle group had blown up the lock gates of the Newry ship canal in May, 
causing considerable damage.”102 
The IRA leadership was crippled when dozens of members were arrested by the 
Southern authorities in June 1957, including members of the Army Council.103 In the 
North, there were additional Special Powers signed to allow for “arrest without warrant, 
detention and internment without trial,” spearheaded by Lord Brookeborough and 
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maintained through Terrence O’Neill’s ascent to prime ministership.104 Limping in to 
two winter campaigns, 1958-1959 and 1959-1960, it was clear the fight was lost. Mick 
Ryan records that amidst an effort to reorganize in the fall of 1959 he admitted to himself 
what many volunteers already knew: “the campaign had been over in all but name as far 
back as February or March 1957.”105 While only one volunteer’s opinion, the re-
introduction of internment by mid-1957 dramatically reduced the organization that had 
already been dealing with deficits in supplies and morale.  
In an effort the Northern authorities believed was meant to breathe new life into 
the faltering campaign, Kelly made a fund-raising trip to the United States in October 
1957. He toured, lectured and raised funds (believed to be a few thousand pounds) for 
five months before returning with the means to purchase weapons and a modern radio 
communication network, according to RUC records.106 This effort would result in few 
discernible gains. Kelly returned to a situation in 1958 where physical force militants 
were reeling from internment. Still, 1957 concluded thirteen months of a campaign with a 
total of 366 incidents resulting in the deaths of three RUC men and seven Republicans. 
Beyond the Brookeborough attacks, the most notable event left four IRA men and a 
sympathizer dead when a bomb prematurely exploded in the November 1957 Edentubber 
disaster.107 Another winter would curtail attacks, and arrests continued through early 
1958. With the IRA’s failure to achieve its stated aims of liberation zones along the 
border, were the political developments equally doomed at the end of the 1950s? 
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3.3.2: Election momentum lost as the decade ends 
As the physical force aims were faltering, the political gains were also beginning 
to decline. Politically, Fianna Uladh could never fully capitalize on the shock victory of 
its founder, Liam Kelly, in the 1953 Mid-Tyrone election. They would cultivate the 
movement and unearth candidates from the borderland, but few possessed the charisma 
of Kelly. Kelly’s “lieutenants possessed much less ability to carry on” than their dynamic 
chairman, according to RUC records.108 Did this lead to a decline in momentum in the 
initial years of Fianna Uladh? Possibly so, but also the shift back towards the armed 
struggle surely was more impactful on re-orienting attention and resources. In the mid-
1950s, it was still unclear how a dual political-military guerrilla campaign could persist in 
the highly-pressurized police state of Northern Ireland.  
Fianna Uladh also had to contend with the two established political parties in the 
Catholic Community: the Nationalist Party and Sinn Fein. Many would still regard Sinn 
Fein as the flag-bearers of Republicanism, and Kelly had to tread carefully not to upset 
the prevailing order when lections were called in 1954. Sinn Féin was still an electoral 
political force – albeit a diminishing one - in Northern Ireland between 1954 and 1959, 
negotiating a clear path with Nationalists in numerous constituencies. For Northern 
Catholics, election results in 1949 and 1953 were overall deeply disappointing, and cast 
the constitutional route as hopeless while showing the strength of Unionist mobilization. 
Violent republicans, Alvin Jackson believes, would seize the opportunity to elect Kelly in 
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1953 and then two Republicans to Westminster in 1955.”109 And while the Border 
Campaign was almost entirely conceived as a military venture with no actual plans in 
place for the governance of liberated borderland areas, an attack would cast a long 
shadow on the 1957 Irish general election. 
The 1957 election was the first electoral contest on either side of the border since 
the Border Campaign had begun in December 1956. The collapse of the second inter-
party coalition was brought about by Clann na Poblachta’s motion of no confidence in 
early 1957; the party withdrew support for Costello’s government over the continuing 
bleak economic picture and the government’s movements to curtail the IRA.110 In the 
decade since its founding, the excitement around Clann na Poblachta had dissipated. In 
the election, their vote share dropped to 22,000 and they won only one seat; Seán 
MacBride would lose his first of three successive efforts to regain his Dublin South-West 
seat.111 The party would disband in 1965, as the 1961 general election was a watershed 
for major parties: Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour returned 92% of the Dáil seats.112 
The main context for 1957, and a rise in public support for Republicanism, was 
the death of two IRA volunteers: Sean South and Fergal O'Hanlon. The funeral of South 
occurred on 4 January, 1957 at time of massive public support for the IRA and by 
extension Sinn Fein; yet the general election on 5 March returned Fianna Fail with a large 
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majority, placing them in government until 1973.113 For some Southerners, this would be 
the only moment the IRA and Sinn Fein would gain notoriety; for one noted historian, 
this electoral context would be the only mention of the IRA or Sinn Féin in the 1950s: 
“Sinn Féin returned four TDs in the 1957 general election, but this was a temporary 
upsurge, not repeated.” 114 Indeed, Sinn Fein attempted to repeat the performance but 
would never again come close to the vote share gained in March 1957. In the North, Sinn 
Fein over-played the 1955 results and it is unlikely Sinn Féin had for a moment a 
northern mandate; many of the votes cast in 1955-1957 showed themselves to be a 
rejection of Unionism’s ineffectiveness, not an endorsement of the Republican 
movement. 
One year after the electoral gains and high tide of public support, the militant 
Republicans were losing the battle over the border. The Sinn Féin electoral bubble had 
burst by March 1958 as little was occurring outside of the Fermanagh and Monaghan 
borderland. One IRA Border Campaign historian notes: “the IRA was coming to the 
spring and summer months without having made any progress during the second year of 
the campaign.”115 The Sinn Fein electoral success was not repeated thereafter. When 
Lord Brookeborough called an election in the spring of 1958 the border was the key 
electoral issue on people’s minds, even more so than the economy. For this election Sinn 
Féin and Fianna Uladh were both officially banned so they fielded no candidates and 
conducted no canvassing; locked out from the political process, their message was muted 
and allowed a Unionist triumph. In the press, Sinn Féin had asked for a ‘shadow election’ 
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to spoil the Unionist vote, and even with four Labour candidates winning in Belfast, Sinn 
Féin gained an abysmal 2,700 votes.116 The Catholic electorate had spoken by refraining 
from acting: the wind was out of the sails. As the Border Campaign came into sharper 
focus as a total military failure from 1958 to 1959, the short-term political humiliation 
compounded the failure. Internment would cripple the IRA efforts North and South and 
crush any momentum built up in the years 1955-1957.117 
Even if the IRA executed a brilliantly destabilizing military campaign against the 
security forces in Northern Ireland, a political apparatus was needed to maintain 
momentum within the wider nationalist community. Farrell theorizes that this was 
“possibly the most unpolitical phase of its [the IRA’s] history” and suspicion of leftist 
views and parliamentary politics left supporters no “channel [for their] energies into the 
mass resistance which is complementary to all guerrilla campaigns.”118 Nationalists in 
the 1950s were still in a sizable minority in the state. Despite having Catholic majorities 
in the crucial borderlands of Fermanagh, east Tyrone, and south Armagh, Northern 
Ireland was an entrenched Unionist political entity. Perhaps most striking is the fact that 
despite the IRA’s efforts to demolish the border between the Republic and “occupied” 
Northern Ireland, the campaign actually hardened it for the first time in its existence. 
Unionists rallied around the idea of “securing the border,” and no cohesive Republican 
counter-movement materialized. Arguably, where Liam Kelly could most have been an 
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asset to the IRA, he was shunned and ostracized by the Dublin-based leadership due to 
envy and provincialism. 
 
3.4 Fallout and emigration 
Reflecting on the end of the Border Campaign, a long-time associate of Liam 
Kelly is clear about his impact on the IRA effort: “The campaign is said to have lasted 
from 1957 to 1962, but the truth was that it actually ended the day Saor Uladh attacked an 
armed RUC vehicle near Clogher [...] with two people were seriously injured, at the end 
of 1960.”119 This incident was one of the final discernible public moments for Liam 
Kelly in Northern Ireland. Not long after, Kelly made the decision to emigrate.  
By the time he would emigrate to New York in 1961, Liam Kelly had ridden an 
electoral tide into offices in both states and – nearly as speedily – lost both political 
platforms. Northern Ireland had criminalized Kelly in a number of ways: he was interned 
a number of times, his political party was outlawed and his publications were made 
illegal. While Kelly’s life story is unique in a multitude of ways, in emigrating from 
Ireland he did as thousands of his coutnrymen were choosing to do. Most historians view 
the large-sclae exodus from the island of Ireland in the 1950s as the result of two 
phenomena: one, an engrained cycle of leaving within Irish society and, two, particularly 
the domestic economic environment with a clear lack of sustained growth.120 Kelly 
would certainly point to the limited economic opportunities available to him and his 
                                                        
119 Ó Baoighill, “Liam Ó Ceallaigh,” 24.  
120 Enda Delaney, “The Vanishing Irish? The Exodus from Ireland in the 1950s,” in Dermot Keogh, 
O’Shea, Finbarr, Quinlan, Carmel (eds) The Lost Decade: Ireland in the 1950s (Douglas Village, Cork: 
Mercier, 2004), 84. 
 156 
young family by the end of the 1950s. One could also surmise that Kelly felt isolated by 
the Republican movement and frustrated with the unwillingness of the movement to 
evolve. In New York he would have found a more dynamic world, although one very 
foreign to his native Pomeroy. 
Having made a fund-raising trip to the United States in 1957-1958, Liam Kelly 
would have gotten a taste of life abroad and living away from the political and social 
confinement of Northern Ireland. Kelly himself also indicated that, as his family grew, 
stable work remained elusive. “I did not have a job nor any chance of getting one. The 
small business I had, I was losing money in it.”121 Kelly had worked in the early 1950s, 
before his election, as a shop manager for the Tempo Cooperative Society, as well as 
teaching Irish classes.122 While it is not clear what failed business Kelly ran in the late 
1950s, he certainly found himself in a dire financial situation at the end of 1960: “When I 
sold all my possessions, my lorry and everything else, and then when I had settled all the 
bills I was left with £193.”123 
When Kelly and his family chose to move to New York in 1961, they were not 
alone: from 1958-1961, over one-third of the Irish admitted to the US went to New York 
City; and for those who moved to major cities, half chose America’s largest 
metropolis.124 Kelly would settle in the Bronx, near St. Anthony’s parish that would 
presumably form part of his parish-communal experience for the next twenty years. He 
worked for the New York Transit Authority, as a bus driver, and he also pursued a 
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university degree in English years later.125 Kelly took to life in New York and seemed 
reinvigorated in his new life and the new opportunities for success he encountered while 
living in the United States. 
It is possible that Kelly believed he could regain a public persona and aid the 
Republican cause from abroad better than he could in rural Mid-Ulster. It must be noted 
that Irish-American advocacy for the ending of partition never historically paid 
significant dividends, and successive visits by Irish politicians to America yielded 
nothing: Frank Aiken (1941), Eamonn de Valera (1948), Sean MacBride (1951) met 
rousing crowds and state department officials, but the policies of Harry S. Truman, 
Dwight D. Eisenhower and even John F. Kennedy never deviated from the US-UK 
special relationship.126 When Kelly landed in New York, President Kennedy would have 
considered the UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan one of his closest allies, and the 
issue of partition to be an Irish-British concern only. Still, while in New York. Kelly 
would remain active in Republican clubs. As Northern Ireland of the 1960s became more 
volatile, Kelly championed Cathal Goulding in 1969 and – amidst the Official-
Provisional split – maintained an allegiance to the Official IRA into the late 1970s.127 
While Kelly never again lived permanently in the state of Northern Ireland, he certainly 
aided in fund-raising for the IRA at least two decades after emigrating. 
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Was Liam Kelly’s decision to emigrate an admission that the Irish Republican 
cause was a lost one by 1960? Had all his efforts to reorganize the IRA, create a 
grassroots movement in Tyrone and affect political policy change been for nothing? 
While flawed, the Republican movement was not doomed to fail, at least in maintaining 
political momentum. Had Kelly been able to build more of a Southern political base, even 
in north Monaghan or Cavan, he could have continued to grow his grassroots Republican 
efforts on a local level with influence from Dublin. He had MacBride as a backer, but in 
being drawn back to physical force tactics would alienate the Dublin establishment and 
the governments of Costello and de Valera. While a military victory was always a fantasy 
for the Republican movement, they could have in fact better leveraged popular 
mobilization along the borderland to gain traction, politically if not fully militarily. The 
rise of borderland Republicanism only a decade later, as noted by Peter Leary in 
Unapproved Routes, occurs “when a sustained military and political challenge, 
specifically to British state power, did emerge from the late 1960s onwards, [drawing] 
significant support from border areas.”128 A set of key factors, political, social and 
militant, certainly could have shifted the standard narrative for 1950s Irish Republicans.  
Still, the IRA had no clear policy other than physical force and “no serious 
political organisation to mobilize their supporters and channel their energies into the mass 
resistance which is complementary to all guerrilla campaigns, and which might have 
steeled the Nationalist population to continue active support despite RUC and B Special 
harassment,” according to Flynn.129 At the end, the campaign was more of an annoyance 
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to the Unionist government of Northern Ireland than any campaign of liberation. As this 
become clearer to Liam Kelly, it is understandable he’d look for a fresh start. 
 
 
3.5 Conclusions, continuity and change 
Irish Republicanism in Tyrone, of course, persisted after Kelly’s departure. He 
was one of many 20th century Republican figures who had their political aspirations 
dashed and faded, subsequently, from the scene. In the decade he emigrated, though, a 
new brand of Irish Republicanism would rise to meet the state – and Loyalist 
paramilitaries – in a violent struggle unparalleled in scope, strategy and trauma: the 
Troubles (1968-1998). One of the most famous IRA units during the 1980s operated in 
Liam Kelly’s former heartland. The East Tyrone Brigade was spearheaded by James 
Lynagh and Patrick McKearney and successfully carried out a number of attacks on the 
security forces in the 1980s. The mode of their attack drew comparisons to a main 1950s 
Saor Uladh/IRA tactic: surprising an RUC barracks with an explosion before opening fire 
on it hoping to kill and maim those inside while extracting weapons and possibly 
intelligence. East Tyrone IRA men were aided by Monaghan volunteers in what former 
RUC Special Branch officer William Matchett calls cross-border collaborative units.130 
Did the IRA decentralizing in to cell structured attacks in the 1980s harken back 
operationally to the Border Campaign? While that tactical parallel is obvious, the 
situation on the ground was markedly different as the Northern Ireland security forces 
employed deadly force. In the failed April 1987 attack in Loughgall, Armagh, a nephew 
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of Liam Kelly was killed. The 32-year-old Patrick Kelly was one of the eight IRA men 
killed that day (in addition to one civilian shot dead by the SAS) the single greatest loss 
of life by a republican paramilitary unit during the Troubles. The ramifications were 
significant, as the former Special Branch detective attests to:  
They [the East Tyrone IRA] stood the entire brigade down after Loughgall. It 
totally wrecked them. The witch-hunt for a mole destroyed them mentally. They’d 
lost all confidence. Nobody was in a rush to join or at least nobody with any 
sense. After Loughgall they were never the same.131 
 
From Loughgall the security forces could begin reversing a slide in the rural borderline 
that had been going on since the 1970s, particularly in South Armagh. Matchett again 
provides insight in to the way the RUC viewed taking down the East Tyrone unit: 
“Success at Loughgall publicly showed where the balance of power lay in the intelligence 
war. It gave Special Branch vital momentum against the IRA that neither they nor their 
political partner [Sinn Fein] could stop.” The RUC had briefly lost momentum in 
December 1956, but would regain it to turn the tide against the IRA raids in the Border 
Campaing. In a deadlier conflict, and at a time, the 1980s, when the Provisional IRA had 
begun to extend no-go areas in the rural borderland such a turn was crucial to the 
Northern security forces. “For a beleaguered police force and a long-suffering public, 
what happened at Loughgall convinced many for the first time that the IRA was beatable. 
Loughgall was the beginning of the end,” and the RUC would again claim victory against 
physical force Republicans. As formidable as the Provisional IRA had been for a time, it 
reached a political reality by the 1980s that the armed struggle was not enough. Even 
reaching a stalemate with the Northern Ireland security forces and British Army did not 
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ensure an end. A new political strategy would be forged but take a decade and a half to 
evolve before it blossomed into the multi-party peace process. 
 When examining the strategy pursued by Sinn Fein in the 1990s in the run-up to 
the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, it is striking that its core principles were aligned 
with policies promoted by Fianna Uladh and Liam Kelly almost four decades earlier. 
Asked in 2009 about the role of reformed Republicans in the peace process, Kelly 
affirmed that “[o]f course, Sinn Fein and the IRA have significantly changed their 
policies today [...] a good thing, [considering that] I was asking them myself, Saor Uladh 
and Fianna Uladh, to change their policies for the past fifty years.”132 Kelly appreciated 
the eventual acceptance of the Oireachtas and the acknowledgement of politicians who 
allowed them a seat at the table.133 If Sinn Fein had leveraged Liam Kelly’s political 
influence in Tyrone, it may have led to a more sustained political impact through the 
1950s. Kelly had transitioned around 1953 from only the use of physical force to the 
politics of force to address grievances; once he made the transition, he could not reverse 
course. Losing his seats at both legislatures North and South spelt the end for Fianna 
Uladh and for Kelly the politician. He would go elsewhere to continue advocating but 
with different methods. By the 1980s he was retired, finished with radical Republican 
politics, and built a home in Magheraroarty, Donegal. “It was my wish from the first day 
that I set foot on the Donegal Gaeltacht land, to have a small house and live there,” Kelly 
would say, adding “who knows if the God of Grace will grant this old fella a few more 
                                                        
132 Ó Baoighill, “Liam Ó Ceallaigh,” 25. 
133 Ó Baoighill, “Liam Ó Ceallaigh,” 25. Specifically Kelly names the SDLP’s Hume and Fianna Fail 
leaders: “The way it is now is that they give recognition to the Oireachtas and to the Constitution and 
praise due to Hume, Haughey and Reynolds who brought them in from the cold.” 
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years to get pleasure and contentment out of it.”134 Liam Kelly would pass away two year 
later, in 2011, at the age of 88; Martin McGuinness would pay tribute to Kelly as a man 
who gave the Irish people “many decades of service,” and in a multitude of ways.135 In 
the end, Kelly’s legacy is one of personal rehabilitation and innovative thinking for an era 
that was constrained by the unavoidable, sometimes uncomfortable, realities of time and 
space and circumstances in the borderland. 
 
  
                                                        
134 Ó Baoighill, “Liam Ó Ceallaigh,”. 25. 
135 Hanley, "Kelly, Liam William Seán," Dictionary of Irish Biography. 
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CONCLUSION  
 The 1950s was not a lost decade in Ireland, but it was indeed a costly decade. The 
IRA Border Campaign cost both states money: £350,000 a year in the Republic and 
£500,000 extra a year in Northern Ireland.1 Damage was estimated at £700,000, and one 
attack alone on Newry canal caused £50,000-worth of repairs.2 Money was put towards 
mending the state’s infrastructure and symbols that had made easy targets for Republican 
attacks: customs huts and courthouses were the physical manifestation of partition. Irish 
Republicans felt their campaign of violence to destroy these symbols, and destabilize the 
state, could force their desired political solution: reunification. Met by a security force 
response, the counter-insurgency measures cost significant amounts of funds, as well as 
the security forces’ time and effort.  
 The IRA’s efforts, the Border Campaign, would also cost the Irish borderland some 
goodwill between the RUC and the Catholic community. More broadly, the state was cost 
some gains in cross-community capital that had been building slowly for decades.3 The 
failures of the Border Campaign would cost some Sinn Féin and IRA figures their status 
within the organizations. Speaking with the British Ambassador to Dublin in 1961, 
                                                        
1 Jonathan Bardon, A History of Ulster (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press, 2001), 608. 
2 Barry Flynn, Soldiers of Folly: The IRA Border Campaign 1956-1962 (Cork: Collins Press, 2009), 147. 
In April 1957, “a bomb attack on the Newry Canal, which caused £50,000-worth of damage, was 
attributed to the Saor Uladh/Christle faction.” 
3 Sam Logan, The Life of Sir Basil Brooke, Bart., The First Viscount Brookeborough (Kibworth, 
Leicestershire: The Book Guild Ltd., 2018), 186. In a 1959 meeting of the Young Unionists, a motion 
was brought up to open (gradually) the Unionist Party to Catholics who showed they wanted to 
preserve the Union with Great Britain. Given the campaign, such a suggestion seemed ill-timed. 
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Taoiseach Sean Lemass explained the campaign had lost all momentum, as its early 
leaders knew their efforts were “futile.”4 When the IRA ceasefire brought the campaign 
to a halt a few months later, the resounding loss cost the Republican movement prestige, 
and rightfully so. Cathal Goulding would give the oration at the 1963 Wolfe Tone 
commemoration at Bodenstown, and while many of the rituals and routines were 
unchanged, his speech spoke of a new path: he affirmed the Republican objective to re-
integrate the six counties of Northern Ireland but called for new measures to obtain it 
such as reaching out to the Protestant community as allies instead of foes.5 
 A political moment was lost as some initial gains by Republicans in the South – 
from the traditional flag-bearer Sinn Féin to Clann na Poblachta and Liam Kelly’s Fianna 
Uladh – were squandered by the end of the decade. In the Republic, Lemass led Fianna 
Fáil in a new economic and international direction, as the party continued to hold office 
until 1973. In Northern Ireland, the Unionist Party remained supremely confident 
electorally as the party leadership transitioned to Terence O’Neill and his vision for a 
newer, but still institutionally flawed, Northern Ireland. Both states stabilized behind 
established parties, and at the cost of minority voices. 
 The futile efforts of Republicans cost an opportunity amidst the backdrop of social 
turmoil. The 1950s were perceived as a “lost decade” due to dire economic 
                                                        
4 Matt Treacy, The IRA 1956-69, Rethinking the Republic (New York: Manchester University Press, 
2011), 12-13. The full quote by Lemass to the British Ambassador, Ian MacLennan, in late 1961 was: 
“[It] had lost much of its strength and most of its earlier leaders who had the intelligence to realise 
that their campaign was futile.” 
5 Ultán Gillen, “Theobald Wolfe Tone and the Common Name of Irishman in 1960s Ireland,” Uncertain 
Futures: Essays about the Irish Past for Roy Foster, ed. Senia Paseta, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016). Oxford Scholarship Online, 2016, 216. Goulding would signal political and social progressions 
in 1960s thought, but grounded it in Tone’s life saying: “Tone’s dictum about uniting Protestant, 
Catholic and Dissenter had been paid only lip service.” 
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circumstances. Life in the 1950s Republic of Ireland was difficult as the economy 
continued to decline and the population dwindled.6 The failure of the traditional 
Republican campaign of violence brought about no change in the attitudes of the two 
traditional nationalist ideologies in Northern Ireland. On the partition issue, the state was 
in 1961 the same as it had been in 1949, at least in the entrenched communal mentalities. 
The only tangible change was a strengthening of border defenses by the RUC and B-
Specials who had the necessity of their preparedness and vigilance reinforced by the 
cross-border attacks and sporadic moments of insurrection from Northern Republicans. 
 Most significantly, the IRA Border Campaign which should impact any effort to 
interpret the decade – and which has formed the core study of this project – cost lives. 
Twelve Republicans and six RUC officers died between 1956 and 1962. The conflict cost 
people bodily harm – 32 members of the security forces were injured – and it cost people 
their freedom: over 200 people were convicted and sentenced to time in prison, while 
countless more were remanded for suspected Republican sympathies.7 One of the men 
who fought, in the Seanad and in the border raids, was the enigmatic Liam Kelly. 
The Northern cultural nationalist, and dedicated Republican, Liam Kelly showed 
for a moment what could happen with grassroots mobilization. He rose to prominence 
and was elected to Stormont in 1953 and appointed to the Seanad in 1954. Kelly’s 
political impact was muted in the Southern state, however, where he failed to make an 
imprint on the immutable, rigid conduct of the Seanad. Yet, viewing his political career 
                                                        
6 Flynn, Soldiers of Folly, 4. Flynn’s introduction describes Ireland as “a clinically depressed place far 
removed from the entity we know today,” citing the staggering population decline. One in five adults 
would emigrate as “the population had fallen to its fallen to its lowest-ever level and the 
establishment of the Irish Republic in 1949 had not brought any tangible prosperity.” 
7 Bardon, A History of Ulster, 607-608. 
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through a contemporary lens can demonstrate the power of inclusive identity politics and 
reconciliatory gestures. Kelly’s presence in both parliaments on the island of Ireland, 
when his Republicanism was thirty years ahead of its time, was significant in itself.  
As Kelly abstained from his seat at Stormont, the government of Northern Ireland 
moved to blunt the effects of his political party by declaring them illegal and banning 
their publications. The security forces continued to make public life difficult for the 
organization, as the culture clash between the RUC and republican gatherings over things 
like tricolors persisted in the mid-1950s. Fianna Uladh frustrated, the militants of Saor 
Uladh sprang into action in 1955, triggering the IRA’s early movement of the Border 
Campaign. By 1957, the campaign was faltering because of failed operations, disasters 
like the Brookeborough raid, and internment north and south. By the time that Saor Uladh 
buried another volunteer, in spring 1958, the RUC file on Liam Kelly was thick and his 
organization compromised. Kelly lost his political office that year and began to doubt the 
cause he had so long championed. Like many of his generation, Kelly ended the decade 
of the 1950s by emigrating to New York, not to return to Ireland until the 1980s. It was a 
meteoric rise, and just as precipitous a fall for Tyrone’s radical Republican, Liam Kelly. 
Kelly would be emblematic of the decade in that successes were obscured by failure, and 
frustrations with the past seemed to limit hopes for the future. Still, as one historian of the 
decade has surmised:  
Underneath the surface apathy and even disillusionment, there was a new restless, 
modernizing spirit, which was eventually to make itself felt in many spheres, 
public and private. Though the bastions of tradition [...] continued to stand 
immobile like stone walls, they were being steadily undermined. So when, inside 
a decade, they collapsed with a suddenness that surprised many people, the credit 
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was rarely given to the submerged radicalism of the generation which had 
tunneled through their rock-hard foundations.8 
 
That radicalism would arise in the 1960s to shake the foundations of both states. While 
their status would seem unchanged by the end of the 1950s, the rumblings along the 
borderland had been made by those tunneling, attempting to find new light. 
Ultimately, the 1950s revealed the nature of the two bordering states on the island 
of Ireland. The Northern state was a realm different from its Southern counterpart in 
numerous ways: the bond with Great Britain, the adherence to strict security measures - 
from cultural demonstrations to dissenting political parties – and even its view of the past 
shaping present perceptions of loyalty and citizenship. The Southern state was still 
coming to terms with its recent proclamation of full independence from Britain, facing 
dismal domestic circumstances, all the while looking hopefully to future progress. While 
some in the Southern state began the decade with hopes of ending partition and 
integrating the Northern state into an all-island collaborative, the status of reunification 
was never promising. The plan had faults from supply constraints to political limitations.  
The borderland remained a state of mind where multiple histories converge, the product 
of conflict, rooted in the colonial and religious struggles that had long forged the modern 
state.9 The status of the borderland, which experienced disruptions from street protests to 
border raids, remained unchanged by decade’s end. The border states remained as 
traditionally they had been: those looking to end partition and those steadfast in 
defending their realm.   
                                                        
8 Brian Fallon, “Reflecting on Ireland in the 1950s,” in The Lost Decade: Ireland in the 1950s, eds. 
Dermot Keogh, Finbarr O’Shea, Carmel Quinlan (Douglas Village, Cork: Mercier, 2004), 47. 
9 Peter Leary, Unapproved Routes. Histories of the Irish border, 1922-1972 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), 24. 
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